Memory and social identity among Syrian Orthodox Christians. by Sato, Noriko
Durham E-Theses




Sato??, Noriko (2001) Memory and social identity among Syrian Orthodox Christians. Doctoral thesis,
Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/1671/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Office, Durham University, University Office, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
Memory and Social Identity among Syrian Orthodox Christians 
Noriko Sato 
The copyright of this thesis rests with 
the author. No quotation from it should 
be published in any form, including 
Electronic and the Internet, without the 
author's prior written consent. All 
information derived from this thesis 
must be acknowledged appropriately. 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Anthropology 
University of Durham 
2001 
0 
US I-iAk 2002 
1, the author, declare that none of the material in this 
thesis has been submitted previously by me or any other 
candidate for a degree in this or any other university. 
This copy has been supplied for the purpose of research 
or private study on the understanding that it is copyright 
material and that no quotation from the thesis may be 
published without proper acknowledgement. 
Memory and Social Identity among Syrian Orthodox Christians 
Doctor of Philosophy 2001 
Noriko Sato 
Abstract 
The massacre of Christians in Turkey and their subsequent expulsion at the end 
of the Ottoman Empire created fear and hatred between the various ethnic groups which 
have lasted to this day. The Syrian Orthodox Christians who were expelled from Turkey 
are unable to construct their own nation state. Religion (Christianity) separates Syrian 
Christians from the nation state of Syria to which they were exiled. 
This thesis examines the relationship between memory and identity of these 
Christians and explores the interrelationship of three aspects: 1. ) how these Christians 
have erased memories of their close relationship with their Muslim neighbours in 
Turkey; 2. ) how they have elaborated orally their recent past to emphasise their unity 
and continuity in faith, though this is contested by other evidence, both literate and oral 
and, 3. ) how they have developed a whole new formal history for themselves based upon 
the supposed transmission of tradition and language of ancient Christians in Syria from 
whom they are claiming descent. 
Their present anxiety is of their community in the region becoming extinct. 
Therefore, they have turned increasingly to manufacturing a past so as to create a safe 
ethnic identity. These Christians have turned toward classical Syriac which had a very 
restricted use in the past, into not just their liturgical language, but to fashion the 
ideological foundations onto which to base their claims as the descendants of the 
original inhabitants of Syria, instead of justifying their 'rootlessness' and being content 
with the concept of a 'hybridic' identity. They attempt to prove that their community has 
had an enduring existence in this locality and to confirm their right to the land, even 
though this is contested by the evidence of their refugee origin. 
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Introduction 
"Between 1914 and 1918 my church lost almost 100,000 faithful through fighting, and nearly the same number were uprooted from 
their homeland. It was a tragedy for a small church that had lived for centuries in that region to be the innocent victim of ignorance, 
fanaticism and inhuman acts. The continuing memories of suffering from wounds that have not healed will keep historians busy 
throughout the third millennium. " (Mor Grcgorios Yohanna lbrahirri, Archbishop of Aleppo, 2001: 8) 
It is well documented that the collapse of the Ottoman system in Turkey resulted 
in massive population movements, massacres, re-appropriations of resources, and the 
creation of fear and hatred between the various ethnic groups which have lasted to this 
day. It was not only the Armenians and the Greeks who were expelled from Turkey; in 
fact, there were many others, including the subjects of my research, the Syrian Orthodox 
Christians (Suiiydn qadirnlorthodoks). As far as religion is concerned, Syrian Orthodox 
Christians compose a section of Oriental Orthodox Christians as do Armenians and 
Greeks. The massacre of Christians in Turkey and their subsequent expulsion at the end 
of the Ottoman Empire hastened and symbolised the fact that the former Islamic political 
millet system, in which people of different religions coexisted, had now ceased to 
function. 
At the time of the First World War, the Young Turks adopted Pan-Islamic 
policies in order to gain the support of the subjects of the Ottoman Empire against the 
Allied forces and started to persecute Christians in the Empire. In the eastern provinces, 
where many Syrian Orthodox Christians lived, the suspicion toward Armenians, who 
might have been sympathetic to Russia who tried to invade into Turkish territory from 
the north-eastem part of the Empire, was linked to Pan-Islamism (Allen, 1974: 224-5). 
The Muslim population concluded that the Christian subjects were infidels and should 
be persecuted. Contemporary Syrian Orthodox Christians refer to the attacks on the 
Christians in 1915 by Turks and their Kurdish agency as a governmental "order" 
(furrndh in Arabic) and year of the "sword" (seyfo in Syriac). These terms emphasise the 
drastic change in the political situation, which meant that the Christian population in 
Turkey was no longer permitted to live with their Muslim neighbours, and so the 
Christians were obliged to emigrate to other parts of the Middle East and to Western 
countries. This resulted in a massive diaspora of the Middle Eastern Christian minorities. 
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Syrian Orthodox Christians were obliged to leave their homeland. This thesis will 
concern these Christians who emigrated from three different areas in Turkey to Syria. 
The whole of the community of the Syrian Orthodox Christians in Urfa emigrated to 
Aleppo in 1924. The Christian refugees from Tur 'Abdin and Azakh in the eastern 
region, settled Qaýtdfflya and al-Miilklya in the Syrian Jazirah. It do not mean that all the 
contemporary Syrian Orthodox Christians in Syria have refugee origins, even though 
majority of them are descendants of refugees from Turkey. Similar to the Armenian and 
Greek Orthodox Christians who had had population in Syria before the 1915 massacre, 
there had been a small number of Syrian Orthodox Christians in the areas of Damascus, 
Horns, Aleppo and the north-eastem Jazirah adjacent to the present Syrian-Turkish 
border, before the massacre. 








I became interested in the Jazirah region, which contained a large Christian 
population, before the Gulf War when I worked for a Japanese archaeological expedition 
in the area of Eski-Mousul, in the Iraqi Jazirah. 'Jazirah' in Arabic means both an island 
and the area between the two rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates. The border between 
Iraq and Syria politically divides the Jazirah into two parts. Although the Iraqi 
authorities did not allow members of our team to have personal contact with local 
people, I became aware as we worked with the local people that they identified 
themselves and classified others in terms referring to which ethnic group they belonged 
- for example, Kurds, Turkmen, Yazidis, Assyrians and Arabs. Even though my 
command of Arabic at that time was insufficient to fully understand the actual 
relationships between the workforce, I became aware that relationship in the workplace 
was a formal one. The various ethnic groups did not interrelate after work. Political 
tension seemed to exist between the various groups. This appeared strange to me, as a 
Japanese coming from a society which was largely homogeneous. Therefore, I wished 
to research the reasons for the tension between the various ethnic groups. 
Although my interest in the Jazirah region had increased, due, in some part, to 
the political turmoil in Iraq, following the Gulf War, I chose the Syrian Jazirah rather 
than the Iraqi Jazirah as a place for my fieldwork. I carried out my research in the early 
1990s in a local Arab Muslim village near Qdmishli, which was the largest town in the 
Syrian Jazirah. I had the opportunity to make friends with Syrian Orthodox Christians in 
Q5mishli, which contained a large number of Syrian, Armenian and Assyrian Christians. 
There were many occasions when I was able to meet and establish friendships with 
Syrian Orthodox Christians. They described the characteristics of other ethnic groups in 
the area in relation to their experiences between the 19 1 Os and the 1930s when they were 
forced to emigrate from their villages in Turkey to Q5mishll. I was unable, at first, to 
understand why they often referred to the events in the past in order to define present 
relationships between the various ethnic groups, To investigate this matter, I started 
research, in 1997, for my Ph. D. on 'memories' of Syrian Orthodox Christians, in 
particular those of the 1915 Christian massacre in Turkey and enforced emigration of the 
Christians to Syria the afterwards. These 'memories', I later became to realise, were 
reconstructions of events rather than what had actually taken place. 
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Among Syrian Orthodox Christians, religion, i. e. Christianity, is an essential 
element for defining their social identity as well as their religious one. Therefore, they 
asked about my religious affiliation in order to give me an identity. I told them that my 
family had a Buddhist origin. Many people whom I met had little knowledge about 
Buddhism and, therefore, questioned me about Buddha. My explanation about 
Buddhism was derived from my understanding of the emic perspectives of the universe 
and my personal experiences of Buddhist religious practices. I took the remarks of 
Klass (1995: 49-55) into my consideration that an assumption taken for granted in a 
given society was not always shared by people in another society. I adopted his way of 
explaining the origin of Buddhism, which reflected an emic perspective of South Asian 
society, but was oriented towards a Western audience, who did not share the same social 
assumptions as people in the South Asia. I told Syrian Orthodox Christians that Buddha 
had promoted a social and religious movement in which he challenged Brahmanical 
Hinduism which taught that one's position in the social-structural ladder reflected the 
result of one's behaviour in a previous life time. Each individual was held to possess 
karma, i. e. the burden of good and ill, which determined into what strata of the social 
ladder you were reborn. Buddha claimed that 'desire' was the root of problems which 
created the social hierarchy and the cycle of rebirth for the individual soul. Therefore, 
each person should strive to relinquish 'desire' and by doing so they became free from a 
cosmically decreed hierarchy of positions. I tried to imply a sin-fflarity between Buddha's 
religious movement and that of Jesus by referring to it as a new religious movement in 
pursuing salvation of one's soul. Syrian Orthodox Christians interpreted my description 
of Buddhism and understood it from their emic perspective; Buddha was a nab! 
(prophet). Their assumptions prevented them from comprehending the universe about 
which Buddha speculated. 
Syrian Orthodox Christians, however, reached to the conclusion that I believed in 
God and Buddhism has no direct link to Christianity, Islam and Judaism. This 
understanding made it possible for me to maintain a different position from both that of 
Western and local researchers. My position was religiously neutral. In Syria, as a 
religious identity is directly related to one's affiliation to a particular social and ethnic 
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group, it means that I have also maintained a politically neutral position. This is related 
to the following fact. Syrian Orthodox Christians have been built up an image of 
Japanese through their access to its material culture, such as automobiles, audio 
equipment and electric power stations constructed with Japanese financial aid. Syrian 
Orthodox Christians flatted me by saying that 'Japanese has an electric brain (mokh 
electron)'. This implies that they have constructed the image of Japanese through its 
material products and have little experience of contact with Japanese, whereas their 
views on the French, British and Americans, have been generated by their direct and 
indirect relationships with the Westerners since the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Their view of the Japanese was friendly but superficial. Syrian Orthodox Christians did 
not have a preconception about Japanese which made it easy for me to be accepted by 
their communities. 
I attended, frequently, Syrian Orthodox Church services and their community's 
educational and social activities organised by its Centre for Religious Education. I was 
impressed by its Sunday Mass in which religious performance and active participation of 
the Christians emphasised commur&ation with the divine power. I learrit the symbolic 
meaning of each part of the services and found that the liturgy, which Syrian Orthodox 
Christians believe has been maintained for over thousand years, was used as a means for 
proving the continuity of their community. Jarman argues, in his study of Irish 
communities, that bodily movements in ritual can be formalised and are readily repeated 
over the years, while the meanings generated in the ritual are often more elusive and 
diverse (1999: 173). In the case of Syrian Orthodox Christians, the rituals are a means 
for re-enacting the past and drawing history into the present and, therefore, changes 
would deprive them of the means of confirming the historical continuity of their 
community. One is able to observe their social dynamics, in which the Christians are 
required to establish their local identity as a community, which has been existed since 
ancient times in Syria, in order to secure their position in Syrian society. 
The one of the reasons for establishing a 'homeland' in Syria is that the Syrian 
Orthodox Christians, unlike the Jews, Armenians and Greeks, do not have an accepted 
home territory, and so are unable to construct their own nation state. For the Jews, 
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Armenians and Greeks, their homeland is very much defined by a sense of religious 
belonging and a distinct geographical space. Religion (Christianity), by contrast, 
separates Syrian Christians from the new nation state of Syria to which they were exiled. 
Therefore, Syrian Christians have been required to adopt strategies for affiliating with 
and differentiating themselves from the wider Muslim community in Syria. First, they 
have to explain how their group has forged their unity despite of the difficulties of 
adjusting to their new situation. Second, they attempt to construct an identity that places 
them as the original inhabitants of Syria, despite the fact that these Christians were 
originally refugees (outsiders). 
The area I am dealing with has been a kaleidoscope of different groups and 
changing identities across time. There were various religious groups (Churches) in what 
is present-day Syria: Armenian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, Maronite, Syrian Orthodox 
and Nestorian. In the 18th century they were exposed to missionary proselytising from 
Rome and many gradually became the dominant intellectuals and traders of the area 
(Hourani, 1970: 55-7). In the 19'h century Protestant activities from the US and Britain 
grew. Syrian nationalism was partly developed by Christians. The people I am dealing 
with originated in three parts of present-day Turkey (Tur'Abdin, Azakh and Urfa) and 
they had a Patriarchate in Tur'Abdin. Western visitors called them Assyrians, and this is 
indeed what migrants from the area to the US in the late 19 1h century called themselves. 
They did not call themselves Syrian Orthodox Christians. The terms Assyria/ians had 
been introduced by the British as a political-geographic concept. Theologically it has 
been claimed that they are Jacobites, but as this is a disparaging term (doctrinal 
memories seem to last long in the Middle East), they are not fond of using it to describe 
themselves. Ordinary people do not even know the meaning. 
It is difficult to discover when this group started using the term Syrian Orthodox 
to describe themselves and thus locate themselves in Syria, but it was certainly after 
their forced migration to Syria. Yet, the term in English translated from the Arabic 
collapses two meanings, although it would be one that would please them by locating 
them so unambiguously within Syria. An inhabitant of Syria is called a Sad (pl. SilrRin). 
Whilst they together with all other groups (including Muslims) are Silridn (inhabitants 
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of Syria), they also call themselves, and are called Suriydn (i. e. members of a religious 
community) but which stretches beyond the borders of Syria. The two terms are distinct, 
but whilst Sild ISUrRin is unambiguously a citizenship term, the term Suyiygn is flexible 
and even a slippery one. It is used by Muslims to mean just the 'Syrian' Orthodox 
Christians, but is also used by Christians to denote a distinct ethnic and religious group 
(of Christians also including the Nestorians) who may not be Sildiln. Although there is a 
slippage between the two terms, there is a difference between them which translation 
into English cannot capture. The term SilrRin (citizens of Syria) is an incorporative 
term. In the hands of others, the term Suziydn (Syrian Christian) can be a distinguishing 
term and even a separating one. I shall try to show this ambiguity between being in and 
out, which constitutes one of the most fundamental anxieties and ambiguities of 'my' 
group. 
Since Halbwach's Pioneering work on memory (Halbwachs, 1992), 
anthropologists have long shown understanding and awareness of the importance of 
memory, as is reconstructed by the present population to promote their group's identity. 
The role of amnesia in the construction of group identities has been less well researched. 
It is usually the State which controls what people remember or conveniently forgot 
through their educational system (e. g. Anderson, 1983). My study is involved with a 
very distinctive example of the relationship between memory and identity. One of the 
aims is to examine how Syrian Orthodox Christians remember only the time when they 
lost their homeland, while they appear to have forgotten their life in the past before their 
expulsion/departure from Turkey. Those who are from Urfa erased even the memory of 
why their ancestors were obliged to leave their hometown. The memory which is 
retained and related refers to theirjoumey from Urfa to Aleppo, their place of 'exile'. In 
the case of the Christians who emigrated to the Jazirah region, they retain memories of 
the 1915 massacre and describe how they cooperated with one another and fought the 
Turkish and Kurdish forces, who tried to deprive them of their rights and how the hostile 
relationships with their neighbouring population emerged. 
However, forgetting or conveniently forgetting the past and breaking off past 
association has not been found to be always the case with the ex-Ottoman Christians. 
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According to the study by Pattie of Armenian emigrants in Cyprus, they have kept a 
closer relationship with their Turkish neighbours, than the Greek majority in society and 
speak Turkish, even though many of them were expelled from Turkey (1990: 148-9). 
By contrast, Syrian Orthodox Christians tried to create boundaries between themselves 
and both Turks and Kurds who used to be and now are their neighbours in Syria and 
have striven to integrate themselves into Syrian society which is predominantly Arab. 
Autobiographical accounts by Armenians describe their life in Turkey before the 
persecution and massacre as their idealised past (e. g. Bedoukian, 1978; Kherdian, 1988; 
Ohanian, 1990). These survivors who had similar or worse experiences than Syrian 
Christians now identify their Turkish past and its folk traditions as a symbol of their 
Armenian identity and try to keep these popular memories alive with the sentiment of 
nostalgia. Many of those who published such accounts are immigrants in the West and, 
due to the course of assimilation and intermarriage which threaten their Armenian 
identity, their past lives in Turkey becomes a representation of their Armenianness 
(Gans, 1996: 148-9). Syrian Christian immigrants in Europe look for remnants of their 
former villages in Turkey and recognise their fellow Christians who still live in the 
eastern Turkey as symbols of their own identity (Hollerweger, 1999). However, they 
never mention details of their past lives in Turkey. It is not because these emigrants are 
only interested in finding their origins, but also there are other reasons which prevent 
them from talking about their past. It is worth to pay attention to the way that Syrian 
Christians in Syria have attempted to 'forget' their folk songs, languages, traditional 
costume and marriage customs which they practised in Turkey. 
Despite the fact that there is some documentary and historical evidence of the 
Turkish past of these Christians, these accounts play no part in the construction of group 
memories. By contrast, most of the cases encountered by anthropologists and oral 
historians show that popular memories are kept alive, but the written record is silent. In 
other cases, folk traditions, which they assume to be handed down from their parents, in 
fact have a literal origin (Alexiou, 1974). Syrian Orthodox Christians have erased 
memories and folk traditions due to the fact that these memories reveal a past in which 
they shared these social and cultural traditions with their Muslim neighbours. 
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Memories of their life after settling in Syria focus on the distinctive features of 
the threatened communities who cooperated in a struggle for power and rights and for 
affiliation into Syrian society. However, political alliance turned to be a risky choice for 
them to take in order to integrate themselves into society. Three examples are shown 
here: 
First, Syrian Orthodox Christians were affected by Syrianism which 
acknowledged rights of small groups and which developed an ideology of a 
nation that was a synthesis of Arabs and other indigenous inhabitants of Syria as 
an alternative ideology to Arab nationalism in the 1930s. Due to the party's set- 
back in 1955, Syrian nationalist supporters in Syrian Orthodox Christian 
communities were arrested. 
Second, many men in the Jazirah region worked for the French as soldiers during 
the Mandate period. This threatened their existence. Resistance to French 
military presence and Syrians' request for independence intensified in 1944 
(Mardam. Bay, 1994: 128-30). At the time of the French army leaving Syria in 
1946, Syrian Christians were afraid that they might be identified as French 
collaborators and be attacked by the rest of the population. The same happened to 
the Harkis in Algeria when the French left. In fact some villagers were attacked 
and lost their land and property. 
Third, massive State repression stimulated the politicisation of the population. 
This produced an adverse reaction from the government at the beginning of the 
1980s. Political alignments with oppositional forces brought serious damage to 
the Syrian Orthodox Christian communities. Many Christians believe that the 
arrests by the government of Syrian Christian intellectuals in 1980 was a 
retaliation on the dissidents, which was symbolised by the massacre of a large 
population in Hama in 1982. This incident enhanced their anxiety about living in 
Syria. Due to the Government's continued repression of Christians, emigration 
has continued and this decrease in the Christian population has become a serious 
problem for their communities. 
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A lesson for outsiders in the Middle East, and one that the Syrian Orthodox 
Christians know only too well, is that political alignments can change with amazing 
rapidity leaving the small and the powerless particularly vulnerable. Religious identity 
and political alignment are therefore weak or risky strategies in the construction of 
ethnic identity or as strategies for incorporation into the wider society. 
Memories of earlier disasters of political alignments enhance their anxiety when 
they face a critical situation. A good example of this is that of the Syrian Orthodox 
Christians who fled from the area of Azakh, Turkey, to the Syrian side at the time of 
religious intolerance and later settled in the town of Qdmishl! in the Jazirah region. In 
the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991, they feared that the Christians may be attacked 
by local Kurds, who had supported Iraqi Kurds. Kurdish anti-government uprisings in 
Iraq did not win support from the Western coalition, and the Iraqi president Saddarn 
repressed the insurgence (Dannreuther 1991/2: 60-1). The Christians' anxiety consisted 
of two interrelated facets: 1) The Kurds regarded them as having a particular political 
alignment with the Western forces; and 2) the exalted anti-Western feeling among the 
Kurds might have encouraged them to attack the Christians. Memories of political 
alignments in past, which had resulted in creating vulnerable situation for them, as well 
as memories of their struggle with Kurds, enhance the anxiety of these Christians about 
their current political position. Several Kurdish attacks on Christians were reported by 
Syrian Orthodox Christian men. The Christian women were afraid of Kurdish attack and 
stored foods in their basements, which might become a shelter if they were attacked by 
Kurds. 
The Christians' reactions to the situation suggests that their memories of the 
religious intolerance in 1915 has a great influence on their understanding of the 
contemporary political issues and their relationship with Kurds. The women who told 
me about their storage of foods were the descendants of the survivors of the 1915 siege 
of Azakh by Turks and Kurds. The memories of the besieged Christians in Azakh, who 
stored food and arms in the basement of their houses and used them as their shelters, are 
the matters of reference when the women prepared for Kurdish attack at the aftermath of 
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the Gulf War. These experiences also contribute to reconstructing memories of the 1915 
incident. The fear created by both their memories and present situation is increased. 
Their anxiety increasingly turns to a manufactured past to create a safe ethnic 
identity. Syrian Orthodox Christians have turned to classical Syriac, which had a very 
restricted currency in the past, into not just their liturgical language, but also as the 
ideological foundations onto which they base their claims as the descendants of the 
original inhabitants of Syria. Syrian Orthodox Christians believe that Syriac-Aramaic, as 
a written language as well as a spoken language, like Arabic today, used to be one of the 
most important unifying cultural features of people in the Fertile Crescent. Ancient 
Syria had extensive communities which were linked by the use of Syriac-Aramaic. 
Syrian Orthodox Christians seek Syria's origin in pre-Islamic Syria. Syriac-Aramaic, 
i. e. the language of Syrian Christians, which has been maintained until the present day, 
is used as an argument to prove Syria's cultural origin. By using the ancient language of 
Syria, Syrian Orthodox Christians can claim membership of the present community of 
Syria. In post modemist discussions, ethnic identities cannot be based on solely cultural 
'roots', because diaspora communities have, over time, become 'hybridic' due to outside 
and host state influences and its nationalistic ideals (e. g. Hall 1992: 256-8). Instead of 
justifying their 'rootlessness', Syrian Christians wish for roots and a pre post-modem 
identity. 
The following three chapters analyse the relationships between memory and 
group identities by referring to the cases of three Syrian Orthodox Christian 
communities in Syria. Despite the fact that the Christians in these communities had 
similar experiences at the time of the religious intolerance in 1915 and afterwards, 
memories of experiences at the time of their expulsion, which members of each Syrian 
Orthodox Christian community share, are selected for their contribution to constructing 
the Christians' own and their community's identities. The memories of persecution and 
expulsion are reproduced within the framework provided by oral accounts of their recent 
past. These memories reveal their groups to be small and vulnerable. Such group 
identities have led to promoting movements for manufacturing their past and for 
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supporting their contention that they are the descendants of the 'original' inhabitants of 
the area where they now live in Syria. 
Chapters of 4 and 5 deal with their 'memories' of transformation of marriage and 
its ceremonies and discuss how they have 'forgotten' their old marriage customs in an 
attempt to establish identities in urban Syrian society. The changes of marriage customs 
reflect the problems inside their communities and reveal the fact that the Christians 
themselves create problems which make their social position weak. 
Chapter 6 compares musical practices in three different Syrian Orthodox church 
choirs. Singing Syriac hymns is the only means for the laity, who have a limited 
knowledge of classical Syriac, to confirm their identity as the heirs of the ancient 
traditions of Syria. The rural communities in the Jazirah region are traditionalists and 
stress the 'original' form of their music as a proof of the endurance of their communities 
in Syria. By contrast, the choir in urban Aleppo is more innovative in their musical 
expression, which they share with Christians from other denominations. Their musical 
performance conveys an idea of unity of Middle Eastern Christians. As they are anxious 
about their existence as a small group in the big city of Aleppo, this ideology attracts 
them to a unity which may contribute to strengthening their social position. 
Chapter 7 examines how Syrian Orthodox Christians construct their own version 
of Syrian national identity. As a government fostered identity emphasises the unity of 
Syrian Arabs who share Arab Islamic traditions and language in the territory of 
historical Greater Syria, Syrian Christians, who are ethnically not Arabs and are also not 
Muslims, feel that their rights in Syria are not acknowledged. Syrian Christians seek the 
source of Syrian identity in pre Islamic Syria. Syriac-Aramaic language traditions are 
crucial for maintaining that descendants of the original inhabitants of Syria share the 
ancient Syriac-Aramaic traditions of Syria. The Christians express their sense of national 
identity in common with the other groups which compose the Syrian nation state. 
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Chapter I 
Attempts at Establishing an Ethnic Identity: 
The Case of Qabtdnlya Christians 
Introduction 
The Syrian Orthodox Christians, after the Ottoman religious intolerance in 1915, 
emigrated from the mountainous area of Tur 'Abdin in southeastern Turkey to the 
Qabt5n! ya area of Syria Jazirah, which is located in the foothills of 'Abdin mountain. 
The incidents which occurred in 1915 are regarded by the Christians as one of the most 
crucial events which obliged them to leave their villages. The events are recounted 
through both written accounts and narratives. Since over eighty years have already 
passed, only a small number of people who had experienced attack by the Ottoman army 
and its Kurdish agencies are still alive. Many people in the community of Qabtdnlya are 
aware of accounts of the survivors and their family members who had heard of the 
experiences of their parents and relatives, and also have read books on the 1915 
massacre and the modem history of Turkey and Syria. The received stories of the 
massacre are remarkable enough to be retained and reproduced as collective memory of 
the community. 
As Halbwachs has noted, collective memory is transformed in response to 
society's changing needs (1992: 75). The collective memory of the events in 1915 does 
not limit itself to the stories told by the survivors and recorded in books, but are 
reproduced in the form which is common among contemporaries. However, this does 
not explain why Syrian Orthodox Christians choose to 'forget' their past before the 1915 
massacre. There are historical accounts written by Western travellers which report on 
the situation of these Christians at the eve of the massacre. Both oral and written 
accounts produced by Syrian Christians do not mention any incidents which were 
reported by foreigners, even though their intellectuals are able to access these written 
sources. In fact, the written accounts play no role in constructing the memories of 
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Syrian Orthodox Christians. They try to conceal their memories of the eve of the 1915 
massacre when the West attempted to make use of the Christians in order to interfere in 
the regional affairs of the eastern provinces, where Christians lived. The Christians do 
not want to take the risk of being regarded as supporters of the Western powers. 
Christians understand that. the. for. eign interference in Syria raised anti-Western feelings 
and encouraged Syrian/Arab nationalism among Syrians. In order to secure their 
position in Syrian society, Christians become silent. 
Memories of the 1915 massacre reconstructed by contemporary Christians can be 
distinguished from the written accounts of the events. The accounts came from various 
sources: Those written by these Christians, prior to the mid 1980s; records of the 
survivors collected by academics and diplomatic reports of eyewitnesses of the 1915 
massacre. These describe the Christians as helpless victims. These accounts present 
ideas of how the Christians were separated from the Muslims by the Ottoman policy. 
By contrast, the narratives, which I collected, display their group as a united 
Christian entity. At the end of 1990s, narratives of the event shift their focus to the story 
of how these Christians barricaded themselves in a church which was being besieged by 
Muslims at the time of the 1915 massacre. The physical boundary, signified by the 
Christian church building, became a symbol of their reaction to political oppression. 
They describe the conflict as a 'war' between different ethnic groups. There is a message 
that the Qalýitdfflya Christians attempt to convey through their reconstructed memories of 
the massacre. They portray themselves not as a group to be identified by their religion, 
but as an ethnic group united in faith. They do not maintain that it is religion 
(Christianity) which separated them from others in the population, i. e. the Muslims, 
because it might isolate them from Syrian society. Rather, they emphasise that Turkish 
policy and Kurdish ambition persecuted 'us' in the guise of religion. In their narratives 
they present ideas of how their social identity has been created by personifying the 
experiences at the time of the massacre (cf Sant Cassia, 1991: 2-3). 
As many Syrian Orthodox Christians immigrated to the area of Qabt5n! ya and 
have lived there for eighty years, their memories of their lives in the recent past in this 
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area have become enriched through time. Although the accounts take the form of talking 
about personal experiences, individuals tend to interpret their experiences by referring to 
regional, social and political situations. In this way, they have developed their own 
manner for recounting their personal as well as their community's experiences. As 
Fentress and Wikham have noted, local incidents are remembered because of their 
power to legitimate the present (1992: 88). Memories of experiences in the past, which 
Syrian Orthodox Christians in this area share, are selected for their contribution to 
constructing their own and their community's identities. When memories are 
articulated, what the Christians can share with their community members is not the 
personal experiences, but the framework within which the personal memories are 
reconstructed as part of their community's history. 
As stated earlier, to identify themselves as a community unified in faith could 
isolate them from the wider society of Syria. Therefore, they choose an alternative 
strategy. They attempt to identify themselves as a group threatened by both political and 
tribal forces. They maintain that why they have been threatened is not because of their 
faith separating them from others, but there are social and political reasons. Their 
reconstructed memory of their lives in the Qabtdniya area convey this message and 
emphasises that their history is that of their fighting against Kurdish tribes who tried to 
confiscate their land and oppression by state politics. 
Their social anxiety has been increased due to their population decrease caused 
by their emigration, Kurdish expansion in the region and the potential threat of state 
persecution to their ethno-nationalist movement, as the regime massacred dissidents 
under the guise of religious persecution in the early 1980s. They are afraid that their 
group is labelled by religion, which may give political authorities opportunities to 
oppress Christians. In order to establish a secure position in this situation, they present 
themselves as an ethnic group, whose origin is Syria, even though many of them have 
emigrant origin. They attempt to manufacture a linkage between themselves and former 
Christian inhabitants in this region in order to prove the endurance of the community in 
this locality, even though they retain little memory before the 1915 massacre. 
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Written Accounts on the 1915 Massacre 
Although the Qabt5n! ya Christians do not mention that their ancestors had 
benefited from the Ottoman political reform, Christians were allowed to renovate 
churches, which had not been permitted earlier. Parry, who travelled to Tur 'Abdin in 
1892, reports that many churches in Tur 'Abdin were "built or restored during the last 
thirty years, which have seen no more of this kind than several hundred years previous" 
(Parry, 1895: 189). Bell who surveyed and photographed the churches and monasteries 
in Tur'Abdin in 1909 and 1911 reports the structure of the Monastery of M5r Malke, 
where some of the Christians stayed in 1915 in order to defend themselves from Turkish 
and Kurdish attack. She says, "its appearance is that of a little fortress. -The remarkable 
thing is that much of the monastery had recently been repaired or rebuilt" (Bell, 1982: 
38-9). 
The political and social background on the eve of the 1915 massacre has to be 
mentioned. After the Ottomans were defeated in the war against Russia in 1878, 
Westerners, in particular the British, were keen to control Russian intrigues in eastern 
Anatolia, where the Syrian Orthodox Christians lived. The British counsels or vice- 
counsels serving in the major cities of the eastern provinces justified their interference as 
support for the Ottoman government's reforms for increasing central control and 
guaranteeing the security of local Christian inhabitants. Such a movement seemed to 
have resulted in the increasing tolerance of Christians in eastern provinces. 
However, as Joseph has mentioned, such a movement and the increasing 
tolerance of the local Christians had created resentment by Muslim neighbours (1983: 
87). Fortress-like church buildings, Western interference into regional affairs and 
exaltation of the Pan-Islamic sentiment contributed to fermenting anti-Christian 
sentiment among the Muslim population. However, as the govemment was unable to 
control the eastern region, Kurdish Agahs had increased power as agencies of the 
government. When the government tried to integrate the Empire by propagating Pan- 
Islamism and started to oppress the Christians, Kurds were therefore the main political 
force for persecuting Christians in the eastern region. Contemporary Qalýt5niya 
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Christians keep silent about the incidents at the eve of the 1915 massacre in order to 
conceal their tactical alignment with Western powers. However, they recognise that the 
change in the Ottoman policy immediately made their situation vulnerable. They may 
have learnt that a political alignment is risky (their alignment with anti-government 
movements of workers and professionals resulted in bitter experiences of government 
persecution in the 1980s) and, therefore, may conceal the memories of it. The small 
group of Christians were unable to control the political situation, when political changes 
were rapid and unpredictable. 
To investigate the distinctiveness of oral accounts by Qabl5n! ya Christians, they 
need to be compared with written accounts of the 1915 massacre. Three different types 
of the written accounts need to be examined: 1. ) Accounts written by Syrian Orthodox 
Christians who are survivors of the massacre; 2. ) the survivors' accounts collected by 
academics; and 3. ) documents of Western diplomats. As Dubisch has noted, different 
meanings are assigned to events by different categories of people. Therefore, culture 
itself is never static or determinate, but necessarily always in process (1995: 158-60). 
Each category of authors assigns meanings to the massacre according to the authors' 
culture, roles and political purposes. However, these written accounts have certain 
characteristics in common. They all seem to emphasise that the Christians became 
helpless victims of religious persecution. 
The historical accounts which were written by Syrian Orthodox intellectuals who 
were survivors of the massacre are examined first. They described the violence and 
cruelty of the Kurds and the Turkish army towards their community (Gorgis, 1987: 111). 
Among these accounts, Al-Qas5rd fi Bakn5t al-Nsdrd (the major Christian catastrophe) 
and Genhe de Sujy5yE de Tur 'Abd-M_(an atrocious event for Syrian Christians in Tur 
'Abd-in) are the most popular books among the Syrian Christians in the Jazirah region 
and those in Qabt5nlya. Many educated Christians seem to have read these books, as 
they recount the history of the massacre in Tur 'Abdin and the Syrian Jazirah region. 
For example, al-Qasdr5 fi Bakn5t al-Ns5rd reports the massacre of Syrian Orthodox 
Christian villagers who lived at the foot of Tur 'Abdin, which is now incorporated into 
Syria, i. e. the area of Qabt5n! ya. The Ottoman government organised regiments under 
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the command of the three Kurdish leaders, in order to attack the Christians. The order 
was sent to other Kurdish Agahs (i. e. tribal leaders). Then, the Agahs started to kill the 
Syrian Orthodox Christians in the villages which were under their control. For instance, 
the Agha, Mabm5d'Abb5s, with the help of fifty soldiers killed his Christian villagers in 
DUger. In other four villages, Syrian Christians were also attacked and many of them 
were killed by Kurdish Agahs and their followers (, krm5la: 465-6)1. Al-Oas5r5 rl 
Bakn5t al-Ns5rd repeatedly maintains that the evil order given by the Ottoman army 
sanctioned the Kurds to attack the Christians. In his description the author focuses on 
Kurdish brutality when they killed their Christian neighbours under the name of 
religious persecution. 
The author of Genhe de SuK y5yZ de Tur 'Abdin was an eyewitness of the 
massacre and a priest in Qabl5n! ya. He has a similar view as krm5la and further 
analyses why the Kurds committed such atrocities. 
Many ask the reasons for the massacre. I say, Muslims. As long as 
they are in the world, they kill, plunder and take captive Christians, 
whenever they have the opportunity. Especially these two peoples, 
Turks and Kurds, who are famous for their harshness and oppression 
with or without reason. ... In every century there are such catastrophes 
committed by them (Henno, 1987: 1). 
Henno states clearly that the Syrian Orthodox Christians have repeatedly 
suffered from terrible religious persecutions. He maintains that the evil attributes of the 
Kurds and Turks generated hostile relationships between them and become a marker for 
distinguishing Kurds and Turks from Christians. Here, moral values are used as ethnic 
markers. It is uncertain whether his idea was shared by these Christians at the time of his 
writing the book, in the mid 1980s, or if he initiated it into the community. In the 
present political state, Turks are no longer their neighbours, even though the Christians 
still feel resentment of both Turks and Kurds. At the end of 1990s in Qaht5diya, the 
Christians have a view similar to that of Henno and maintain that due to evil Kurdish 
characteristics, they used the opportunity of religious persecution to attack Christians. 
However, the contemporary Christians regard the massacre as a social conflict between 
themselves and Kurds rather than a religious persecution. 
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A Christians' view toward Kurds is expressed in the following proverb, in which 
the Christians differentiate Kurds from local Arabs. It says that "we eat with Kurds and 
stay at the place of (literally, sleep with) local Arab (naakul ma'a Kuad wa inirn ma'a 
Shawdya). " The Christians maintain that Kurds treat Christians fairly well, but they are 
two-faced. "If we stayed in their place, they may betray us and stab us in our backs. 
Local Arabs (Shawjya) are not civilised, as they do not know how to cook for their 
guests. However, they are simple but trustworthy. " This proverb is validated by the 
accounts of evil intent of Kurds, who attacked the Christians at the time of the massacre, 
even though they were neighbours. Such Kurdish characteristics are regarded by the 
Christians as a cause of disturbing relationships between neighbouring groups and are 
not related to their faith. By contrast, local Arabs are Muslims, but they do not have evil 
characteristics. A book about the Christian history in the Jazirah, written by a Syrian 
Orthodox Christian, even mentions political support by local Arab tribes, such as the Tai 
tribal confederation, who helped the Christians to settle safely in the Jazirah after the 
1915 massacre (Malge, 1995: 38). 
The survivors' experiences at the time of the massacre in 1915, which academics 
collected and recorded, provide these Christians with the view of how they were helpless 
victims of the Ottoman policy (e. g. Yonan, 1989: 280-284). The government of Young 
Turks tried to obliterate the Christians in Turkey. Records of memories of Syrian 
Christian survivors (Yonan, 1996: 22) as well as a study of Armenian memories of the 
1915 massacre by Miller and Miller (1993: 40-1) suggest that Young Turks plotted to 
diminish the possibility of Christian resistance as: 1. ) Many young Christians 
conscripted to the Ottoman ariny were treated badly, and many died due to hunger and 
exhaustion; 2. ) Early in 1915 the government confiscated arms possessed by Christians; 
and 3. ) The local leaders of the Christian population were imprisoned, tortured or were 
killed. As possibilities for Christian resistance had reduced, then the Turkish army, 
which collaborated with Kurdish agencies, started to attack the Christians. The miserable 
situation of Syrian Christians is recorded by Jestrow (1994: 75-9) who interviewed a 
survivor from Mlabs6 near Diyarbakr in Turkey, whose village was suffounded by 
Muslim villages. ' Many Christians lost family members, and the survivors, who fled to 
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Diyarbakr, suffered from hunger and starvation. These authors seem to stress the 
injustice of the massacre, 3 and the government plot of Christian termination. By 
contrast, contemporary Qabtdniya Christians show little concern for how the government 
planned systematic persecution of Christians. They stress that military operations by 
Turks and Kurds provoked a reaction by the Christians who fought back. 
Report of the 1915 massacre which were those written by British and American 
diplomats at the time of the First World War, convinced Western readers, such as 
Western politicians and humanitarian activists, that the Ottoman government had 
devised a cunning plot to eliminate the helpless Christians. These diplomatic sources 
tend to view the Christian massacre as Armenian genocide, who at the time constituted 
the majority of the Christian population in eastern Turkey. These reports suggest that 
most Armenian Christians, such as those in Zeitoun and Urfa, had been loyal to the 
government. However, they decided to hold against the government because of its 
'cunning procedures', when they realised that the elimination of their communities by 
the government was the fate in store for them (Toynbee, 1916: 71; Saraflan, 1994: 24-5, 
31). Contemporary Qabt5n1ya Christians do not think their ancestors, who barricaded 
themselves in churches, were prepared themselves for an approaching death-struggle. 
Christians, who were to be attacked or eliminated, united together and fought against 
their enemies. Despite of their difficulties, the Christians kept their independence and an 
equal position to that of Turks and Kurds. 
Many Christians in Qabt5n1ya have read written accounts of the 1915 massacre 
and books about Syrian Christian history. However, the written accounts have little 
influence on the reconstruction of their memories of the massacre. It is no wonder that 
the aims of diplomatic documents and academic writings which record survivors' fears 
and exhaustion are different from that of oral accounts given by the Qabtiinlya 
Christians. Their memories are related to construction of their identity in this locality. It 
is inevitable that their experiences in this locality have affected their views about the 
massacre. 
33 
Memories of the Massacre in 1915 
Since over eighty years have passed, many people who have had direct 
experience of the massacre have either died or emigrated. The survivors to whom I 
spoke had experienced it as children. Others whom I interviewed were those who 
remember the experiences and stories after being told them by their parents, relatives 
and neighbours. A shared framework which constitutes the narratives of the massacre 
among the QabtWiya Christians is that their ancestors barricaded themselves in churches 
and Turks and Kurds laid siege to them. They present their memories in an identical 
structure so as to constitute a part of their community's history. 
The following are brief accounts which I summarised from the narratives of the 
1915 incidents by Qabt5n! ya Christians. The first story of the village of 'Ain Ward 
which is presented here was collected from people who heard of the experiences of their 
parents and relatives at the time of the massacre. 
The Ottoman soldiers marched to the village of 'Ain Ward which was located in 
the east of Midyat. Many Kurdish tribesmen followed them. The villagers braced 
themselves for the attack by the Turks and Kurds. Then the leader, i. e. Gallo 
Shabo, went to Midyat to tell the Syrian Christians there about the situation in 
'Ain Ward. A beacon was the signal which notified the Syrian Orthodox 
Christians of the start of the war between themselves and the Muslims. Many 
Syrian Orthodox Christian villagers whose villages were located in the east and 
northeast of Midyat were afraid of being attacked by the Turks and the Kurds. 
When they received this message, they joined the villagers of 'Ain Ward in order 
to defend themselves. 'Ain Ward lay on the top of a hill and therefore, it seemed 
difficult for the Turks and Kurds to attack the village. 
The Christians barricaded themselves in a village church (it might have been the 
church of St. IjUshibo). A Kurdish Agah and his tribesmen thronged in front of 
the church gate. Gallo Sh5bo tried to dissuade the Agah from attacking them. 
The Agah said, "we will abduct your girls and women". Gallo and the Christians 
were furious with the Agah and killed him. Then the Kurds said, "we will break 
into the church tomorrow at seven o'clock. " 
After the morning prayer, the Kurds broke down the church door which the 
Christians had propped up with wooden poles. But when the Kurds entered the 
courtyard, they could not find the Christians. The Christians under the command 
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of Gallo had hidden in the upstairs rooms surrounding the courtyard and started 
to attack the Kurds. Eighty Kurds were killed there. 
There were 150 families living in the village at that time. In all, including people 
ftom other villages, 2,000 people had been in 'Ain Ward for two months during 
the siege. No one can tell how they fed such a large number of people. Although 
the Turks and Kurds had besieged the village for two months, the Christians did 
not surrender '. The government tried to negotiate with the Christians in order to 
end this war. The Christians requested the government officials to appoint 
Sheikh Fataballah to the mission. This Kurdish Sheikh of al-Muballamiya, 
which was located to northeast of Midyat, was believed to be a descendant of a 
Syrian Orthodox bishop who had been converted to Islam. The Christians 
thought that this sheikh might be trustworthy. The sheikh negotiated with the 
government officials and they promised to withdraw their army and to leave the 
village. 
The second story is of the Monastery of M5r Malke where Christians retreated 
from their villages and gathered there when the beacon in Midyat notified the Christians 
of the start of the war between Christians and Kurdish and Turkish forces. The 
monastery stood alone in the south of Midyat. The Turkish army and Kurdish tribes 
besieged it for a year. The following is the narrative of Ellia, who was a survivor and 
was ten years old at the time of the siege. 
Due to the shortage of food and water for two hundred Christians, in the limited 
space of the monastery many people became sick. Even though some of them 
slipped away from the monastery at night and stole food and water from villages 
nearby, many people in the monastery died. My mother also became sick during 
the siege and died. Despite such critical conditions, the monastery did not fall to 
the Muslims. Sheikh Fataballah mediated between the Christians and the Turkish 
officials, and then, a peace settlement was arranged. 
As over eighty years have passed since the siege, the memories of the details of 
the sieges may be hazy. However, the ways they described the event are remarkable for 
their clarity. In the written accounts, the Christians in Midyat were afraid of murder and 
arrest and therefore fled to 'Ain Ward (Yonan, 1996: 214). Those in 'Ain Ward who 
held out against Turks and Kurds are described as those whose elimination was the fate 
in store for them. By contrast, the Qabt5n1ya Christians have a propensity for looking at 
the event as the 'war' between the Christians and the Kurds. Kurds are described as 
those who took advantage of the persecution and took the opportunity for eliminating the 
Christians and stealing their land and properties. The Christians in 'Ain Ward even tried 
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to protect the honour of their fellow Christians in the church and killed the Agah, since 
he had tried to ruin sexual honour of the women. The Christians were described socially 
as equal to Kurds. The event is depicted as an ethnic conflict rather than a Christian 
persecution. 
The Syrian Orthodox church is used as a symbol which differentiates 'us' from 
'them'. Although Muslims besieged the church, they could not set foot inside it. The 
church is seen as a sanctuary which only these Christians were allowed to enter. They 
fortified themselves with the thought that divine love is supposed to have saved them 
(Wilson, 1983: 24-9). Divine miracles, i. e. guarding and defending these Christians, are 
not expressed in their narratives as a demonstration of the interrelationship between God 
and themselves. The description given by these Christians suggest a fundamental belief 
in eminent divine justice that protects the Christians from falling to their 'sinful 
enemies'. The Christians use the characteristics of their enemies, which are depicted as 
cevil'. It may be possible for people to interpret that food and water were given by God 
to individuals who were faithful Christians. However, it is not possible to say that the 
Christians who died because of starvation and illness during the siege, like Ellia's 
mother in the Monastery of Mdr Malke, were not faithful enough to be saved. A crucial 
point in their historical account is, therefore, that during this 'war' against the Turks and 
Kurds, these Christians co-operated and strove for a collective salvation, i. e. for their 
community as a whole, rather than individual one. The community was united in faith 
(cf. Meijers, 1984: 149). 
Third Parties as Mediators 
A key figure in their accounts is the Sheikh Fatballah of MOallamlya in Tur 
'Abdin. As a descendant of a Kurdish ex-Syrian Christian and a powerful leader in the 
region, it was important for Syrian Orthodox Christians that he undertook the role of a 
peacemaker. The Syrian Orthodox Christians in Qabtgnlya describe the ancestor of this 
sheikh, who was both a religious and tribal leader in the mid 17 Ih century, as being 
responsible for saving his congregation at the time when they suffered from famine. 
They needed to eat whatever they obtained. Despite this critical situation, the Patriarch 
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would not allow them to eat dairy products and meat, during the fasting period of Lent. 
For the sake of the congregation, the ancestor of the sheikh, i. e. the Syrian Orthodox 
bishop, converted to Islam in order to allow them to break fast. The Qabtdn1ya Syrian 
Orthodox Christians give the bishop a positive commitment to honour his descendants. 
Due to this action undertaken by the ex-bishop, his descendant, the Sheikh Fatballah, 
was regarded symbolically as a person who was able to cross the boundary between the 
Christians and the Muslims and negotiate with both sides. For the Qaýtdnlya Christians, 
existence of the mediator is important in order to claim that they negotiated with the 
government and the Kurds on the equal terms. 
By contrast, historical accounts of conversion of Mulýallamlya Syrian Orthodox 
Christians to Islam, which are written by the Syrian Orthodox Church authorities, do not 
endow Moallamiya ex-Christians with any heroic character. The Church does not admit 
mismanagement by the Patriarch Ismail, which led to the loss of the Mulýallamiya 
congregation. The late Patriarch Ephreirn Barsourn maintains that the Patriarch Ismail 
admonished some Christians, when they broke the fast. This made the situation more 
serious as it became a social problem as the dispute spread. Therefore, the Patriarch 
excommunicated them. Furthermore the late Patriarch tries to deal with the story of the 
conversion being brought about by the famine as a 'legend', which is believed by the 
Syrian Orthodox Christians in Tur 'Abdin (Barsourn, 1963: 353-4). 
The bishop Isbaq Sakka mentions the conversion as happening in the fourteenth 
century (1983: 51). This statement implies that the story of the famine and conversion, 
which the Christians from Tur' Abdin believe occurred in the 17'h century, is not related 
to historical fact. The local Christians challenge such a historical view of the conversion. 
For example, lbr5b! m Hod who lives in Q§mishli, whose town is located next to 
QabtWiya, conducted research on Syrian Christian history of Muballamlya. He suggests 
that the conversion took place at the time of the Patriarch 'Abdallah al-Mard-in-i in 1643. 
For the Christians in Qabtiinlya, the story of the conversion which brought about by the 
famine is a historical fact. This history endows the ancestor of the Sheikh Fatballah with 
honourable character and, therefore, is essential for creating a putative link between 
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themselves and the Sheikh. Due to such linkage, the Christians agreed to accept him as a 
mediator in the peace talk at the time of the massacre. 
However, the role played by the Fatballah's family at the time of the conversion 
is never mentioned in the writings of the Church authorities. Writings by Church 
authorities convey a message in which the power and authority of the Church is 
pronounced. As clergymen try to deny the Qabt5niya Christians' belief in the 
relationship between the famine and the conversion of Muballamlya Christians to Islam, 
and the role of the Fatýallah's family, their accounts have had no influence on the 
reconstruction of the memories by the Qabtddiya Christians. 
The QabtAnlya Christians have created an 'authentic' past for themselves, in 
which written accounts have little influence. The memory of the 1915 massacre 
recounted by the Qa4t5nlya Christians suggests that the Kurds failed to exterminate 
these Christians, due to the unity of their community in faith, which they believe was the 
key for their survival. They fought against oppressive Kurds, and struggled in defending 
their rights. The conflict ended due to the mediation of a powerful third party. Moreover, 
unconditional withdrawal of the Turkish and the Kurdish forces was a sign that their 
power and injustice which had oppressed these Christians had now broken down. 
Memory of the 1915 events contributes to establishing their identity as an ethnic group 
united in faith. 
The History of Qab! idiya 
Through writing about memories of these Christians in Qabl5nlya, I can distance 
myself from the accounts given by the Syrian Orthodox Christians. These accounts show 
how these Christians view the history of their area and, therefore, I cannot treat them as 
objective, i. e. describing factual incidences on which their actual history can be based. 
As I spoke to many people and recorded their historical accounts, I am able to say that 
their memories, which I present here, is not merely narrators' individual accounts, but a 
shared view of the history among these Christians. What I have been attempting to show 
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is their collective ideas and how they present their memories by imposing their own 
understandings of the historical incidents that they experienced. This also has an effect 
on shaping oral accounts on the 1915 massacre, 
The narrators are the "authors" of "the local history" and are also "actors" who 
speak for themselves and imbue their emotions into their accounts. My task is to 
understand and interpret the meanings which emerged from their narratives. However, 
there is a problem here. My understanding may not be identical to the narrators' aim (cf. 
Rosaldo, 1989: 49-50). When I present in this chapter what these Christians say about 
their history, the material is the product of my transcription and translation of their 
narratives in Arabic into English and my attempting to categorise them. What I aim is to 
show that my anthropological writing presents the meanings that the narrators are trying 
to convey in their dialogue. I shall adopt an analytical framework that acknowledges the 
metaphorical interpretation in order to fill the gap between what is said and what is 
meant. This metaphorical approach "proceeds from the literal to the figurative, and in so 
doing creates meaning" (Moore, 1986: 75). Their history is a repository for delving into 
the meaning behind what the Syrian Orthodox Christians mean in their narratives, which 
are affected by their social position and political situation. 
The Qaýt5nlya Christians have a refugee origin and, therefore, need to establish a 
secure position in Syrian society. Their reconstructed memories of the 1915 massacre 
identify them as an ethnic group unified in faith. They emphasise that due to changes of 
the political situation in Turkey, their relationships with their neighbouring population 
had deteriorated and, consequently, ethnic conflicts emerged. They are afraid that their 
group is labelled by religion, which easily gives political authorities and their Kurdish 
neighbours opportunities to oppress Christians. Therefore, they strive to establish not 
religious, but social identity. Their historical narratives of their recent past in Qabt5n! ya 
maintain that Christians had been oppressed by Muslim tribal sheikhs not because of 
differences in religion, but because of the latter's economic and political ambitions. 
They stress that although they were liberated by the third party, e. g. the Alawi 
government of the president Asad, there is a possibility that the small group of 
Christians might be persecuted in the guise of religion. Thus the past is reconstructed 
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from their current political stance and its complex historical details are reduced into a 
basic plot structure (Zerubavel, 1995: 8). Now I shall relate a famous story known by 
these Christians in Qabtdnlya and investigate why they consider it so important for 
claiming their identity. 
After the Turkish defeat in the First World War, they lost their sovereignty over 
Syria. In 1920, the Syrian Congress proclaimed the independence of Syria. However, 
this was rejected by the British and French. At the Council of San Remo, the Mandate 
for Syria was assigned to France. Consequently, the French advanced to the east, i. e. the 
Jazirah region. 
The Syrian Orthodox Christians describe the murder of a French corporal, 
Rogan, which changed French tribal policy and trigged tribal domination over the 
Christians. The story of this incident does not reflect exactly what occurred in 1923 and 
1926. This is a reconstructed version of the historical incidents given by the Christians 
in Qabt5niya. 
Some tribesmen ambushed and waited for the French corporal Rogan in 
Bay5ndir near Qab! 5n! ya on his way back from 'Ain Duwal where the 
French started to construct a new army base. Since his party was small and 
isolated, the tribesmen succeeded in killing Rogan. A sister of Rogan 
visited Qabtdnlya in order to bring his remains back home. She got on a 
plane to look at the place where his brother was killed. Then she had a 
meeting with a Kurdish tribal Agah, called Hajo. 
Sister: "You used to take the Turkish side [against the French]. " 
Hajo: "The Turks attacked my tribe. I do not support Turks. As we moved 
to Qabtdnlya, we are on your side. " 
Sister: , You are like my brother [who dedicated to his life to France]. " 
There are different views among the Syrian Orthodox Christians about who 
murdered Rogan. Some say that local Arab tribesmen killed Rogan and blamed the 
murder on Hajo. Others say that Hajo issued orders to kill Rogan. Whether the Arabs 
framed Hajo, or whether he committed the actual murder, this incident shows that tribal 
leaders resisted French tribal policy. 
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Hajo, who was one of the important Kurdish Agahs in Tur 'Abdin, tried to 
expand his power by collaborating with Turkish officials. Since the 1915 massacre 
Syrian Orthodox Christians in Tur 'Abdin had been hostile to Hajo who had attacked 
Christians. The relationship between Hajo and Turkish authorities deteriorated (Syrian 
Christians are unable to explain why the relations between the two became strained) and 
Hajo told the Syrian Orthodox Christian leader, 'Atte, that he was ready to make peace 
between his tribe and Syrian Orthodox Christians who supported 'Atte. It seemed to be a 
military threat by the Turks which instigated the alliance between Hojo and 'Atte. They 
left Tur 'Abdin with their followers for Mt Sinj5r, which was occupied by Syrian 
Christians and Kurds, and then moved onto Qab! 5n! ya where they tried to establish their 
influence. For Syrian Orthodox Christians the murder of the French Lieutenant 
manifests the French failure to control the tribes. French policy, which relied on their 
own officials to administrate tribal affairs, failed to control the tribal sheikhs in the 
region. The incident at Bay5ndir is an example of how a tribal sheikh, Hajo, was 
successful in manipulating this situation and was able to manifest his influence on 
regional politics. The Christians recount that due to the political turmoil, the French 
were obliged to change their tribal policy. The French introduced a policy of appointing 
powerful tribal leaders, such as Hajo, to administrate this large and remote area. Since 
the 1920s, the Mandate government needed to appoint tribal leaders and thus 
incorporated regional politics into national politics (Frederick, 1975: 151). The 
Christians consider that Hajo showed his power by manipulating regional politics and 
the French had to acknowledge Hajo's leadership. The change of the French policy led 
to tribal domination over the Christians. 
Christians present further evidence of the change of the French policy. They 
maintain that at the beginning of the Mandate in Qabt5niya the French tried to punish the 
Kurdish Agahs, such as Hajo, who attacked local Christians at the time of the 1915 
massacre. The French favoured the Agahs who had helped the Christians escape from 
attacks by Turks and Kurds. For example, the Christians recount that the Kurdish Agah 
ý&Vchan helped Christians escape to the Monastery of Wr Malke at the time of the 
1915 massacre and therefore was entitled to be treated as a Pasha by the French (the 
Syrian Orthodox Christians do not remember the name of the Kurdish tribe of which 
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$5r5khFh was a leader). The Christians suggest that the French tried to favour this tribal 
leader who had not collaborated with Turks at the time of the Christian persecution, but 
failed due to the plot of Hajo who murdered S5rUkh5n. It was a manifestation by Hajo 
of his influence on both tribal politics and regional affairs. 
The change of French tribal policy is symbolised by the meeting of Hajo and the 
sister of the murdered Lieutenant, who was described as a representative of French 
authority. Hajo promised to support the French Mandate and to be responsible for peace 
and order in the region. As a reward, the French gave him administrative power. The 
French offered Hajo the right to own nineteen villages and have a monthly subsidy 
(according to the Syrian Orthodox Christians, it was twenty Turkish gold Liras). 5 As the 
indirect administrative policy became effective, the characteristics of tribal leadership 
were altered. In the tribal structure, a tribal leader was one among equals. However, 
under this new French policy, privileges were given to tribal leaders who served the 
French and the new policy made them dominant figures in the region. The change in 
French policy made it possible for Hajo to expand his personal power based on the 
government support. According to Christians, the Kurds took advantage of the political 
turmoil and confiscated Christian lands. The following case proves their belief. Even in 
1998, twenty Syrian Orthodox Christians whose ownership of land had been 
acknowledged by the French Mandate in 1934, but had been occupied by Hajo asked the 
present government to return their land (2,000 dwinam, approximately 200 hectares). 
This reconstructed history, which is represented by the story of Hajo, is different 
from written accounts given by the French. The comparison between oral and written 
accounts emphasises the message which the Christians try to convey through the story. 
According to the French historical records, we find that the Christians generated the 
story by relating two major incidents which occurred in 1923 and 1926. The French 
Mandate force arrived at the Jazirah region in 1922 and tried to advance to the east. In 
1923 Kurds, who were agents of the Turkish army and resented the French, attacked the 
French at Bay5ndir (B&hedour) (Nfinist6re des Affaires ttranges, Beyrouth Carton no. 
413, n. d.: 8). Although the Christians mention the murdered lieutenant as the French 
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corporal Rogan, he may be identical to the Lieutenant Regard, who was murdered at 
B6hedour (Prezezdziecki, 1936: 5). 
In the official French accounts, Hajo cooperated with Turks in raiding B6hedour 
against the French (Dilleman, 1979: 53). However, it was not Hajo who murdered the 
Lieutenant, but another Kurdish Agah, 'Abbas. He murdered the Lieutenant Regard, as a 
retaliation against the latter's killing of his brother (Prezezdziecki, 1936: 5). The French 
punished the Agah by confiscating some of his village lands (Van Bruinessen, 1992: 99). 
Dilleman explains that in 1926 Hajo betrayed the Turks and killed Turkish 
soldiers and that this obliged him to pledge loyalty to the French Mandate in order to 
secure his position in the Syrian Jazirah (1979: 53). For his personal gain, in 1926 Hajo 
ordered his agent to kill his rival 5drUkh5n by abusing his position as a security guard of 
the Syrian-Turkish border (ibid.: 54). 
These written records suggest how the Christians combined incidents occurred 
between 1923 and 1926 and manufactured a story to explain how the collaboration 
between tribal figures and political authorities created a situation which made the 
Christians vulnerable. According to the written records, the murder of a French 
Lieutenant did not affect French tribal policy. Hajo was described as a figure who 
sought personal gain and put the regional situation into turmoil. In fact the French was 
not successful in controlling the region, but people who were stationed in Qaht5diya and 
wrote reports might have tried to defend their position and not to expose their inability to 
act. Therefore, it may also not be possible to say that the written records reflect historical 
truth. However, it is obvious that the Christians speak for themselves. The comparison 
between oral and written accounts makes it clear what the Christians try to do through 
this story: The reason why they had been threatened is not due to their religion, but due 
to the changes in the government policy and its collaborators. A similar political 
structure is also depicted by them in the narratives of the siege in 1915. Memories of 
different incidents have reconstructed in a similar way to emphasise these points. They 
give political rather than religious or ethnic persecution accounts. 
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Agricultural land is, to this day, the main capital resource of the region. The time 
of the agricultural boom in this region coincided with the period of tribal expansion. 
Confiscation of land by tribal leaders has therefore political and economic importance in 
the history of this region. Syrian Orthodox Christians, whatever villages they lived in 
those days, shared the experiences of being afraid of losing their land to the tribal 
leaders. Some of the Christians were peasants and paid tribute to Hajo. Others, who 
disliked working for Kurds, worked in the territory of the local Arab sheikhs. Since 
many Syrian Orthodox Christian villagers moved into Qalýt5n`iya between the 1970s and 
1980s, they settled down together there. Stories of the domination of tribal leaders were 
represented by that of Hajo's dominance in Qaý! dnlya which became a shared historical 
knowledge among Qalýtdfflya Syrian Orthodox Christians. Once they settled down in a 
single place, i. e. Qabl5n! ya, accounts of the Christian villagers' experiences in the past 
now became told in a similar form. They were reproduced as a simple story. Hajo 
becomes the symbolic figure of a powerful tribal leader. 
Tribal domination ended when the Ba'ath party introduced agricultural land 
reform in 1963 and when President Asad strengthened central government control. The 
Christians mention that the Hajos were unable to retain power, due to the confiscation of 
land by the government. National politics no longer gave the Kurdish Agahs privileges. 
Consequently the importance of tribal sheikhs in regional politics decreased and Kurdish 
control over the Qabi5n! ya population ceased. The Syrian Orthodox Christian peasants 
obtained the right of lease-holding the land confiscated from the tribal leaders. However, 
many of them were still poor. 
In the 1970s, the development of the national oil industry provided job 
opportunities in the National Oil Company in Rumeildn, near Qabt5n1ya. Many 
Christian peasants who got jobs in the company and moved into Qabtdn1ya from where 
the company provided bus services for the commuters. The Qabldnlya population 
gradually increased and economic opportunities developed. The Christians did not miss 
out on such economic opportunities and former peasants started to be engaged in urban 
occupations, such as mechanics and shopkeepers. The more the town of Qabliinlya 
provided job opportunities, the more Syrian Orthodox Christian villagers emigrated to 
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the town. Political and economic liberation was brought to these Christians by the Alawi 
regime. 
Even though the tribes no longer oppress them, the Christians fear that Kurds 
may once again dominate the region. At the end of 1990s, they realised that the Kurdish 
population in the area of QaýtWya has increased and, consequently, many villages were 
occupied by them; whereas the Syrian Orthodox Christian population in villages had 
dramatically decreased due to their emigration to urban areas. 
Moreover, many of the urban population then started to emigrate to Europe, and 
this movement reached its peak after the Hama incident in 1982, At the beginning of the 
1980s, there was a big trend towards opposing the government's economic restrictions. 
The Qabtdniya community contained many workers in the Rumeilfin oil company and a 
few professionals, both of whom were dissatisfied with the economic policy. The 
governi-nent took decisive action. Some of them were arrested. Then, the regime showed 
what happened when the dissidents were retaliated. The regime destroyed the market in 
Hama, which was the centre of anti-goverriment traders, who had collaborated with the 
Muslim Brotherhood, and massacred people in the town. This massacre must have 
terrified the Syrian Orthodox Christians in Qaýtiinlya. What Christians learrit from the 
incidents were: 1. ) That they take a big risk of being persecuted if they are involved in 
political activities; 2. ) that the present regime may use religion again as a tool to justify a 
massacre, similar to that of the Turks who massacred Christians in 1915. Even at the end 
of 1990s, they are still afraid of government retaliation due to the reason that many 
Christian professionals in the Jazirah try to trace their ethnic origin of Syrian Christians 
going back to ancient Assyrians who had controlled the region. This ethnic identity 
implies their having a territorial demand. Many Syrian Christians think it is dangerous, 
because of the regime's harsh characteristics. 
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Restoring the Linkage to their Land 
Syrian Orthodox Christians feel threatened due to a possibility of government 
persecution and expansion of Kurdish population in the area. Christians look for a way 
to establish identity in order to secure their position. They look at the fact that Christian 
villages at the foot of Tur 'Abdin, which are located near to the border between Syria 
and Turkey, have been occupied by Christians long before the border was fixed. 
Christians are, therefore, the original inhabitants of the region and their rights to the land 
should be protected. Syrian Orthodox Christians attempt to re-establish a connection to 
their villages, where many of the villagers have emigrated, and prove the continuity of 
their community. To renew the relationship with village saints is a crucial means for 
maintaining the land associated with their village territory. The importance of such 
patronage ftifther indicates that the Qabt5niya community is unified in faith. Therefore, 
they believe that they need to restore their village churches and their relationship with 
the local saints who might admonish them for neglect. Restoring their relationship to the 
local saints is a means for tracing their Syrian origin, which Christians believe 
contributes to establishing a safer identity in this locality. 
First, I shall examine the case of Gergshamo, where sixty Syrian Orthodox 
Christian families used to live, but now all of them have emigrated. Many village 
houses have already been demolished. Only the family of a former Syrian Christian 
landowner refurbished their house for their visit to the village. There are three Yazidi 
refugee fwnilies who fled from Mt. Sinj5r in Iraq in 1983 and who occupy houses and a 
school for former villagers. The village church is dedicated to St. Quryaqus. The 
former villagers talk about their relationship to this Saint. 
When we lived in the village, we used to sit in the courtyard of our 
church and chat. Often in visions, we saw St. Quryaqus sitting with us. 
A family took their deaf and dumb boy to the church and spent a night 
there. During the night, the family were woken up by someone knocking 
on the church door. They found that the boy opened the door and talked to 
St. Quryaqus. It was a miracle perfon-ned by the Saint. Since we left the 
village, we do not often have a vision of the Saint. This must be the sign 
of his sorrow. He feels we neglect him. 
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They believe that receiving messages from the village's revered saints is an 
attestation of the faith. These saints give Christians favours and provide miracles, such 
as healing diseases and removing physical handicaps. Such favours are the proof of their 
close relationship with their local saints. Former villagers are anxious about losing their 
ties with St. Quryaqus and his favours. The village church was the place which had 
mediated their communication with the Saint. His patronage and favour were given to 
the people who were devoted Christians and attended this local church. The narrative is 
a coded way of saying that nothing cements the relationship between the Saint and the 
former villagers since they gave up their land in the village. When they live outside the 
village and stop attending the church, the church loses its congregation as a collectivity, 
and the Saint no longer protects the villagers and gives special favours (c. f. Christian, 
1972: 66,74-5). The reconstruction of the church is a way of restoring the relationship 
with the Saint, and, at the same time, maintaining their connection with the village. 
The reconstruction of the St. Quryaqus church was completed in September 
1998. The Bishop of the diocese acknowledged this reconstruction and a local priest 
promoted it. The village landowner, as a member of the village congregation, donated 
money for the reconstruction, and the former villagers welcomed this project. The Syrian 
Orthodox Church believes in strengthening the connection between the QabVinlya 
congregation and the village through official participation in restoring the relationship 
with the Saint. The Qaýt5nlya Christians interpret the intention of the Church authority 
to bring people back to the village: "if there is a church in the village, people will visit. " 
They value the renewal of the relationship between themselves and the village, since it 
enhances regional identity to coalesce the QabtWiya Syrian Christians. As this official 
promotion of a reconstruction project is a parish one, it is not only the former villagers, 
but also other local Christians who consider this matter of collective interest. Their 
relationship with the Saint acts as a symbol of their connection with their territory, 
which will prevent from it being violated by Muslims, mostly Kurds, since the 
Christians believe that their relationship with the Saint, associated with the village, 
legitimates their right to the land. 
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Their territorial concern is expressed in the case of St. George's church in the 
village of DrajI. This village used to be occupied by Assyrian (Nestorian, or East 
Syrian) Christians in the 1930s. As the government reallocated them to the Habur basin, 
Yazidis settled in the village. The construction of St. George's church is related as 
follows. 
'Ashu Malge, a Syrian Orthodox Christian from Qdmishl! lived in Lebanon and 
one day he had a dream of St. George, who told him: "Build me a church in 
DrF, jik ! It will be a place where you can stay. " First, 'Ashu did not follow the 
instruction being given to him in the dream. The vision appeared once more and 
then, he decided to visit DrEjlik and look for the place where St. George's church 
used to be. He discovered the foundation stones of the church which was in ruins 
having collapsed after the Assyrian Christians left. He built a church on the same 
site in 1973 and dedicated his life to the Saint. He spent most of his time, until 
his death, in the church. 
Although 'Ashu died in 1991, many Syrian Orthodox Christians in Qalýt5fflya 
still visit this church. People know Dr6jIk has never been a Syrian Orthodox Christian 
village. However, it was a Syrian Orthodox Christian who was chosen by the Saint to 
reconstruct the church there. This makes it possible for the Christians to establish their 
association with the St. George's church. Moreover, Syrian Orthodox Christians share 
their identity with Assyrian or East Syrian Christians, as Syrian Christians in a wider 
sense, since both Christians use Syriac as their liturgical language. The Syrian Orthodox 
Christians maintain that Assyrian Christians use East Syriac, whereas they use West 
Syriac. These languages developed as different dialects of Syriac, but, originally, were 
derived from the same language, i. e. ancient Aramaic, which was the language of 
ancient Aramean tribes. Therefore, the Syrian Orthodox Christians regard both 
themselves and Assyrian Christians as belonging to the same ethnic group and the 
descendants of ancient Arameans. As all the Christians in this parish, except for two 
Armenian families, are Syrian Orthodox Christians, they feel they ought to reclaim their 
Syrian Christian heritage in this area, as well as that of the land. 
They try to associate themselves with this area by referring to archaeological 
evidence that their liturgical language, i. e. Syriac, had been used there. One example is 
the St. Sharna'dn ZaitUni church in the village of Qasrdk. When the first Syrian 
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Orthodox Christians settled here in the 1940s, there was no inhabitant nor was there a 
church in this village. The church was established in 1997 by the decision of the Bishop. 
His decision was made on the basis of archaeological evidence which coincided with the 
popular belief that miracles occurred in the village. According to the villagers, they 
found a stone with Syriac inscriptions in the present graveyard and reported their finding 
to a local priest in 1948. The stone was blessed by him. The villagers also found other 
archaeological materials, such as coins and decorations added to an altar. 
They report several miraculous experiences. The following was told by a deacon 
from the village. 
They say that there used to be a holy man living near the village, but his name is 
unknown. One night I and a son of the priest in Qabt&nIya went up to the top of 
the tell (a hill where a strata of archaeological ruins have been accumulated for 
over thousand years) near to the village. We heard voices and recognised them 
as that of St. Sharna'5n Zait5ni and St. Shim5ne were talking to each other 
(details of the conversation were not given by the narrator). After this incident, I 
bought ten duwjnam (approximately I hectare) of land in this tell, believing that 
this was the place where St. Shama'Gn Zaidini dwelled. Other Syrian Christian 
villagers also maintain that many years before this incident happened, a Muslim 
villager, a slave tribesman of the local Arab sheikh, Dahfirn al-H5di, who had 
administrative power to control villages surrounding Qasr-uk, saw a light and a 
holy man who was standing on the tell. This man told his experience to Daharn. 
Dah5m thought that the tell must have had a sluine and so, removed his garage 
which was built on the tell. These historical evidences indicate that the village 
was the place where a Syrian Christian saint used to live, and where there was a 
church dedicated to him. 
Memories of miracles and findings of archaeological church objects are 
combined and make it possible for them to say that Syrian Orthodox Christians are not 
outsiders, but have a linkage to the area going back hundreds of years. This view is 
supported by an official announcement of the deciphering of the classical Syriac 
inscription on the stone which was found in the village. The Syrian Orthodox Bishop 
announced that the contents of the inscription showed that the local Arab tribe, the Tai 
(Muslim), used to be Syrian Orthodox Christians. A study by archaeologists of the 
inscription proved that it dated back to the fourteenth century. These official statements 
supported the historical circumstantial evidence that the villagers presented. The 
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villagers claim that Syrian Orthodox Christians had occupied this area, at least since the 
fourteenth century and, therefore, this area has been the territory of Syrian Orthodox 
Christians. They share this view with the Syrian Orthodox Church authority and insist 
that the Syrian Orthodox Christians had been dominant in this area, and that it is proved 
by the historical fact that even local Arabs were Syrian Orthodox Christians. Since they 
believe there used to be a church dedicated to St. Shama'Un Zaitlini, the new church also 
dedicated to him. This is a means for restoring the relationship between the Saint and the 
villagers, Since the Church authorities officially participated in the activities for 
restoring the links between the Syrian Christian present and the past of this area, it is not 
only the villagers, but also the Qahtdniya congregation who is involved in this renewal. 
This religious movement demonstrates the continuity of Orthodoxy and the Syrian 
Orthodox Christian community as an enduring existence in this area. They claim that the 
land they occupy now has been their territory for hundreds of years. 
The idea of the relationship with local saints, as a symbol of their association 
with their land, is deeply rooted in the consciousness of the congregation who celebrate 
the feasts of the local saints. Each village church in the parish has a feast of celebration. 
One of the largest village feasts is that in Mabrk5n on 6"' May. I attended it. On the eve 
of the feast in the village of Malýrkdn, people start to visit the village church and some of 
them stay there overnight. Around nine o'clock at night, people, as well as musicians, 
gather in front of the church and start folk-dancing, in which they dance hand in hand. 
Malýrkdn does not have enough space for accommodating a large number of the pilgrims 
from Qabtdnlya and Q5mishll, so on the day of the feast they attend the Mass in the 
morning in Mabrkiin and then move to its neighbouring village, Rut5n, which has a 
suitable space for picnic lunches and dancing. On the feast days, people not only attend 
the church services, but also sing Syriac folksongs and dance. This worship generates a 
common bond between the Syrian Orthodox Christians whose devotion to the local saint 
enhances their concern for their village land and whose churches are the places for their 
communication with the saints. Pilgrimage plays an important role in creating their 
linkage to the area and unity of the participants. 
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Conclusion 
The political threat and critical struggle against their population decrease and the 
Kurdish expansion influence their reconstruction of their history, and, at the same time, 
this 'history' is used as a means for understanding their present social situation and 
promoting social movements aiming at securing their position in this locality. I have 
tried to show how their present concerns affects their, way of reconstructing their distant 
past. Memories of the 1915 massacre explain how they barricaded themselves in a 
church which became a symbol of their unity and struggle against the government 
persecution of an ethnic group in the guise of religion. Such historical reconstruction of 
the 1915 incidents is different from written accounts which describe the incidents as 
religious persecution and Christians as its helpless victims. To identify the incidents as 
religious persecution means to accept that their faith separates Syrian Orthodox 
Christians from Muslims. This identification makes their position insecure in the wider 
society of Syria whose majority are Muslims. The Christians therefore ignore the written 
accounts and reconstruct their own version of the 1915 incidents. 
They fear being oppressed as a religious group, as they refresh their memories of 
their recent past in Qabt5n! ya when the changes in the French Mandate policy caused 
them to be oppressed by tribal leaders and obliged them to struggle against the land- 
grabbing Kurdish tribes. Although they were later liberated from the oppression by the 
Alawi regime, this regime then massacred people in the guise of religion in retaliation 
against anti-government movements. Syrian Orthodox Christians are afraid of bring 
persecuted as Christians, since many of their intellectuals support an idea of Assyrian 
nationalism. Therefore, the Qabt5n! ya Christians strive to affiliate themselves to Syrian 
society. They regard themselves as descendants of the 'original' inhabitants of the 
region. The reconstruction of village churches and their emphasis on the 'worship' of 
their saints are attempts to prove that their linkage to the QabVinlya goes back at least 
hundreds of years. However, their memories before the 1915 massacre are fragmented 
and they are unable to prove the linkage between the present Christians and former 
Christian inhabitants in this region. These reconstruction movements convey the 
message that they maintain their right to the land of their ancestors and so they are 
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attempting to conceal their refugee origin and to create a safe identity that their origin is 
Syria. 
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Chapter 1. Notes 
' The author's name is not mentioned in al-Oasira fi BaknRt a]-Nsir5, even though this was written by 
Isbaq krrnila. The Syrian Orthodox Christians in Jazirah maintain that this is due to his fear that Kurds 
may seek revenge on him and the government may sensor his book. 
I The Sultan Abdulhamid's policy used pan-Islamic sentiment to integrate the eastern provinces which 
were dominated by Kurdish tribal agahs. For example, in Midyat several Kurdish agahs completely 
dominated political power. There was no Ottoman force to restain them. Moreover, some Kurdish 
tribesmen enlisted in the Hatnidieh regiments, which were created in order to put down Armenian 
revolutionary activities, and gave them authority legally sanctioned by the government (Duguid, 1973: 
140-7). 
3 Armenian survivors of the massacre also present a similar view is in their biographies. They emigrated to 
the United States and Europe after the incident and recollected their experiences (e. g. Bedoukian, 1978; 
Ohanian, 1990 [1988]; Kherdian, 1988 (1979]; Hartunian, 1968). It seems to be understandable that those 
who were obliged to leave their country describe themselves as being sacrificed in national and regional 
politics. 
" The Turkish policy of oppressing the Christians had continued for three years since 1915. 




Reconstructing History for Community Unity: 
In the Case of al-Mdtk7iya 
Introduction 
Al-Milkiya is a small town which is located in northeastern part of the Syrian 
Jazirah region and close to both the Turkish and Iraqi borders. The only official census 
for al-M51k-iya's population was published in 1981 when it stood at 13,225 (MRwiffl, 
1986: 220). As the Syrian government now publishes its population census at the 
provincial level, the number of the recent inhabitants of the town cannot be obtained. 
However, the annual population growth rate in Syria is 3.2% (Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 1998-9: 15). In 1998, there were about 380 families of Syrian Orthodox Christians 
in the town. The other Christian inhabitants were 83 Armenian families and about 20 
Protestant families plus a small number of Chaldean Christians, who are East Syrian 
Christians united to the See of Rome. Kurds form the majority of the town folk. 
Al-M51k-iya was scarcely populated until the Christians immigrated to this area. 
Formally, the ancestors of the Syrian Orthodox Christians in al-Wlklya, lived in the 
area of Beth Zabday, which is the ancient name for the village of Azakh, now Idil, in 
southeastern Turkey. They mention that there used to be nineteen villages attached to 
Azakh, the largest village in the area, which contained the Christian population. Among 
these villagers, only those who lived in the six villages (i. e. Kufakh, Bgbqqa, Kufakh, 
Khaddel, Esfes, Kafshanna) and retreated into kzakh survived when the Ottoman army 
and its Kurdish allies attacked them in 1915. The Turks and Kurds besieged the village 
of Azakh, which was surrounded by walls, but when the Kurds heard the sound of 
gunfire coming from the church of the Virgin Mary, they withdrew their troops, 
assuming that the Christians had an armed force there. However, according to 
contemporary Syrian Orthodox Christians in al-Milklya, they were mistaken. The retreat 
of the Kurds subsequently gave rise to the belief that the Virgin Mary was responsible 
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for the impression of gunfire and did so to prevent the Kurds from annihilating the 
Christian community. 
The M51kiya Christians identify themselves as descendants of the survivors of 
the 1915 siege of Azakh. Both direct and indirect memories of the siege emphasise that 
Christians cooperated during the siege and were united in faith due to a 'miracle' of the 
Virgin, which the present M5lkIya Christians accepted as historical fact at the time of 
my fieldwork in 1998. There is a similarity between the memories of the 1915 massacre 
given by the Qabt5n! ya and Mdlk-lya Christians. For both of them, the event takes a 
symbolic role in explaining how the boundary between the Christians and their 
neighbouring non-Christian population emerged. However, the meaning of the siege to 
the M51k-iya Christians differs from that given by the Qabt5n! ya Christians. For the 
M5lk7iya Christians, the importance of the siege is to confirm how the present 
community and its unity in faith emerged at the time of the siege. it is a foundation 
myth. By contrast, the Qalýtgniya Christians maintain that the incident of the 1915 was a 
&war' which separated them from Kurds, i. e. their neighbours. These different 
interpretations of this distant past event, given by these two separate Syrian Orthodox 
Christian communities, are affected by their recent experiences. 
Some intellectuals in the M51k-iya community must have read published work on 
the 1915 massacre. This knowledge appears to have little influence on their oral 
accounts of the siege, which emphasise their salvation by a 'miracle' of the Virgin. 
Other details of the siege, as well as their life in Turkey before the siege, play no part in 
defining how the present community has emerged. 
Similar to Armenians and Jews, Christians were obliged to leave their homeland 
and live as a small group in Syria. The Mdlkiya Christians as well as their Kurdish 
neighbours, who emigrated from Turkey to al-Wlkiya due to Kurdish persecution, are 
refugees. Therefore, both of them needed to expand their influence and secure their 
position in the area. Conflicts occurred between them. Christians recount that Kurds 
invade Christian villages and their quarter in al-Mdlkiya. In order to claim their right to 
the land, Christians used two strategies. First, they maintained that their right is 
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supported by the Virgin. The patronage of the Virgin enhances their feeling of unity 
since the community, as a collective entity, experienced 'miracles' in 1915 in Azakh and 
in the 1960s when the Virgin led them to find oil springing out of an old church ground 
in al- Miilklya. To promote their community's unity in faith is, however, a risky strategy 
for Christians. They fear that their rivals, i. e. Muslim Kurds, may have the advantage of 
being able to secure their rights in the area. In order to establish a secure position in 
society, Christians manufacture their past by claiming that a 'miracle', which made them 
find an ruined old church, provides them with evidence that Syrian Orthodox Christians 
are originally from this area of Syria. 
Nash (1989) has noted that traditions provide a community with the evidence 
of its survival for over a long period of time, and, therefore, the continuity of its 
traditions encourages the community to claim the rights for their future survival. 
Syrian Orthodox Christians believe that the Virgin's intercession occurred several 
times in their history in order to save the community and, therefore, it is a distinctive 
tradition of the community. Maintaining memories of the 'miracles' and the current 
practice of demonstrating their dedication to the Virgin enable them to rationalise 
their survival as a distinct community, on the one hand, and on the other hand, they 
claim that political authorities have guaranteed their right as descendants of 'original' 
inhabitants in the region as the 'miracles' are acknowledged by them. 
Nowadays their unity is threatened from both outside and from within. This 
chapter investigates their problem of how to maintain unity in the face of external 
threats and internal tensions. External threats are: 1. ) from the Kurds who have 
dominated these Christians for over eighty years and are rapidly increasing their 
population, whereas the Christian population has been decreasing over the last 
twenty-five years due to emigration; 2. ) from the quasi-Christian groups, such as "the 
Brethren" and "the Jehovah's Witnesses", who have made some local converts. This 
has threatened the unity of the Christian community. Christians fear that their 
community is gradually diminishing and they may once again be suppressed by the 
Kurds. In the face of these threats, the Christians have tried to gain ground by 
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establishing themselves as urban 'professionals' so as to differentiate themselves 
from the Kurdish 'peasants' (in fact they are tribal members). However, this attempt 
has not proved very successful due to regional economic stagnation. Identity as an 
urban professional is also threatened from within when they find their community 
members who emigrated to Europe are at the bottom of the social ladder. Moreover, 
different village origins and different attitudes among community members on the 
issue of whether or not Syrian Christians should demand their territory as an ethnic 
group create further divisions within the community. The only way for these 
Christians to establish and promote their integrity and establish a secure position in 
the region is to reconstruct their history and so display their community as one which 
has endured in the region under the protection of the Virgin. 
The 1915 siege of Azakh 
When I visited al-M5lk-Iya for preliminary research in March 1998, Yusef al- 
Qass who is a knowledgeable Syrian Orthodox Christian deacon and a local historian 
told me that his book about the oral history of Azakh is not obtainable in Malkiya, but 
only from the Church publisher in Aleppo. He seemed to be anxious about the local 
authorities' reaction if he should give it to a foreign researcher, as his book mentioned 
the Turkish and Kurdish atrocities against the Syrian Orthodox Christians in Azakh 
during the time of the religious intolerance between 1910s and 1920s. Al-M51k-iya 
contains both Kurds and Syrian Orthodox Christians and the hostile relationship between 
them has lasted throughout the history of al-M51kiya. This has a great effect on these 
Christians' view of their contemporary relationships with the Kurds. 
I returned to al-M51kiya in June 1998 with his book, which had been published in 
1991, and was planning to meet the survivors in al-Mdlklya, whose experiences during 
1910s and 1920s Yusef al-Qass recorded in his book. However, I found that many of 
these people had died and others had emigrated abroad. Although I asked many people 
in the community about these survivors, I was not able to find anyone who was 
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mentioned in the book. During this inquiry, I also discovered that most Syrian Orthodox 
Christians in Mdlk-iya neither had read Yusef's book nor known of its contents, or even 
that it was the only one having recorded the history of their community in the early 
twentieth century. Records written based on a study of events during the Christian 
persecution in Turkey are likely to be more reliable than their memories. However, 
Christians have elaborated the whole oral past that emphasises the importance of the 
1915 event which creates unity and continuity of the community. The historical 
narratives which I collected are therefore heavily reliant on people's memories or what 
they have been told of the events from witnesses. 
When I asked the community members about people who remember their past in 
Turkey, only a small number of elders were suggested to me. I had meetings with them 
and they talked frankly to me about what they remembered. I found that memory prior to 
the 1915 siege was no longer retrievable. However, I needed to talk about their past with 
as many other people in the community as possible in order to discover how the Syrian 
Orthodox Christians in al-M51kiya understand their past in Turkey. I tried to speak to 
people who visited my host family and my neighbours, and asked about their own and 
their family's historical experiences. As I had seen the reaction of a[-Qass, the local 
historian, who was afraid of local government authorities, I confined myself to asking 
about their experiences within such family settings. The reason behind this fear of 
censorship was that the authorities in al-M51kiya needed to check on the political 
activities of inhabitants who might be involved in subversive activities, such as Kurdish 
and Christian autonomist movements, across both Turkish and Iraqi borders. The 
conversations about their family's experiences led the Christians into describing ethnic 
and political conflicts between their community and their Kurdish neighbours and to 
their political interpretation of the origins of regional political conflicts during the 1915 
siege. These pieces of information, which I collected through conversations, gradually 
took shape. I discovered the symbolic importance of 'the miracle of the Virgin Mary' 
during the 1915 siege. 
Yusef al-Qass mentions that kzakh had undergone a siege twice in 1915 (al- 
Qass, 1991). According to him, the Ottoman army and Kurdish tribesmen had first 
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surrounded kzakh for forty days in summer, but were unable to break into it or destroy 
the village walls (ibid.: 57-8). However, in 1998, the Syrian Orthodox Christians in al- 
Mdlk-iya could not separate this incident from a later siege in November 1915. There is a 
specific reason why the contemporary people's concern is focused on the second siege in 
November and that the first siege is forgotten. The second siege contains the image of 
divine intervention through which they were able to survive. Contemporary Christians 
mention that the Ottoman army regarded villages in Beth Zabday to be those of 
Armenians, among whom there were An-nenian nationalists and revolutionaries, and, 
therefore, the govenu-nent ordered the army to evacuate all the Armenians. However, it 
is unlikely that the local authorities did not know the population composition of the 
villages in the area. By stressing that this deportation order (fu=fti) was only 
applicable to Armenians, Syrian Orthodox Christians tried to describe how the siege was 
unjust and that they were the victims of- 1. ) Turkish nationalism which was combined 
with Islamic identity; and 2. ) the desire of the Kurdish Muslim population to control the 
region. The following is a narrative of the 1915 siege given by Syrian Orthodox 
Christians in al-Mdtklya. 
The Ottoman soldiers and Kurdish tribesmen, who were agents of the 
government, reached Azakh. The Bishop of kzakh insisted that Azakh was a 
village of Syrian Orthodox Christians and had no Armenians. Despite the efforts 
of the Bishop, who hosted government officials and repeated to them that the 
Christians were obedient subjects of the Empire, next day the army started to 
attack the Christians. The latter used the basements of their houses, where they 
stored up a large amount of food and arms, for shelter and also returned fire. 
Some of these men slipped over the village walls and stole guns from the dead 
soldiers and supplied these arms to their community. Due to the heavy attack and 
overcrowded conditions (Christians from other six villages in the region took 
refuge in Azakh and, therefore, each house contained around thirty people), the 
Christians were terrified and soon became exhausted. 
Dozens of Kurdish tribesmen heard shot of cannons coming from the direction of 
the church of the Virgin Mary. They recognised that the shots were deliberately 
targeted on the Turkish and Kurdish sides. The Turkish commander requested a 
meeting with the Christian leaders and suggested investigating the church. The 
Christians flew a white flag and invited the officials inside the village gate. The 
officials said to the Bishop and the community members, "you should hand over 
the latest model cannon to the government as the proof of your obedience. " The 
Bishop replied: "We do not own a cannon. You can search the village if you 
wish. " Although the officials searched the church, they could not find any arms 
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in it. Moreover, there was no window in the church, from where the Christians 
could fire a cannon. Since the officials could not find a cannon inside the village, 
both Turks and Kurds believed that the fire was the work of God and that God 
had intervened in the war. The Syrian Orthodox Christians maintain that their 
enemies were afraid of God and, therefore, this miracle was the cause of the 
Turkish withdrawal. 
The narratives of the siege emphasise how the experiences of the villagers in 
, kzakh, including those from the other six villages, and their cooperation during the 
siege, united them as a community. They were within the village walls which were 
besieged by the Turkish soldiers. The latter regarded all the Christians as infidels and 
Armenian armed revolutionists. Until this day, the Turkish government claims that the 
government reacted reasonably to the Armenian r6volts (Poulton, 1997: 81). However, 
the narratives of the Syrian Orthodox Christians suggest that the Christians became 
victims of a retaliation, which attempted to unite Turks under the name of Islam. This 
movement established a crucial boundary between Christians and Muslims and, 
consequently, the Christians in the Empire were no longer regarded by the authorities as 
loyal subjects. The Christians claim that the Kurds, as agents of the army, took 
advantage of this religious persecution and the governmental order which allowed them 
to evacuate, plunder and massacre the "infidels", i. e. the Christians. The narratives 
describe that under such a political situation, the besieged Christians in Azakh, who 
experienced fear, hunger, thirst, disease and death, wished to stay together and support 
one another. 
The old people in al-M51kiya refer to the Christians in Azakh as being in an 
4ark', i. e. a vehicle (the walled village) which provided them with refuge from hostile 
forces as did Noah's ark in the case of the Flood. Due to its association, the 'ark' of 
, kzakh is seen as a vehicle and a signifier, which supports the blessed, i. e. the Christians, 
from the Turks and Kurds. Contemporary Christians in at-MMkIya wish to associate the 
'ark' of Azakh with the original Biblical story, and emphasise their identity as the 
survivors of the siege in order to unite their community members. Their experiences are 
associated with the symbolic vehicle, i. e. the 'ark' and the Azakh's 'ark' generates its 
own meaning, or significance apart from the original meaning (cf. Turner & Turner, 
1978: 143-4). 
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The Christians in Azakh differed from Noah in that they were not told by God to 
enter into the ark to save their lives due to their righteousness (Genesis 7: 1,1982). They 
did not know their fate until their enemies, i. e. Kurdish tribesmen, heard gun shot 
coming from the church of the Virgin Mary and then, the Turkish army commander 
found that the Christians did not possess the cannon. Since God did not address them, 
contemporary Christians interpret the situation as a case of the Virgin Mary acting as an 
intercessor with God to save them, as God had done for Noah. This miracle was a sign, 
the Christians recognised, of God imposing order upon confusion (cf. Coleman, 1987: 
209). The Christians maintain that the Turks and Kurds who saw what occurred 
recognised this incident as a miracle, in which human beings had no power before God. 
The present Christians regard the Turkish and Kurdish withdrawal from Azakh as the 
sign that the Virgin's protection of the Christians was acknowledged by their enemies. 
As the Virgin did not communicate with the Christians nor send messages to 
them, they could interpret the incident in different ways. Reported incidents of 
apparitions and miracles of the Virgin in other parts of the world suggest that many 
stories about miracles spread and strengthen the belief in a site's miraculous power, and 
that these stories are sometimes used to achieve political purposes (e. g. Zimdars- 
Swarats, 1991: 31-7; Christian, 1996: 29-33). However, the contemporary Syrian 
Orthodox Christians in al-M51kiya share a standardised view of the 'miracle' whose 
importance is to confirm the patronage of the Virgin and identify their community as a 
social entity whose unity is derived from their shared experience of the 'miracle'. As 
Connerton has noted, a particular experience entails a set of expectations by virtue of 
which people understand current issues from the perspectives that these have the same 
features as those of the previous experiences (1989: 12). Present day Christians believe 
that their community's unity is achievable under the patronage of the Virgin even in 
their current situation where their neighbouring Kurds exceed the Christian population 
and their integrity is threatened due to divisions vAthin the community. In discussions of 
ethnic identity with the Syrian Christians, Azakh has, therefore, a meaning not only as a 
place of the 'miracle', but as the place from which their unity has created. Azakh is 
therefore significant as a symbol for reintegrating the community. 
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No one in the community considers that they can have access to God's blessing 
by visiting Azakh. Prayer to the Virgin is the only way for descendants of the Azakh 
survivors, who immigrated to al-Milklya, to plead for her intercession on their behalf 
They believe that strong faith (amina qauw! ) may make it possible for them to hold 
communion with the Virgin. Faithfulness, amdna, is an important value not only for 
individuals, but also for the community whose dedication to the Virgin brings her 
blessing to the community as a collective entity, as occurred during the 1915 siege. This 
belief is largely affected by the community's social and religious experiences in the 
recent past, which I shall discuss in the following section. 
Miracles in the Church of the Virgin in al-WWya 
The 1915 'miracle' has been recounted in its relation to the Syrian Orthodox 
Christians' social and religious experiences in al-Mdlkiya. Their struggles and potential 
hostility against Kurds have never ceased throughout their history. In order to investigate 
how the patronage of the Virgin is important for unifying the contemporary Syrian 
Christian community, memories of the Virgin's 'miracles' which occurred in the recent 
past should be examined. Some of the survivors of the 1915 siege moved to northern 
Iraq, due to their fear of Kurds and Turkish authorities. Iraqi Arabs and Kurds 
disapproved of Syrian Christians, i. e. Assyrians (Nestorians), and other Syrian 
Christians, such as Syrian Orthodox, Syrian Protestant and Syrian Catholic, many of 
whom were refugees from Turkey and were attempting to create a homogeneous 
Christian settlement zone. After the British mandate in Iraq was terminated in 1932, the 
Iraqi army fired on Assyrians who pleaded for autonomy. Fighting followed and many 
Christians were massacred in 1933 (Arberry, 1969: 530-1; Nisan, 1991: 164-5). Many 
Syrian Orthodox Christians fled from Iraq to the area of al-M51kiya in Syria. 
Other survivors of the 1915 Azakh siege returned to their villages in Turkey. At 
the time of Kurdish uprising in eastern Turkey between 1924 and 1928, the Turkish 
republican government oppressed not only Kurds, but also the Christian population. The 
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government saw the Christians as unsuitable to become 'Turkish' and tried to eliminate 
them (Poulton, 1997: 97). Moreover, in 1924 when the frontier between Turkey and Iraq 
was drawn, the former Ottoman province of Mousul in present northern Iraq was 
integrated into Iraq under the British Mandate, Turkish nationalists became hostile to the 
British. Contemporary Syrian Orthodox Christians maintain that Turks suspected 
Christians in Turkey as British collaborators since many Assyrians and some Syrian 
Orthodox and Syrian Protestant Christians in Iraq, worked for the British. The Turkish 
government strictly controlled Christian inhabitants in Turkey, even though the 
Christians in Azakh were obedient to the government. The Christians describe British 
interference in the regional politics and the consequent upsurge of Turkish nationalism 
accentuated the differences between the Christians and the Turks. In 1926, according to 
Yusef al-Qass, it was on the first Sunday of Lent that 257 out of approximately 700 
Syrian Orthodox Christian men in Azakh and adjacent villages were arrested by the 
government (1991: 9 1). The men were chained together in fours and were sent to a jail 
in Jazirat Ibn 'Umar. Later, they were sent to Midyat and were confined in St. Simona 
Church. Elderly Syrian Orthodox Christians in al-M51kiya, whose fathers and family 
members experienced this incident, so-called al-qafla (the confinement), remember it 
due to their difficult personal experiences. 
The authorities tortured the prisoners badly and did not provide them with food. 
Even their Bishop was beaten and died. Their anxiety was enhanced by their 
belief that the government might once again try to exterminate them. Some died, 
even though Syrian Orthodox Christians in Midyat offered these prisoners food. 
Syrian Orthodox Christian women came from Azakh and other villages near 
there to Midyat in order to feed their men. Many of these men were set free in 
August, but some of the more influential members were transferred to Harput. 
They bribed officials in order not to be sentenced for treason. After five months, 
they were able to return toAzakh. 
This incident still remains as bitter personal and family experiences in the minds 
of the Syrian Orthodox Christians in al-M51k-iya, whereas many people in the 
community regard the 1915 siege as a foundation for defining their origin and a means 
of integrating community members who share this historical experience. Some survivors 
cried when they recollected their desperate situation in 1915 when the Turkish army 
started to attack Azakh. However, such emotional reactions are rarely shown by the 
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younger generations. By contrast many elders, even middle-aged people, who have 
indirect experiences of the 1926 al-qafla, talk about it as a terrible experience. Such an 
emotional response is related to their understanding that their suffering was caused by 
official discrimination against Christians in the 1926 al-qaua, and that the co-existence 
of different religious and ethnic groups was no longer possible in Turkey. This increased 
their anxiety about living there. Therefore, they decided to move to the Syrian Jazirah, 
when the French Mandate constructed their anny base there. The narratives of the two 
persecutions give different meanings to each event. The 1926 event was an incitement to 
their emigration and loss of their homeland. On the contrary, the 1915 siege was a sign 
of consolidating the community through sharing the same historical experiences. 
The Syrian Orthodox Christians in al-M51k-iya maintain that Turkish 
discrimination and the Kurdish attacks and plunders continued after 1926. At the 
beginning of the 1930s when the French army was stationed at 'Ain Duwar, which is 
located on the riverbank of the Tigris on the Syrian side and adjacent to the border 
between Syria and Turkey, the Syrian Orthodox Christians from the area of Azakh 
moved there. They expected the French neither to discriminate between Christians and 
Muslims, as Turks did, nor to allow Kurds to attack them. As Kurds had massacred 
Syrian Orthodox Christians in this part of Syria in 1915, they did not have relatives nor 
land there. They needed urgently to find sources of income in order to feed themselves. 
Their preferred job was to work for the French as soldiers since the French provided the 
soldiers with ration tickets for food supplies, such as sugar, olive oil and milk. Some 
people opened shops in 'Ain Duwar. Many others constructed villages and settled there. 
There were Christians who worked for Kurdish landowners, i. e. tribal chiefs, as 
agricultural labourers. 
Due to security reasons, the border village of 'Ain Duwar was not an appropriate 
place to develop as a regional economic centre. As early as the 1930s, when a barracks 
for the French soldiers was constructed in Derik, which is an old name of al-Milklya, 
Christians moved there. ' Since Derik was a new village, it did not contain an established 
Kurdish population. However, the Kurdish population in Defik gradually increased due 
to their emigration from the Turkish side. The Kurds gradually moved into the Syrian 
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Christian quarter. These Christians who did not want to live with Kurds in this quarter 
started to construct a new quarter, i. e. Wasta quarter. The Christians who lived in the 
old quarter gradually moved into the Wasta quarter and, consequently, the old quarter 
became entirely Kurdish. Furthermore, increase of the number of Kurdish emigrants 
created conflicts between Christian and Kurdish villagers. Both of them tried to obtain 
agricultural land in the area, which used to be scarcely populated. 
After the French left Syria in 1946, these Christians lost their protection, and so 
they became fearful of Kurdish attacks. Since the French took the local soldiers to 
Lebanon at the time of their withdrawal, the families left behind in al-M51kiya, consisted 
mainly of women and children, were anxious about Kurdish raids. They shut themselves 
up in St. Simona's church. Nothing adverse occurred in al-M51kiya. However, in a 
village near al-M51k-iya, conflicts between Kurds and Syrian Christians started and the 
Christian inhabitants were evacuated in 1948. The Syrian Orthodox Christians saw the 
imminent danger of Kurdish attack in this period of political instability. They had to 
defend themselves in order to ensure their survival and protect their property. It was in 
this situation that miracles of the Virgin occurred. 
A Syrian Orthodox Christian peasant had a dream of an old sheikh indicating a 
spot inside the wrecked church of the Virgin in the old quarter. The sheikh said 
to him, "Dig here! You will find a cross and a picture of the Virgin. " The 
peasant found a bronze cross, a picture of the Virgin and a book in Latin. He 
reported his findings to a priest in St. Simona church in the Wasta quarter. The 
priest blessed them. 
According to al-Qass, this incident occurred in 1953. These objects were 
believed to have been buried at the time of either the 1895 Kurdish attack on the 
Christian or 1915 massacre (al-Qass, 1993: 35). The finds discovered by the peasants in 
the wrecked church could be interpreted that Syrian Orthodox Christians were in al- 
Malkiya long before the present population moved in. They even believe that the 
foundation of the church dates back to the fourth century A. D. The Christians identify 
themselves as descendants of the survivors of the 1915 siege of kzakh and this reveals 
their refugee origin. Therefore, they need to have a means to secure their position in 
Syria. Memory of finding remnants of an old church is related to construction of 
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identity among the contemporary Mdlk-iya Christians. They hold that the findings prove 
continuity of Orthodox faith in this area; the endurance of their community in this 
locality for over thousand years. This religious identity has become a means for 
claiming that the church is proof that Syrian Orthodox Christians were the original 
inhabitants of this area. Therefore, they are able to claim their rights to the land. Here, 
the connection between their religious and social identities is established. 
Due to the potential hostility by the Kurds, Christians do not want to live in the 
old quarter surrounded by Kurdish neighbours. They say: "We never think of Kurds as 
our fellowmen, even though they say the relationships between us and them are like 
those of brothers. " Christians believe that Kurds want to establish their independence in 
Kurdistan and try to get support from the Syrian Christians to realise their political aims. 
However, the Christians consider that the co-existence of the Christians and Kurds was 
destroyed in the 1915 siege and subsequent conflicts between them and the Kurds, 
which occurred after their emigration to Syria. They believe that a clear boundary should 
be maintained between themselves and the Kurds. A proverb used by them denies the 
possibility of Christians living together with the Kurds: "If a Kurd were an apple and 
you put it into your pocket, you would find a hole there [because the apple dropped out 
-, ý 2 of it or vanished] .A measure Christians took in order to protect their right to the land 
was to reconstruct their church in the Kurdish quarter, as a claim to prior residence there. 
Thus, in 1954, the board of Trustees, who were representatives of the Syrian 
Orthodox Christian community in al-M51kiya, decided on the reconstruction of the 
church of the Virgin. The Bishop was invited to the church, and many community 
members attended prayers and a ceremony conducted by the Bishop before setting to 
work. For the Church, the reconstruction is a sign of the people's devotion. For the laity, 
its importance is a symbolic feature of patronage of the Virgin to the community in this 
specific locality. The acknowledgement of the Church authorities adds theological 
meaning to this reconstruction and provides a vehicle for the laity to claim the territory 
as theirs, i. e. that of 'original' inhabitants, by right. 
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Their memories of the 1950s and the 1960s suggest that Christians in those days 
were threatened by the Kurds. When the unification of Egypt and Syria in 1958 
increased tension between Syria and Turkey, Turkish and Kurdish landowners who 
retained their land in Syrian side sold it to Syrian Orthodox Christian peasants who 
cooperated financially to buy it. The Christians maintain that Kurds took advantage of 
the political tension between Turkey and Syria and stole crops from the purchased land. 
Under such a situation, the ultimate concern of the Christians was to defend themselves 
from Kurds. Other 'miracles' of the Virgin occurred, which gave favours of the 
Christians. The narratives of the incidents describe how their community was united 
under the protection of the Virgin who defended their rights. The contemporary 
community recollect an incident where a local priest found holy oil springing out from 
the ground at the south-eastem comer of the altar of the Virgin's church in 1960. A 
vision of the Virgin is also reported (Isbaq, 1993: 57-8; al-Qass, 1991: 36,38). This 
incident was told in the following way: 
In 1961, city planners decided to demolish the church for a road expansion. At 
that time, the story of the holy oil had spread among Christians in Jazirah across 
boundaries of denominations and many people visited the church in order to ask 
for God's blessing. Syrian Orthodox priests explained the miracle to two 
engineers, who were in charge of the demolition plan, and tried to persuade them 
to abandon the plan. A bulldozer arrived in front of the church to knock down the 
building, but it stopped working. This was the manifestation of the Virgin's 
power preventing the work and supporting the conservation. 
When the authorities required proof that the miracle was genuine, the 
congregation held an examination session. In front of a city-planning engineer, 
the congregation wiped the oil from the cement surface from which it sprang out 
and then, covered and locked the place in order that no one could enter it. After 
one week, the same engineer confirmed that there was no sign of anyone having 
entered the covered place. The community members watched the examination. 
The engineer unlocked the place and found oil on the surface. The engineers sent 
reports to government authorities about the examination and result of their 
scientific analysis of the oil's components. The authorities accepted the 
Christians' request and abandoned the demolition plan. 
This historical experience shares its characteristics with the 1915 incident in 
which the Christians were unreasonably threatened by the Kurds and the Virgin, who 
was unable to let Kurdish violence go on, supported the Christians. Their memory of the 
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experiences in their recent past is functionally relevant to that of the 1915, in which they 
try to reconfinn their social identity as those who were saved and united by the 
patronage of the Virgin. 
These series of incidents, concerning the church of the Virgin, are regarded by 
Christians as community matters. The relationship between the Virgin and the 
community was shown by the messages from the Virgin, such as interruption of the 
demolition work and a spring of holy oil, which were accessible to any community 
member. The Virgin showed a priest where to find the holy oil and this resulted in the 
Church authorities persuading government officials to maintain the community's right to 
keep their church. The negotiations between authorities of each side made the matter 
public. Christians maintain that the Virgin appealed to the political authorities not to 
eliminate her church as well as her people from the area. They understand that the 
cmiracle' was acknowledged by political authorities and the right of Christians as 
'original' inhabitants in this area was respected. However, the report written by the 
engineer did not mention the spring of oil as holy nor Christians' right to the land. 
Therefore, it is the Christians' interpretation that the patronage of the Virgin to the 
community which contributed to obtaining their political rights in the area. They 
maintain that as the Virgin who gave support to them they were able to obtain official 
acknowledgement of their rights as 'original' inhabitants of the region. 
Dedication to the Virgin 
Since their group identity is closely related to the Virgin, the community has the 
means for confirming their unity in social and religious practices, e. g. an annual cycle of 
religious feasts. The Virgin is the only saint with one exception, for whom the 
community celebrates feasts, such as the feast of Annunciation (25 March), the 
celebration of the church of the Virgin in the village of Bara Bait (15 May), and the feast 
of the Assumption (15 August). 'Me only exception is the feast of St. Ephreim, the 
patron Saint of the Syrian Orthodox Church. As Valensi has noted in the case of Jews 
who lost their homeland, religious memory as well as social memory becomes one of the 
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bases for reproduction of their identity and is a result of their choosing which figures and 
events are to be retained by religious commemoration ceremonies (1986: 80). 
Dedication of the Syrian Orthodox Christians to the Virgin, i. e. celebrating her rather 
than other saints, is a result of their strategic choice in which the feasts of the Virgin 
tend to make them remember their relationships to her. In these official celebrations 
men take the initiative, whereas women present their association with the Virgin in 
another way. 
As can be witnessed, every Saturday afternoon, a crowd of female Christians 
walks down to al-Milklya's oldest quarter in order to visit the church of the Virgin. 
They have an implicit understanding about date and time for their visit. The main street 
of the quarter is filled with the Syrian Orthodox Christian women. The Christian women 
walk towards the church confidently as if they are returning to their homes; the Kurdish 
inhabitants stand on the edge of the road and look on. There is no communication 
between them. This visit is a weekly event for commemorating the miracle and support 
of the Virgin given to their community. Their visit is also a means of reconfirming their 
victory to the Kurdish inhabitants by suggesting that they retain rights to this quarter and 
to maintain their church. 
A local priest conducts a religious service on Saturday afternoons. However, it is 
not very important for these women whether or not they attend the service. There are 
also some women's groups, even teenage girls with their teachers, who stay overnight on 
Saturday. Their purpose is to visit the church and to spend their time there praying in 
order to aff irm their association with the Virgin. Inside the church, there are icons of the 
Virgin of Azakh, in which the Virgin is shown inside the village walls of Azakh and 
stretching out her hands to help the Christians. The scene described in the icons is a 
symbol of their communion with the Virgin (cf. Bowmann, 1999: 145-6). Dedication of 
these icons by community members to this church suggests an understanding by the 
community of the historical linkage of the two 'miracles' of Azakh and al-Mfilkiya as 
sharing the characteristics for unifying the community under the protection of the 
Virgin. Photocopies of the icon are also hung on walls of the houses and shops. 
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The community's relationship with saints is expressed in their support for the 
Coptic Patriarch whose photo hangs on the wall of the Virgin's church. This is the only 
Syrian Orthodox church in which I found his picture. The Coptic Church promotes the 
idea of a faith that governs human beings' relationship with the deity through stories of 
saints and personal experiences of divine miracles, and these are presented in videos and 
magazines. These concrete materials project the idea of how human beings and the 
divine are interrelated. I shall present the story of St. Mina, whose video was produced 
by the Coptic Church. I had an opportunity to watch it when my neighbour borrowed it 
from a Syrian Orthodox priest and invited her female neighbours to watch it together. 
The story is composed of two parts. The first part is a story of the human Mina. He 
overcame human desires, such as wealth, a luxurious life and sex, all of which make 
human beings commit sin. Due to his Christian faith, he was tortured and killed by a 
pagan Roman governor. The second part is a story of St. Mina who is given miraculous 
powers, such as healing and communication with humans. Because of his obedience to 
God in this world, God endowed him with such power. An individual devoid of sin, i. e. 
being obedient to God's will, is considered to have a strong faith (am5na qauwj). This is 
an ideal relationship between God and a human. These kinds of stories teach the Syrian 
Orthodox Christian audience how they can internalise an ideal relationship with God and 
how the saints act as intercessors between man and God. They believe that their patron 
saint, the Virgin, favours and loves faithful Christians, as St. Mina's story suggests. 
There is another reason why the relationship with the saint is so important for the 
M51kiya Christians. They believe that the Virgin's power protects them, i. e. the 
community of faithful Christians, from offences connected with social vice, such as 
Kurds plundering crops from Christian villagers. The following example shows how the 
Virgin gives the strength to Christians and protects them from someone who does them 
an injustice. 
George remembers the experience of his deceased mother at the beginning of 
1940s when she lived in Azakh and was jailed in Jazirat Ibn 'Umar. (George does not 
remember why his mother was jailed. Since her husband had died in 1940, the Turkish 
authorities might have persecuted her, instead of her husband, due to the reason that her 
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children had secretly immigrated to Syria in 1942. ) The following is the memory George 
has of his mother. 
My mother had been confined in jail for five months. A Kurdish prisoner who 
was in a cell opposite to hers sympathised with her and liked her character and 
motherly love. Their cells were located on the third floor and had a small 
window near the ceiling. He laid one box upon another under the window and 
helped her climb up on the top of the boxes. She jumped down from the window 
and her body fell to the ground. The noise of her fall did not wake the prison 
guard. Moreover, she was not injured. Then, the Virgin crossed her forehead and 
said to her, "Your way is open. Run away from here! " She hired a man who was 
able to smuggle her out of Turkey and guide her to the village of Bara Bait in the 
Syrian side, where her mother and brother were. When she arrived there she 
asked for support from a priest in al-M51k-iya who originally came from Azakh. 
As policemen were inquiring about her, the priest helped her escape to the 
monastery of St. Matta in Iraq. The monastery gave her refuge. After a while, my 
mother returned to Syria and, finally, was able to come and see me in the village 
of al-Uay5ka. 
George believes that Turkish officials unfairly exercised power to put his mother 
into a jail even though she did not commit a crime. The Virgin gave support to her as a 
faithful Christian during a difficult time. The Virgin's miracle eliminated all the 
obstacles laid in her way, such as the prison, country border and police investigation, 
when she tried to rejoin her son, George. This event is an experience in which the image 
of divine support is externalised and the Christians' rights are protected by the Virgin. 
This kind of personal experience is told to relatives, friends and neighbours, and then 
spreads to the community at large. Their inspiration derives from what they interpret as a 
miracle which is enacted through their relationship with the Virgin. Narratives of 
personal experiences with miracles are embedded into the community's history, such as 
that in the 1915 siege and the holy oil of 1960 and 1961, in which their community, i. e. a 
group of faithful Christians, fought injustice and was saved by the Virgin. Therefore, 
the Virgin's support for Christians whom someone had done an injustice serves as locus 
for their relationship with the Virgin which forms part of their collective history. The 
patronage of the Virgin is not only a means for the M51k-iya Christians to construct their 
religious identity, but also a means to claim their social rights. 
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Crisis of Identity 
The Syrian Orthodox Christians in at-M51kiya have been facing crises for over 
twenty-five years. One of the causes which created their problems is the introduction of 
the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Brethren of the Lord to this area. These sects have 
created two problems: they threaten the Syrian Orthodox Christians' unity based on their 
unity under the patronage of the Virgin; and some of Syrian Orthodox Christians 
converted to either of these two sects. Syrian Orthodox Christians do not remember 
exactly when these Christian sects started their missionary work. Existence of the 
Jehovah's Witnesses is mentioned in the description of the holy oil springing up in the 
Virgin's church: The story spread to Christians in the Jazirah region even to the 
Jehovah's Witnesses in 1960 (al-Qass, 1993: 37). Even though the Witnesses had not 
yet started their work in al-M51k-iya, they had had a certain number of the conversions in 
the Jazirah at that time. 
When I spoke to women about the Brethren and the Jehovah's Witnesses, they 
said, "the Brethren and the Jehovah's Witnesses attracted people by preaching God's 
love and love between human beings. Some of the Syrian Orthodox Christians converted 
to these sects and then they discovered that these sects deny the holiness of the Virgin 
and the Trinity". 3 Women explain the reason why they are not able to accept the 
Brethren's attitude by using the phrase of their 'denial of the Cross'. Syrian Orthodox 
Christians cross themselves and are taught the meaning of it. When the Christians make 
a cross, they put their own fingers on parts of their bodies in the following order and 
each movement carries a meaning. The forehead means the God in heaven, and the belly 
is embodiment of God, i. e. Jesus. The left shoulder means sin which human beings 
commit, the right shoulder represents the Holy Spirit. And finally, the movements that 
they make a circle in front of their chests and put their hands on their chests symbolise 
the Trinity. 
The honour of Mary is derived from the birth of Jesus from her virginal womb 
due to the Holy Spirit that came into her. Mary is the Holy Mother who is pure and clean 
of sin. The Brethren's denial of her life-long virginity, which means Mary later had 
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children and remained a virgin only until the birth of Jesus, is not acceptable for the 
Syrian Orthodox Christians and is seen as a means to deny her honour and purity. 
Moreover, they understand that the Jehovah's Witnesses make little of the Virgin. Mary 
is seen as the mother of Jesus who is both God and man. Because of the belief of the 
non-existence of the Trinity, the Jehovah's Witnesses regard only Father as God and 
consider Christ, the Son of God, as inferior to the Father. For the Syrian Orthodox 
Christians, this teaching means a rejection of Mary's character as the mother of God. 
Syrian Orthodox Christian women use a symbol of the Cross to show the 
discrepancies between their belief and that of the other two sects, whereas the men try to 
protect their own beliefs by constructing a logical explanation by referring to Biblical 
evidence. For example, during my research in al-M51k1ya, there were male community 
members who requested to have a meeting with me when I had told people of my 
research topic: How community members remember their own history. It was usually 
me who asked to have a meeting, but in al-M51k1ya, it was community's male members 
who initiated it. At the meetings, I let them speak on whatever the topic they were 
interested in. I thought that it was an appropriate way to get to know what concerned the 
community members. What they talked to me about was their Biblical stories and the 
history of the Syrian Orthodox Christians dating back to the Old Testament. They insist 
that Jesus stressed the virtue of generosity, unselfishness, mercy and love in his ministry 
in order to present that it is not only the Brethren and the Jehovah's Witnesses who 
preach these virtues, but their denomination does as well. The Resurrection, by which 
Jesus ascended into Heaven, is the proof of the second person of the Trinity. Through 
this argument they try to reconfirm Mary's heavenly credibility and at the same time, 
defend the identity of their community which is derived from their relationship with the 
Virgin as the mother of God and as a powerful intercessor. 
The reason why the challenge of the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Brethren has 
threatened the community, is not because some of the community members converted to 
these sects, but because the ideological foundation of constructing their social identity 
has been threatened by these sects. Syrian Orthodox Christians understand that these 
sects denies their beliefs in Mary's characteristics as Mother of God and an intercessor 
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between God and themselves, based on whose support they are able to integrate the 
community. 
Their village population started to move into towns, such as al-Mfilklya, 
Qýmishh and Aleppo, since the late 1950s. Employment in the national oil company in 
Rumielan gave the Syrian Orthodox Christians in al-M51kiya, as well as those in 
Qabtdnlya and Q5mishlI, alternative economic employment between the late 1970s and 
the beginning of 1980s. Their emigration to the town and regional economic growth 
provided Christians with opportunities to be engaged in urban occupations, such as 
mechanics, drivers, teachers, government employees, hair dressers, tailors and 
shopkeepers, and with opportunities to educate their children in schools. 
Urban occupation and education have become markers which Christians use in 
order to separate themselves from Kurds, who are categorised by them as rural peasants. 
Although there are affluent Christians who are farmers owning a large amount of land, 
they also live in the town and commute to their villages in order to maintain their 
identity as urban residents. Another criterion which they use in order to show themselves 
as the cultivated is at the educational level. Figure I shows the number of both Muslim 
and Christian junior high school boys in al-Shahid IbrWirn Masa'uud junior high school 
in al-M51k-iya in 1998. Christians do not have separate schools and, therefore, Muslims 
and Christians go to school together. Since the Syrian government does not publish a 
census of population composition in the country by using religions as its criteria, this 
school material, which I obtained from the headmaster, is an interesting example that 
suggests different attitudes toward child education between Muslims and Christians in 
al-M51kiya. Junior high school is where children go at age twelve years old after their 
finishing six years elementary school education. However, pupils who have failed school 
exams are unable to progress to a more senior grade. In the seventh grade, there are 
seven classes and the average number of pupils in a class are thirty-eight. Christians 
occupy 17.7% of the total pupils in the seventh grade. In the eighth grade, the number of 
classes reduces to four, due to dropouts, and the average number of pupils in a class is 
thýirty-seven. The proportion of Christians in this grade is 29.9%. In the ninth grade, 
there are five classes and the average size of a class contains forty pupils. The proportion 
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of Christians in this grade increases to 30.7%. Although the category of Christians 
includes Syrian Orthodox Christians, Armenians, Chaldeans (Kuldiin) and Protestants, 
the majority among them are the Syrian Orthodox Christians. Kurds are believed to 
occupy over 80% of the regional population. Therefore, this school census reveals the 
basis by which Syrian Orthodox Christians identify their group as 'educated'. It does not 
mean that their group contains many people who obtained higher degrees, but it means 
that they are more educated on average than the Kurds. 
Christians ideally try to establish themselves as an urban middle class, but the 
actual economic situation prevents them from realising this ambition. The regional 
economic situation created a serious shortage of daily necessities in the late 1980s due to 
import restrictions. This was solved by the government relaxing restrictions on private 
business due to its expectations of foreign aid after the Gulf War. However, salaries of 
employees in public sector are still low due to the governrnent policy of reducing 
unemployment rates by hiring a large number of people in excess of requirements. 
Although public sector employment and teaching are preferred occupations for the 
educated Syrian Orthodox Christians in al-M51kiya, a substantial raise of their income 
cannot be expected in the present economic situation. 
Due to economic difficulties, some Christians were unable to establish 
themselves in urban areas. Many of them have already left their villages. By contrast, 
Kurdish village population are increasing. Christians feel that their community is 
becoming small and vulnerable. Such a fear is accentuated by the decrease of their 
population due to their continuous emigration to Europe, mainly Sweden, for the last 
twenty-five years, which has accelerated since the mid 1970s. Bjorklund who conducted 
research on Syrian Orthodox Christian immigrants in Sweden mentions the majority of 
these selected belonged to the Syrian Orthodox Church (Bj6rklund, 1981: 57-8,63). 
Although it is claimed by Syrian Orthodox Christians that the figure 
(unpublished) was less for the 1990s than for the 1980s, the decrease of the 
community members and what they learnt from the emigrants, who temporarily return 
75 
Figure 2. Number of pupils in al-Shahid IbraMm. Masa'uud Junior High School 
in al-Mdlkiya in 1998 
Grade Class Muslims Christians Total 
Th 1 32 7 39 
7 th 2 32 6 38 
----------- - 
7 th 3 30 8 38 
------ ------ 
7 th 4 




---- - ----- 
37 
- 








7 th 6 
------ 
32 7 39 
-------- ----- 
7'h 7 






Subtotal 219 47 266 
(%) (82.3) (17.7) (100) 
8th 1 26 12 38 
8th 2 24 12 36 
---- -------- 
8 th 3 25 11 
------ -- 
36 
8th 4 28 9 37 
Subtotal 103 44 147 
(%) (70.1) (29.9) (100) 
91h 1 




gth 2 31 9 40 
gth 3 22 18 40 
qh 4 
------------ 
25 15 40 
- 
91h 5 34 5 39 
Subtotal 138 61 199 
(0/6) (69.3) (30.7) (100) 
Total 460 152 612 
(%) (75.2) (24.8) (100) 
to their homes in al-M51k-iya, make them reconsider their situation. They say that they 
experienced emigration to Syria after al-qafla (the confinement) in 1926 and, then, 
gradually reconstructed their community in al-M51kiya. They question why once again 
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they have to be dispersed throughout the world. When they emigrate to Sweden, these 
emigrants, consequently, abandon their homeland and become a minority in Swedish 
society. These Christians are afraid of their community disintegrating due to this 
emigration. Moreover, the situation of their fellowmen abroad threatens their social 
identity as urban professionals, which they have attempted to build up during the last 
twenty-five years. Many emigrants depend on social benefits and have to begin their life 
from the bottom of the social ladder since even people who are highly qualified in Syria, 
such as engineers and medical doctors, do not have their qualifications recognised in 
Sweden. 
In order to solve the problem of the break up of their community and the loss of 
their identity, by the late 1990s they began to adopt alternative ways for strengthening 
their unity and claiming their rights as 'original' inhabitants. The first is to prove the 
continuity of the community in this locality by claiming that their religious traditions 
have been maintained since ancient times. Knowledgeable deacons and priests are all 
keen to transmit their religious traditions to the younger generations, such as the chants 
with modal stanzas of weekday Offices, hymns with Syrian Orthodox musical tunes, and 
their liturgical language, i. e. Syriac. (see Chapter 6). The second is to establish proof that 
the ancestors of Syrian Orthodox Christians dominated this region in ancient times and, 
therefore, they have a right to be in al-MAlklya. They maintain that they constitute not 
only a religious community, but also an ethnic group, i. e. of Arameans who seek to trace 
their origin back to the ancient Assyrian Empire. This ethno-religious identity includes 
the Christians using Syriac as their liturgical language, which, as stated earlier, is 
derived from ancient Aramaic, i. e. a lingua franca of the ancient Assyrian Empire. 
Therefore, Christians maintain that these areas were their original homeland and those 
who maintain Syriac, i. e. modem Aramaic, as their liturgical language ultimately share 
their origins with the ancient Assyrians. This belief has been disseminated worldwide by 
the Christians. In the regional context of al-Milk-tya, this ideology makes it possible for 
them to locate their community as a part of a larger ethnic group, whose identity is 
derived from a shared origin, language, religion and homeland. 
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Internal Tensions 
These strategies which al-M51k-iya Christians adopt do not contribute fully 
towards integrating their community. The community tends to split into two groups who 
support different strategies. Furthermore this division is related to their village origin. 
Since the M51kiya Christians originally came from seven villages, they have a village 
identity. The largest two of these village groups in al-MAlk-Iya are those from ý. zakh and 
Esfes. They do not want to intermarry. Their marriage practices show an endogamous 
tendency within their own groups. The Azakh group contains twelve clans and the Esfes 
group has seven clans. These people can trace their patrilateral genealogical 
relationships for a few generations back, but are not able to trace back their genealogical 
relationship to their believed common ancestor. Christians from both Azakh and Esfes 
say that they used to differentiate community members in terms of kinship relationships 
only at the time when they chose marriage partners. However, nowadays the community 
tends to be composed of two factions, i. e. those of Azakh and Esfes. 
The Azakh group composes a large number of the congregation of St. Simona's 
church, whereas the Esfes group insists that the church of St. Dodo is theirs. Both of 
them attempt to establish social identity as the descendants of 'original' inhabitants of 
the region through maintaining tradition and culture based on their religion, which are 
the only means for them to trace their origin and prove the continuity of their community 
going back to thousands years. Ironically, they reveal their refugee origin, i. e. villages in 
Turkey where they lived, when they claim their Syrian origin. Many people who attend 
services in St. Simona's church insist that the maintenance of ancient traditions of Syria 
proves the endurance of the community in this region and, therefore, their rights to the 
land should be acknowledged. By contrast, the congregation of St. Dodo's church stress 
that the rights to their territory could not be acknowledged without maintaining their 
ethnic origin as Assyrians. The supporters of the former approach regard the latter as 
ethno-nationalists who may create dangers for their community through possible 
persecution by the government, like the Kurds experienced in Turkey. Those who insist 
on their Assyrian origin consider that religion itself cannot define them as an ethnic 
group and, therefore, they require another marker to characterise their group, like the 
78 
Muslims who can describe their social identity based on ethnic groups to which they 
affiliate. These Christian groups recognise that religious identity does not contribute to 
securing their social position. However, two conflicting views for constructing secure 
identity of the M51kiya Christians further increase the danger of the community 
disintegrating. 
These opposing views are presented by different groups which are maintained by 
practising endogamous marriage between people of the same village origin. These 
Christians admit that such a division is a recent phenomenon. St. Dodo's church was not 
regarded as entirely composed of people from Esfes (Fsainlya). The community 
members know that the church's foundation stone was brought from St. Dodo's church 
in Esfes to al-M51k-iya and its construction started in 1982. Therefore, more people from 
Esfes donated money for its construction than did those from Azakh. However, they 
insist that this fact did not become a cause for division in the community. When the 
church was established in 1991, the idea of creating group solidarity in line with village 
origins is connected to the opposition between the ethno-nationalists and the 
traditionalists. Consequently, the churches. become vehicles for the factions to promote 
their religious activities according to their own principles. 
Conclusion 
The reluctance shown by the community members to talk to me about the 
dissension between community members was not due to their intention to conceal it 
from an outsider, but to their reluctance to accept that situation has weakened their 
integration (cf Fentress & Wickham, 1992: 99-100). Their disunity increases their 
anxiety about living under the threat of the Kurds. Through their historical narratives, 
they wish to confirrn which experiences the community members shared and what is the 
distinctive tradition of their community. Shared memories, real or imagined, provide 
them with prospects for unifying the community. The patronage of the Virgin, which is 
sustained by their memories of the 'miracles', is maintained by their participating in 
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both the one year cycle of feasts dedicated to the Virgin and weekly prayers in her 
church. 
The patronage of the Virgin defines the community as descendants of the 
survivors of the 1915 siege of Azakh when she came to their assistance and homage to 
her contributes to creating their unity. However, they now want to secure their position 
in Syria. They attempt to create their identity as 'original' inhabitants of the region 
rather than that of refugees and so protect their rights in this locality. They adopt three 
strategies: 1. ) to emphasise the collective memory of the 'miracles' of the Virgin, who 
they believe supports their aim of securing their rights to the land; 2. ) to prove the 
endurance of the community in Syria and 3. ) to claim their ethnic origin as an ancient 
tribe of Syria. Although all these strategies are expressed through religious practices, 
their main aim is to establish their social identity as Syrians. 
The strategies for redefining their identity as Syrians ironically split the 
community into two factions, whose composition reveals their refugee origin. Since 
genealogy, village origin and political orientation are intertwined, people have to make 
careful consideration before choosing their affiliation to one of these factions. For 
example, people from ý, zakh are not necessarily traditionalists; a person from Esfes may 
choose to attend St. Simona's church because he/she cannot support the idea of ethno- 
nationalists. The Syrian Orthodox Christians in al-M51kiya are faced with the 
discrepancy between the ideals of their unity and the present turmoil within their 
community. 
80 
Chapter 2. Notes 
' Due to the Arabisation policy promoted by the Syrian government, names of places which are not 
originally Arabic were replaced by Arabic ones. According to the Syrian Orthodox Christians, Derik, 
whose name is originally Syriac and whose meaning is a small monastery, officially changed its name into 
al-Milkiya between 1960 and 1961. 
2 Bjbrklund mentions the similar proverb which is used among Syrian Orthodox Christians in Tur 
'Abdin (Bj6rklund, 1981: 79). 
3 According to a Syrian Orthodox priest, not a disinterested observer, in 1998, among the Syrian Orthodox 
Christians who converted to the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Brethren only twenty people are still 
believers of these two sects. 
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Chapter 3 
Concealment through Display: 
Ethnic Identity among Urfalli Syrian Christians in Aleppo 
Introduction 
As was discussed in the previous chapters, Syrian Orthodox Christians in both 
Qabt5n! ya and al-M51kiya do not recall their past before the 1915 massacre. The Syrian 
Orthodox Christian population of Urfa, i. e. Urfallis, who were expelled from Urfa in 
southeastern Turkey in 1924 and settled in Aleppo, must have had similar experiences to 
those of their fellow Christians in the Jazirah. However, in the space of eighty years 
they claim not to remember their past in Turkey, nor the reasons or conditions relating to 
why they left. In all these three cases the amnesia is oral. There is some documentary 
and histofical evidence of their Turkish past, but they have not preserved these in their 
own memories. In most cases encountered by anthropologists and oral historians the 
opposite attains: the written record is silent, but popular memories keep alive certain 
sentiments (oral history). The role of amnesia in the construction of group identities has 
been less well researched, although there have been some important exceptions (e. g. 
Collard, 1989). 
Written records do not appear to play any part in the construction of group 
memories of Syrian Orthodox Christians. Instead, they appear to have done two things to 
attempt to maintain their ethnic identity. Firstly, they have elaborated a whole recent 
(oral) past that emphasises unity and continuity of the community in faith. Secondly, 
they managed to construct an identity that places them as the 'original' inhabitants of the 
area where they live in Syria, despite the fact that they have refugee origin. Can one talk 
about the historical continuity of a group across time if individuals claim no memory of 
their medium-term. past, whilst at the same time claiming links that go back some 
thousands of years? It is usually States that claim long pasts for their nations where none 
existed (Gellner, 1983). The case of Urfalli Christians, whom I discuss in this chapter, is 
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distinctive in that they claim to have a long past but never had a state, and, moreover, 
they do not recall, or are not interested in their time in Urfa before moving to Aleppo. 
One factor can be discarded. According to Anderson, the state's systematic 
historiographical campaign obliges people to forget certain memories (1991: 199-203). 
The collective amnesia of Urfallis is not a result of state control at integration. Turkey 
wanted to expel these Christians. The Christian persecution in the 1920s in Turkey, 
where neighbours, fought one another, is not part of Syrian history and, therefore, the 
Syrian government shows no interest in the memory of this persecution. It is Urfallis 
who expelled themselves from their own past. 
Eriksen has suggested that minority groups follow three ideal types of strategies: 
assimilation with, separation from and subordination to the state control (1993: 1234). 
In practice, minority groups choose combined strategies. Urfallis' attempts at integrating 
themselves into Syrian society, have resulted in the collective amnesia of their past in 
Turkey. Ironically, this prevents them from identifying the origins of their community 
and its endurance. In order to acquire a new identity as Syrians, they have to develop a 
collective history of how their community has constructed relationships with others in 
the wider Syrian society while maintaining their distinctiveness as a community. 
Modem states in the Middle East lack homogeneous national populations, many 
of which are sub-divided along tribal lines (Tibi, 1991: 137-43). According to the 
government propaganda, Syria is a state of ethnically Syrian Arabs. However, they are 
sub-divided into a pre-modem organisation of tribes, who have geographically occupied 
Greater Syria. Within such a political situation, Urfallis have no traditional warrant 
which bestows upon them a pedigree guaranteeing them their ethnic identity, due to the 
collective amnesia of their past. Urfallis identify themselves as Syrian Orthodox 
Christians who are the descendants of Arameans, the dominant tribal people in ancient 
Syria. They thus attempt at integrating their group into the tribes which, ethnically, are 
composed of Syrian Arabs. However, such an attempt to establish their ethnic identity 
in contemporary Syria ironically makes Urfallis inhabit ancient Syria. 
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Refugees or Original Inhabitants? 
The Urfallis settled on vacant land on the outskirts of Aleppo, now called the 
quarter of Ija! as-Suriy5n. As immigrants they did not know Arabic, the major language 
of Syria, and they were unable to integrate easily into the larger society of Aleppo. 
By contrast, Syrian Orthodox Christians in Qabt5n1ya and al-Miilklya in the 
Jazirah region, did not have such experiences as outsiders in society. They had 
established their communities in the places which were located on the Syrian side 
adjacent to the frontier between Turkey and Syria and which were close to their former 
villages in the Turkish side. Moreover, both Qabt5n! ya and al-Mdlkiya used to be 
lightly populated. Both Christians and Kurds settled in Qabtiinlya and al-M51kiya and 
had emigrated from the same area in Turkey. Their neighbouring local Arab tribes, who 
used to be pastoral nomads had often moved across the frontiers between Turkey and 
Syna at the time when borders were porous and national boundaries were rudimentary. 
These Arab tribes had settled on the Syrian side, to where the Christians immigrated. As 
a result, the population composition in these new settlements was almost identical to that 
in their 'homeland' in Turkey. Therefore, Syrian Orthodox Christians who immigrated 
to Qabt5n! ya and al-MdWiya did not have difficulty in affiliating themselves into the 
society, whereas the Urfallis in Aleppo did. 
Isolation was not only the problem for the Urfallis. As the majority had left 
property and houses in Urfa at the time of their emigration, they also experienced 
financial difficulties in reconstructing their lives in the new environment. They 
developed a strong sense of community, due to shared experiences of dislocation and 
isolation. "We had to leave everything in Urfa. We were poor when we started our life in 
Aleppo. We gradually developed a reasonable standard of living in Aleppo by 
cooperating with each other. We achieved it by ourselves without the help of outsiders", 
they recount proudly. While these Christians try to present their community as unit, 
nevertheless, they faced the necessity of adapting to Aleppo's social situation. 
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The most extraordinary aspect of this community is that they claim to have 
forgotten, or at least cannot recall why they actually left Urfa. Throughout my research 
into Syrian Orthodox Christians, it was apparent that the collapse of the Ottoman 
political system, which allowed co-existence of people of different faiths on Turkish 
territory, resulted in bloodshed. The Christians were under threat from the Turks. 
Because of nationalist stirrings in the Balkans, and the important role of the Churches 
there as representatives of their respective ethnoslethnoi, the Ottomans became 
increasingly suspicious of the Christians. They were seen as fifth columnists of Western 
Christian powers and harbingers of the collapse of the Ottoman system. As Christians 
had experienced the sustained trauma of persecution since 1915, the Urfallis must 
therefore have experienced a very critical situation. However, I found that their direct 
and indirect memories of their past in Urfa were fragmented. There must be reasons why 
they forget or conceal their past. A collective amnesia, such as that of Urfallis, is more 
difficult to maintain than for example, a collective mythic memory of origins. This 
chapter examines this conundrum. 
From the time of their immigration until the beginning of 1960s, political and 
economic instability of Syria had a bad effect on the Urfallis. Many of them were poor 
and so needed to integrate themselves into the new region in order not to be 
discriminated against as outsiders by the other populations in Syria, Aleppo in particular. 
Such necessities led them to participating in community's activities. This participation 
had two ideological components. One was to attempt to develop certain activities, such 
as the Scouts and Guides movements and Sports Clubs, which supported Syrian 
nationalism. The second was to promote the distinctive characteristics of the community, 
such as solidarity and unity, which have been nurtured through communal activities. 
The Christians seem to sustain an apparent contradiction in their reconstructed 
history. On the one hand, they merge their community's history with the national history 
of Syria. On the other hand, they claim their community's distinctiveness. This is found 
in other communities that experience an ambiguous and tense relationship with their 
national centres. Cretans present themselves as 'super Greeks' in terms of the retention 
of the national values of courage, resistance, etc., whilst at the same time, despise 
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mainland Greeks (particularly Athenians) as 'soft' and 'corrupted" (Herzfeld, 1985). 
Knudsen has noted that in Corsican history the Corsicans' view of their local society and 
its activities are enacted within the wider framework of traditional egalitarianism, which 
is different from that of national politics, which produces absolute and centralised 
power. Corsicans seem to have dual histories, i. e. local and national histories. According 
to Knudsen, a local community's history is occasionally merged into a national one 
when the locals try to settle local disputes by arbitration by national authorities 
(Knudsen, 1992: 95). The Urfallis had a difficult set of tensions. They had just been 
expelled from across the border. As displaced persons, they had to integrate themselves 
by developing a new identity; they had to develop symbols and a history. As outsiders, 
they had to develop activities that linked them to the wider Syrian society, so as to be 
accepted. 
By the 1970s, the community's ability to adapt to life in Aleppo was no longer a 
significant problem. Their economic conditions had improved and the number of 
educated people in the community had gradually increased. The necessity of adaptation 
into Syrian society gradually declined in importance and they began to view their current 
situation in terms of a new idiom: their development as a community. As the Urfalli 
community has integrated into Aleppiene society, its interest has shifted from how to 
adjust to the new region, to how they can improve their social and economic position 
within the society. Such a change transforms the depiction of their history. However, it 
does not mean that unity and solidarity are no longer important values. 
Urfalli Christians are interested in talking about their past. By doing so, they 
create the ideal image of the community. The following is the account of Abu Salim, 
when a schoolteacher in the community and I asked him to talk about his experiences. 
I was only 13 years old when the French took me and my siblings from Urfa to 
an orphanage in Beirut to be educated (my father had been dead some years). I 
took the Baccalaureate in Beirut and, later, came to Aleppo in order to see my 
family. I worked for an Armenian merchant in Aleppo as his accountant and also 
worked voluntarily as a teacher in the community's elementary school. Later, I 
became a member of the School Committee. I cooperated with members of the 
Charity Committee, who asked donations from community members in order to 
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improve educational quality of the school. We were united under [our 
community's spirit of] mabbba (love). There was no khalaf (difference) of 
opinion between us. We decided to ask Urfallis in the USA for financial help to 
build a new school building. I wrote a letter to my friends with whom I brought 
up together in the orphanage in Beirut and who later emigrated to the States. 
They donated money to our school. 
Individuals, like Abu Salim, are proud of their achievements in the past, and so 
have high hopes for their community's future prosperity by claiming their community's 
principle of mobba (love). They reconstruct their experiences and tell stories of their 
contribution to the community's activities, in which more or less every individual 
member has participated, in order to demonstrate their role in satisfying community's 
ideals. Yet, individual experiences are not only one's personal memories, but also are 
those of communal activities and so constitute part of the community's history. Thus, 
the history can be seen as a dialectical reference for comprehending past events, whilst 
implicitly constructing future objectives. 
Such reconstructed histories are not free from coloration. Historical events or 
examples which do not support their construction of future oriented identity are 
concealed or ignored. For example, not every decision of the School Committee was 
made according the idealistic principles of m4bba. The fact that the Committee 
members favoured children of their relatives through a remission of school fees 
generated conflicts between community members. This was opposed to their ideal of 
'love' and, therefore, was concealed. Their recounted history conveys idealistic 
comments about what problems they faced in those days. It was a hard task for me to 
discover the things that were not told and why they were concealed. Hence we need to 
explore the gap between their reconstructed history and what actually occurred. 
To begin with, the Christian community's continuity with the past is ruptured by 
their ignoring events which took place before their arrival in Aleppo. Ignoring pre- 
expulsion events has generated the anxiety that their origins cannot be identified. 
Therefore, they need to have evidence of their community having endured for centuries. 
Since the 1970s Urfallis have began believing that their living tradition have lasted for 
generations. In the late 1990s, their revivalism led to church services being conducted in 
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Syriac, which they believe has been their liturgical language since ancient times and 
which used to be the everyday language of Syrian Orthodox Christians. As they trace 
the origins of their tradition, their origins are also rediscovered. As Hutton suggests, a 
living tradition is the source for reminding the community's place of origin, even though 
a living tradition might provide only the imaginative representations of one's historical 
identity (Hutton, 1993: 87). Urfallis maintain that the ancient Christians were found all 
over Syria. Thus, their "heritage" of Syriac provides them with an identity as Syrians. 
Syria's regional history and their memory of their traditions thus suggest that the 
ultimate solution for Urfallis (who are in fact immigrants), for securing their position in 
contemporary Syria, resides in identifying their place of origin as Greater Syria. Here 
'Syria' is not so much a bounded nation-state, but a representation of an idea of the past 
conceived in linguistic terms. 
Forgotten Memories of the Community 
The present Urfallis maintain that when most of their community members 
emigrated to Aleppo in 1924, they were not aware that the community had obtained 
permission from the Turkish governor to leave Urfa on the condition that they would not 
return. Only a handful of leaders of the community, who negotiated with Turkish 
officials in Urfa, knew this. Thus many people were waiting for the time to return to 
Urfa. Two years after their emigration, this fact was revealed to the community 
members, who, believing that they were staying only temporarily in Aleppo, lived in 
tents rather than permanent houses. 
When I conducted research between 1997-1998, many Urfallis, who had 
experienced this emigration, or were descendants of the immigrants, did not know the 
reason why their community as a whole had had to abandon their properties and leave 
Urfa. Indeed some educated middle-aged people who knew about my project asked me: 
"Have you found out the reason for our emigration? We have no documents relating to 
the emigration. We did not ask the older generation about the reason why they decided 
to leave Urfa. By 1924, the Turkish massacre of Christians was already over. So why 
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were our elders forced to emigrate? " Yet there are books, which were published in the 
1980s, based on authors' own experiences of the 1915 massacre in Turkey. Educated 
Urfallis must have read some of these books and knew about the massive social 
disturbance and expulsion of Christians from Turkey, which lasted for three years after 
1915. This knowledge and awareness appears to have filtered through to the 
contemporary community. We are thus witnessing an example of collective (oral) 
amnesia in the face of historical (written) documentation. The question posed by Urfallis 
is why their ancestors were obliged to leave Urfa in 1924 after they stayed in Urfa at its 
most difficult time. Their fragmented memories can no longer help them understand the 
reason of their displacement and emigration, their social situation of Urfa, and their lives 
on the eve of their immigration. 
There are cracks in this sustained official amnesia, but these do not amount to a 
radical collective rethink. Some elder Urfalli Christians remember that the Turks 
confiscated arms from Christians in Urfa and in 1915 started to arrest influential men. 
Some of them were deported, and others were tortured and killed at a ravine near Kara 
Koepru (Black Bridge). This incident is confirmed by historical sources (Yonan, 1996: 
214). However, Urfallis never recall the disaster of their neighbours, the Armenians in 
Urfa. By contrast, Armenians express their harsh experiences in public. Syrian Orthodox 
Christians oppresses their memories, whereas Armenians do not. This seems to be 
related to the fact that Syrian Orthodox Christians do not establish their nation 
(Armenians did) and have to coexist with other dominant groups. An autobiography 
written by an Armenian pastor, Jemazian, who lived in the Syrian Christian quarter in 
Urfa at that time and later emigrated to the United States, recollects how Armenians 
were in a vulnerable situation in 1915. By then, the Armenians had began to realise that 
their peaceful compliance with Turkish authorities only brought them increased 
oppression from the Turks and the gradual elimination of their leaders and young men. 
The Armenians thus decided on an honourable death through active resistance 
(Jemazian, 1990: 75). 
Although Syrian Orthodox Christians lived in their own quarter and were not 
involved in the fighting, except for small numbers who lived in the Armenian quarter, 
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there must certainly be reasons why such a crucial incident cannot be recalled. Possibly 
a fear of annihilation seems to have made them forget the incidence. But it also shows 
how their ethnic identity does not encompass other Christian groups. In short, it 
indicates separate histories and separate identities - hardly a sign of collective action by 
the different ethnic groups, but confirming the 'fruit cake' nature of Ottoman society. 
Each group is distinct and retains its own identity. Nor did the subsequent experiences 
of the Urfallis encourage them to re-evaluate their recent past and establish an empathic 
identification with the Armenians who experienced far harsher treatment than they 
probably experienced. Indeed many Urfallis then and now understand Armenian. 
Written accounts provide some clues to apparent oral amnesia. Jemazian 
describes how the situation became vulnerable again after 1919 (ibid.: 115-9). The 
British army which occupied Urfa for eight months in 1919 supplied arms to the Turks 
for fighting against the French. After the British relinquished Cilicia and Syria to the 
French, they withdrew from Urfa. The armistice of Mudros in 1918 ended the First 
World War, and Mustafia Kemal launched an effective military campaign to promote 
Pan-Turkish nationalism. When a French battalion of infantrymen came to Urfa in 1920 
the local Turks in Urfa gave the French an ultimatum to leave the city. When the French 
refused, the Turks immediately began to attack them. After two months of fighting, the 
French surrendered, due to being outnumbered by the enemy, a severe winter, and the 
lack of food. 
Some older Syrian Orthodox Christians remember the tragedy of the French and 
the forty Syrian Orthodox Christians who had followed them: 
The Turks had promised the French safety if they took the mountain route to 
Syria, i. e. to Aleppo. Some Syrian Orthodox Christians worrying about safety of 
the French suggested to them that they took the roads in the plains of Harran 
instead. The French refused, trusting the Turks. The French fell into a trap set by 
the Turks who slaughtered them in a deep ravine. Heads of murdered French 
soldiers were displayed at the city centre of Urfa, and Turks had celebrated their 
victory for three days. Syrian Orthodox Christians feared that it might be their 
turn to be slaughtered. 
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Elder Syrian Orthodox Christians recollect that their community did not side with the 
French, even though a small number of people joined them and, consequently, were 
killed in the ravine. Their memories emphasise the treacherous characteristics of the 
Turks. Their narratives highlight the feelings of being helpless victims about to be 
slaughtered. However, they were not able to locate this incident in wider regional 
politics. There is a gap in their memories of events between the aftermath of the French 
incident (1920) and their emigration in 1924. One elderly man told me of an account 
which he printed in order to deliver a lecture. According to him the arrest of 
community's intellectuals by the Turkish authorities was the immediate reason for their 
emigration (Tourna, n. d.: 8-9). However, it appears Touma confused incidents which 
occurred after 1920 with the arrests and slaughter of Syrian Christian men near the 
Black Bridge in 1915. 
The people to whom I spoke had left Urfa as children and, consequently, were 
unable to understand what happened. Their elders did not tell them or concealed the 
events that occurred on the eve of their emigration. It is highly probable that the elders 
feared for their community's safety. Manipulation and fragmentation of their memories 
thus prevented them from linking the fear of annihilation, generated by the slaughter of 
the French, to their departure from "home". Instead of Urfallis saying: "we left because 
it was life threatening for us", they appear not to remember the Turkish atrocities. It is 
an unlikely scenario that a handful of community's leaders were able to mobilise 5,000 
people without saying why they were leaving. 
A person who experienced the emigration and wrote a book about the 
community's history is Yusef N5mek. Although he was a small boy at the time of the 
emigration, he recounted the events. In his book, as well as in my conversations with 
him, he explained the reason of their emigration in a broader political perspective. Yet 
he gave me a political analysis of the situation rather than grounding his account in the 
actual experiences of the community, i. e. a non-participant's account rather than a 
personalised account based on experience. His view is that the existence of Christians in 
Turkey gave the British and the French justification for interference into Turkish affairs. 
In order to stabilise the social and political situation and to eliminate foreign 
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interference, Mustafa Kemal encouraged the Christians to leave Turkey voluntarily by 
spreading fear among the Christian population and causing them to panic (NAmek, 1991: 
42). This is regarded by community members as N5mek's personal view of the 
emigration, as his view is not confirmed by 'memories' which describe the process of 
emigration from Urfa. Although his interpretation may be correct, what is interesting to 
note is that nobody in the community talks about how their fear of the Turks had been 
generated within the community. As Bozon points out, "the memory of the oppressed ... 
is first and foremost an oppressed memory" (Bozon, 1990: 40). 
Memories of Community Unity 
Although Urfallis left Urfa without having acquired permission to enter Syria, 
they were allowed to stay in Aleppo as refugees. Some families had relatives in Aleppo, 
who were able to afford to accommodate them for a short while. Even though the Syrian 
Orthodox Bishop, Siurerius Ephreim Barýum, petitioned the French delegation to 
construct a refugee camp for them and give them tents, the Church was unable to 
provide them with financial aid. The Urfalli reftigees were poor and spoke Turkish and 
Armenian. They did not know Arabic, the lingua fi-anca, of Syria. It was very difficult 
for them to integrate into Aleppiene local society. Syrian Orthodox Christians in Urfa 
might have had intimate relationships with the Armenians. By the fear of being 
identified as Armenians and being persecuted, Syrian Orthodox Christians concealed 
their relationship with the Armenians and claimed separated identity. 
In a bid to resolve their isolation and economic problems, in the 1920s and 
1930s, many Urfalli Syrian Orthodox Christians converted to Catholicism supported by 
the French Mandate in order to get food and assistance. Contemporary Urfallis do not 
mention that they or their family members became Catholics then in order to obtain flour 
and scholarships for their children. Thus hidden parts of their history emerge only when 
some community members mention their own or families' contribution to welfare. Such 
narratives suggest that around seventy-five percent of the community converted 
temporarily to Catholicism. 
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In their narratives, contemporary Urfallis maintain that the Catholic Church gave 
food and money to poor Urfallis in exchange for handing over their identity cards to 
Catholic priests. The Catholic priests then used these cards to change the government 
registration of the Urfalli Orthodox Christians to that of Catholics. Contemporary 
Urfallis interpret such an incident as an example of how the Catholics attempted to steal 
"our" people: "it was difficult to convert Protestants to Catholics because they are 
supported by Americans. However, it is easy to make the people of the Wooden Chapel 
(i. e. Urfallis) convert to Catholicism. When we give them food and money, they will 
bend to us. " Contemporary Urfallis maintain that the Catholics took advantage of their 
precariousness. Lack of Arabic and of political support isolated them in the large society 
of Aleppo. Conversion into Catholicism may also have been an attempt at protection by 
the French. 
Table 1. Changes of Urfalli Languages 
Year/ Prior to 1924- 1970s 1990S 
Language 1920 (Urfa) (Immigration 
To Aleppo) 
Official Turkish Arabic Arabic Arabic 
Language 
Liturgical Turkish Turkish Turkish to Syriac 
Language Syriac 
Common Armenian/ Armenian Arabic/ Arabic 
Language Turkish Armenian (Armenian) 
The unity of the community as a single Orthodox Christian one is highly valued 
nowadays. According to oral history, in the face of apostasy to Catholicism, some key 
individuals, i. e. members of the Board of Trustees and other committee members, 
decided to construct a church building in 1932. Although they already had a humble 
wooden chapel, built in 1926, an appeal was made for donations to build a larger stone 
church. Once the donations reached the necessary amount for materials for foundations, 
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the community leaders asked the bishop's permission to construct a new church. Due to 
shortage of funds, men and women voluntarily donated their labour. According to their 
accounts, once they began, the foundations were completed almost miraculously in one 
day. They maintain that this achievement was a result of cooperation between the 
community members: men were engaged in the building work and women fetched water 
from a well and carried it to the construction site. 
The building of the church had another significance. It showed that in spite of 
some conversion to Catholicism, members of the community could rally together to 
distinguish their church from that of the Catholics. The fact that they were able to 
construct a large stone edifice also enforces their importance of their church. The church 
is thus a historical marker and provides a symbol to reflect upon and proclaim their 
unity, despite their poverty. However, such ideals do not always reflect the realities of 
the past. In reality, the community was unable to collect enough money to buy materials 
to complete the construction. They got loans from a Syrian Orthodox Christian in 
another community in Aleppo. This led to many debates with many suggesting its 
postponement. Indeed, due to financial difficulties, it took twenty years to complete the 
building. The road to a completed church is paved with many debates. 
Apostatised Urfallis returned to the Syrian Orthodox Church, when the Catholic 
Church no longer provided economic aid to its congregation after the French Mandate 
force withdrew from Syria in 1946. They ironically rhyme: "No more flour, no more 
[Catholic] religion (Oum bitti Din bith)". This suggests that although they yielded to 
Catholics proselytising, they did not renounce their faith in Orthodoxy and, therefore, 
they returned to the Syrian Orthodox Church soon after resources dried up. They turn 
the story into a moral about their resistance to the Catholics' attempts to divide their 
community: Due to their maintenance of their Orthodox Christian faith, the community 
were once again united. However, they do not mention that the return of the converted to 
the Orthodox Christian faith occurred at the time when being Catholics was no longer 
politically important to secure a position in the larger society. Indeed that it may even 
have been a liability. 
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The most urgent task for the Urfalli community was to integrate themselves into 
the new region, i. e. Syria. The historical accounts of the community's elementary 
school, which Urfalli Syrian Orthodox Christians established and developed by 
themselves, emphasise how they made efforts to improve their ability in Arabic. Their 
accounts suggest that the community was eager to educate children in Arabic following 
a curriculum adopted by the schools in Aleppo. It seems they regarded adoption of the 
Syrian educational system as a means of indicating their affiliation to society. There 
was, however, a problem in that their educated members only spoke Turkish, not Arabic. 
By the late 1920s and 1930s, several youth groups recognised such problems of 
the poor educational standard in the community's school. The ultimate concern was to 
raise funds and hire a teacher from outside the community who was able to teach Arabic. 
By the late 1930s, the first generation who had been educated in Aleppo had become 
teachers in the community's elementary school. Former pupils, teachers and the school 
committee organised parties and film sessions for the community and used the profits to 
employ competent teachers. The following is a recollection by Maryam, who worked as 
a teacher of the community's elementary school in the 1940s. 
I went to a girls' school in the Annenian quarter, which had the reputation of 
giving good Arabic language education. Although it was difficult to catch up 
with classes taught in Arabic, I finished my five-year elementary education in 
1942. As I wanted to earn wages and help my father, I worked for a stocking 
manufacturer. Then, at the age of fourteen, I got a job in the community's 
elementary school as an Arabic teacher. I taught the children the alphabet and 
read stories in Arabic. This had been the way I had been educated during my 
school days. At the time of my marriage in 195 1,1 stopped working as a teacher. 
As I had only elementary school education, my father thought that my 
qualification would not be enough to get a good job in future, if I should need it. 
He encouraged me to learn skills as a seamstress. My father was right. When my 
husband became unable to work due to his illness, I had worked as a seamstress 
at home for twenty-two years. 
Maryam's narrative can be examined from the dimensions of both personal and 
collective histories. As an individual, Maryam was fortunate, as her father was interested 
in girl's education and was able to afford to send her a school outside the community, 
which had high educational standards. ' However due to poverty, Maryam, like many 
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girls of the community, who started to work at ages between ten and thirteen in tobacco 
and sweet factories, got a job in a stocking factory after finishing her elementary 
education. In those days, knowledge of Arabic and the acquisition of skills as artisans 
were important for economic advancement. Her good command of Arabic and later her 
skill as a seamstress helped provide her with an income. 
Such personal histories must be placed in the framework of the community's 
history. History concerns itself with social change and how the change is understood by 
people in the present. Individual memory can be extended beyond the scope of an 
individual subject and can be placed in a collective tradition (Halbwachs, 1992: 81-3). 
What is critical about these accounts is that they are not merely personal life stories. 
They are also stories about how the collectivity improved itself gradually. Individuals 
peg the collective history of the groups onto their own personal trajectories. Individual 
memories of the school are recounted within the framework of proving how the 
community was gradually integrated into Syrian society and progressively improved its 
lot. The history which is reconstructed on the basis of such narratives provides 
contemporary Urfallis with collective characteristics indicating that the community 
improved its educational standards, which they regard as a distinctive achievement. 
When I carried out fieldwork in the late 1990s, all the people who told me about 
history of the school mentioned that community members made many efforts to solve 
educational problems. Until the 1960s, the educational standards of the community's 
school lagged behind those of other schools in Aleppo. However, what the present 
community members express through their narratives of the school history is different 
from what community members in past tended to achieve through school activities. By 
the late 1990s, Urfallis were fully integrated into life in Aleppo and their adaptability to 
life in Syria was no longer so problematic. Since their immigration to Syria, the 
community had undergone massive social and economic changes. As a result, the 
adaptation strategies which had been adopted until the 1960s seem now to be a little out 
of place. Currently, Urfallis are more interested in relating their history from the view 
point of their economic improvement and the acquisition of better social positions. The 
community replaces old strategies of integration into Syrian society with new strategies 
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for climbing the social ladder. Consequently, their reconstructed history ignores the fact 
that Arabic education used to be a means of indicating their affiliation to society. 
Community Activities and National Politics 
As Blok has noted, historical time is perceived by memory of social events 
(1992: 124-5). Urfallis attempted to affiliate the community to the wider society of Syria 
through their alliance with nation-wide political movements. Many political movements 
in Syria were linked to the Scouts movement and Sports Clubs which started their 
activities in the 1930s. This was at a time of an upsurge of Arab nationalism and Syrian 
nationalism demanded independence for Syria. Urfallis organised football teams and an 
Urfalli regiment of Boy Scouts was established. These nation-wide associations 
provided a framework in which each group could find its place. 
Contemporary Urfallis still consider these activities as important. The political 
background between the 1930s and 1950s has to be taken into consideration. Many 
Syrian Christians supported Syrian nationalism developed by the Syrian Nationalist 
Party which was founded in the early 1930s by a Lebanese Orthodox Christian, Antun 
Sa'ada. Syrian Nationalists (a]-qawm[ Si1n) strove to create a modem and secular Syrian 
nation embracing a greater geographical Syria extending to the Suez Canal in the south 
and proclaimed that the nation was a synthesis of the Phoenician and Arab people and 
their culture. 2 Their supporters were spread throughout Syria and Lebanon and were 
mainly non-Muslims, as Syrianism developed as an alternative ideology competing with 
Arab nationalism and appeared to protect rights of small groups in Syria (Petran, 1972 
: 734). When the anti-French campaign erupted in 1936, the National Block, Wa! anl, 
which was one of the groups led by young people as a movement of Syrian nationalism, 
emerged from a Boy Scouts movement (Erlich, 2000: 60). 
Urfalli group activities started in the 1930s in Ijai as-Suriyfin were attempts to 
establish their identity as Syrians through political alliance with Syrian nationalists. 
Their groups adopted Syriac names which indicated their cultural origins. For example, 
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Ninawa (Nineveh) and the Aryo (Lion), which symbolise the Assyrian Empire. Lah"tat 
Lishono ([mother] tongue lovers) and ko Lishono (Church language), which were the 
first groups to organise Scouts. The use of Syriac names emphasised the Syrian 
Orthodox Christians' right to be acknowledged as citizens of the nation state of Syria - 
their spiritual and actual home. Even though liturgical services in the Urfalli community 
were mostly conducted in Turkish in the 1930s, they learnt Syriac hymns in the 
community's elementary school. They attempted to identify their cultural and political 
origins with Syria by tracing the roots of their liturgical language. By doing so, their 
identity merged into Syrian identity and they were able to incorporate their activities into 
national movements. 
As representatives of the community, the Sports Clubs participated in sports 
competitions and national celebrations, such as Independence Day and the Celebration 
of the French Withdrawal. The Boy Scouts movement of Udi as-Suriyin was registered 
as the Sixth Regiment (al-Fauji as-Sddis) in Aleppo. Syrian Orthodox Christian Scouts 
regiments from different regions participated in sports competitions in the rally on an 
equal basis to other regiments which were composed of different religious and ethnic 
groups coming from all over Syria. Participation in these public events meant firstly, that 
their community was officially recognised as an organisation having rights to participate 
in governmental political events and, secondly, that they were admitted as one of the 
independent groups which constitute the Scouts or Sports Club Association in Syria. 
Before the Unification with Egypt in 1958 when both the Scouts and the Sports 
Club activities flourished, Syria's political situation was unstable. The deciding factor in 
Syrian politics was the control of the national army. In 1955, Adnan Malki, Deputy 
Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army, was assassinated by a Syrian nationalist, and both 
Ba'athists and Communists seized on the murder as a chance to remove the Syrian 
nationalists. Due to the party's set back, Syrian nationalists called on supporters to 
coordinate a military uprising. However, due to Israel's invasion of Sinai in 1956, Syrian 
nationalists postponed their operations. Later, their plot was discovered and the leaders 
were arrested and persecuted (Rathmell, 1995: 97-98,120-123; Seale, 1965: 241-2). 
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Leaders of the Scouts and the Sports Club in Ijai as-Suriy5n were supporters of 
Syrian nationalists. As the present regime is controlled by the Ba'athists, Syrian 
Christians were not willing to talk to me, an outsider, about how these youth groups 
participated in political movements in the 1950s. Yet, in the course of the purge of 
Syrian nationalists, disputes occurred between the young people in the community. For 
example, some Communist members of the community informed against the Syrian 
nationalist supporters in the community to the authorities and, consequently, these 
supporters were arrested. This is a typical example of internal divisions which exist in 
the Urfalli community, yet which were concealed under the umbrella of the Scouts and 
Sports Clubs. 
Political alignments can change with amazing rapidity. Political alliance is a 
risky strategy leaving the small and the powerless, such as Urfallis, particularly 
vulnerable. Although Urfallis are proud of the contribution of the Scouts and Sports 
Club activities to unifying their youth and presenting the community as part of Syrian 
society, what they learnt is that political alliances should not be used as a means of 
establishing a secure position in Syrian society. Therefore, contemporary Urfallis are no 
longer interested in getting involved in political movements. 
When Asad came into power, the Sports Clubs and the Scouts came under state 
control. The community lost interest in the Sports Clubs and the Scouts, in 1972 when 
the government issued a new regulation that certain sports clubs should merge into one. 
The Urfalli Christian Sports Club was merged with other Christian clubs of the Syrian 
Catholic and Greek Orthodox. Apart from the practical difficulties in managing the 
united club, it lost its social significance as the community's club of Urfallis. Urfallis 
resent the loss of their right solely to manage their own Club. 
Something similar occurred to the Scouts Association. In the 1980s, the 
government launched a campaign to bring youth movements further under its control. 
The Scouts Association was displaced by the Ba'ath Party's Youth Association and was 
deprived of its function of integrating Middle Eastern youth. The only way the Urfalli 
Scouts regiment could survive was to transform itself into a yquth group for religious 
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education under the authority of the Syrian Orthodox Church. They do not think that to 
portray their community as a religious (Christian) group will contribute to affiliating 
them into Syrian society whose majority are Muslims. Consequently, the community lost 
interest in the Scouts activities. 
These accounts suggest that the community possessed its own local organisations 
which had a representative function. When these groups lost their independence, as the 
community's political representatives, they no longer held importance for the 
community. The decline of the Scout and the Sports Clubs suggests that they had 
meaning only when such groups participated in state politics and the state acknowledged 
their political rights and identity. In this sense, the history of these groups was merged 
into national history. 
Syria as their Home 
Under the state control of collective activities Urfaiii Christians lost the means 
through the Sports Clubs and the Scouts, to identify the community as part of Syrian 
society. In the 1980s, Urfallis have become concerned about their political and social 
position in Syria. Urfallis say, "we left everything behind in Urfa, except our faith 
(im5n)". As their memory of Urfa has faded, the community's continuity with the past 
has ruptured. However, the fact that they have refugee origin remains. Urfallis need to 
have evidence to prove the apparent continuity of their community and its relation to 
Syria. They find it through their religious traditions. They recollect that even at times of 
adversity, soon after their immigration to Aleppo, children studied the Bible, sang Syriac 
hymns and recited part of liturgy in Syriac in the community's school. 
Syriac as their liturgical language presents a problem for the Syrian Orthodox 
Christians, as, in fact, they have retained only a limited knowledge of Syriac. When they 
lived in Urfa, Turkish was the official language. They have not and did not use Syriac as 
their common language. Due to their poor knowledge of Syriac, there are current 
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attempts to revive the religious and cultural heritage of the community through holding 
Syriac courses for both children and adults. 
The revival of Syriac started in the 1970 (see Table 1). Until then liturgical 
services had been mostly conducted in Turkish by priests who were trained by 
immigrants from Urfa. In 1976 a young priest from the Jazirah region was appointed to 
work for the Urfalli community in Aleppo and young priests from the community were 
then ordained. These started to use Syriac for the religious services. They had been 
educated in Syria, together with Muslims and Christians from other denominations. 
Currently, many community members welcome this revivalism of Syriac as a movement 
of creating the threads between the Syrian Christians' present and its past. It is also a 
means of distinguishing themselves from other Christian denominations. 
As the current Urfallis regard themselves as Aleppienes (inhabitants of Aleppo), 
they wish to conceal their origin as refugees from Turkey. Therefore, the revival of 
Syriac is a means for them to identify themselves as Syrians. They maintain that Syriac 
was used in the southern part of present-day Turkey, including Urfa, as well as in Syria. 
Therefore, the connection was not lost. 
One attempt to prove such origins is the installation of a stone carving which 
illustrates an ancient legend of King Abjar the Black of Edessa (present-day Urfa). 
Committee members in the community planned the renovation of the community's 
church and decided to install the stone carving in front of the church door. This carving 
gives eminence to the Syrian kingdom, as the first Christian dynasty, where the people 
spoke Syriac. The carving tells the story of King Abjar who sent a mission to Jesus to 
ask him to come to Edessa and cure his disease. Jesus said that he could not go to 
Edessa, but one of his disciples would go. This disciple cured the king who, 
consequently, became the first Christian King in the world 3. As Urfa used to be a centre 
of ancient Christians of Greater Syria, this legend makes it possible for them to identify 
themselves as descendants of the ancient Christians of Syria. 
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Figure 3. King Abjar the Black of Edessa at St. George's Church, Aleppo 
E2 
Present Urfallis also try to find evidence that ancient Syrian Christians lived in the 
area of Aleppo. They organise one-day trips to visit areas, such as Jabal Barisha outside 
Aleppo, looking for ruins of ancient Syrian Christian villages. For example, they can see 
that the second century Roman road along with ancient Christian villages connected 
Antioch, i. e. an ancient Christian centre, to Aleppo. From this, they assume that their 
ancestors lived in this part of Syria. This affirms the persistent presence of Syrian 
Christian community in Syria, and hence the continuity of their group. Even though 
Urfallis moved from one place, i. e. Urfa, to the other, i. e. Aleppo, both of them are within 
the territory of the 'land of their fathers'. By reconstructing their history in such a way, 
they try to make a connection between the religious history of their community and 




The problem which the Urfallis face is that they need to be accepted by the 
nation state not only as citizens of Syria, but also a community in its own right. Urfalli 
Syrian Orthodox Christians use the Arabic word rjifa to describe their community. The 
word can imply both a community in social terms and a religious group. Current group 
activities aim at presenting their community as a successor to the ancient Syrian 
Christians, so that their tjifa has been in this region prior to the invasion of Arabs from 
the Arabian Peninsula. They try to conceal their refugee origin and define their 
community as 'original' inhabitants of Syria. Urfallis have turned to archaeology and 
langua: ge and education as means to establish their identity. Education enabled people to 
be evaluated on the same criteria without taking their social background into 
consideration. Educational achievements elevated not just individuals but also enable the 
community to conceal its origins. They describe how they have achieved their ideals, 
such as unity, cooperation and solidarity of community members, in order to integrate 
themselves into Aleppiene society. These ideals are regarded by them as distinctive 
characteristics of their ffifa. 
When attempting to establish their historical right to be in Syria, the gap between 
oral memories, those recounted in stories people tell, and written histories becomes 
evident. As we have seen, there appears to be an oral amnesia in the Urfalli community. 
Little is mentioned about life in Turkey nor about their expulsion or emigration, 
although some data is available in historical accounts. Ile reason why such accounts 
appear not to have filtered down into oral culture could partly be explained because of 
inability in Arabic among the older generations. Written accounts about the Christian 
persecution were obtainable, but they were unable to read them in Arabic. Furthermore, 
the few individuals who had some restricted literacy in Turkish did not write because the 
young were being educated in Arabic. The formal model available to individuals does 
not appear to have been the autobiography or personal narrative ("I was there; I saw 
this... ") as in the West, but rather the formal model of grand political actors and 
geopolitics. There is however the problem of why the Urfallis never seem to talk about 
their expulsion. This is very different to the Armenians who have kept strong traditions 
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of expulsion and genocide alive, and whose experiences the Urfallis certainly were 
aware of before their own expulsion. Urfallis actually interacted with Armenians before 
and after, and spoke the language. Isolation cannot be advanced as an explanation. 
We must therefore look to other reasons. One might be that the Urfallis, realising 
their time in Turkey was up, decided as a small group, to try to camouflage their alterity 
in Syria as much as possible. The other 6migrds in other parts of Syria maintained links 
with their past, but the Urfallis had to adjust to a novel and uncertain political situation 
in Syria that threatened to replicate their immediate past. Some did indeed align 
themselves with the French and converted to Catholicism, ultimately a risky strategy in 
the face of rising Arab nationalism. Their suggestion that they have always maintained 
their Orthodox Christian faith is contradicted by the facts and requires a vocabulary of 
justification. Others began supporting Syrian nationalism which equally turned out to be 
risky. A lesson for outsiders in the Middle East, and one that the Urfallis know only too 
well, is that political alignments can change with amazing rapidity leaving the small and 
the powerless particularly vulnerable. Religious identity and political alignment are 
therefore weak or risky strategies for the construction of ethnic identity or as strategies 
for incorporation in the wider society. Christianity in any case differentiates them from 
their Muslim neighbours. 
Having concealed their origin, Urfallis have tried to identify themselves as 
descendants of the original inhabitants of Syria. They claim that their original language 
is Syriac and that it is the remnant of the original language spoken in Syria. Since the 
1970s, Syriac has been revived as their liturgical language to articulate their identity 
with Syria. Their memory of Syriac hymns and the liturgy is now shown as proof that 
Syria is the 'land of their fathers". 
Herein lies the irony of their predicament. Syrian Christians appear to have been 
expelled from their own original homeland, and they conceal their insecurity by 
claiming to be the descendants of the original aboriginal inhabitants of the land they now 
live in, even before the invasions of the Arab tribes. They are refugees from their own 
past and guests in a future that might not be theirs. If as Lucette, Valensi (1990) has 
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suggested 'to be Jewish is to remember', perhaps 'to forget is to be Syrian' - which may 
be even more fraught. 
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Chapter 3. Notes 
1 In the 1930s, the old Sunni elite in Syria as well as prominent Christians tended to send their youngsters 
to private schools and neglected state affiliated education (Hourani, 1946: 93-5). Urfalli Syrian Orthodox 
Christians who wanted to give their children a better education tried to follow such a trend in education 
and sent them to either American or French schools. Parents who were unable to afford to send their 
children to these private schools educated their children in government schools, which had a good 
reputation, outside the community. 
2 The contemporary discourse of Syrian nationalism advocated by Syrian Orthodox Christians defines 
Syria in terms of geographical and cultural unity of the land of ancient Arameans. This proto-Syrianism 
shares some ideological aspects with that of Syrian Nationalists in the 1930s. See Chapter 7. 
3 The panel in the church of ýIai as-Suriyin represents the Urfalli Christians' version of the legend of King 
Abjar the Black. The panel depicts a messenger of the king, Iýannan, reporting to him about his meeting 
with Jesus. As Jesus had said that as he was unable to visit Edessa, he would send his disciple to cure the 
king's disorder. The king had ordered his mission to bring back a portrait of Jesus, if Jesus could not visit 
him. The panel shows Ijannan with a cloth on which the face of Jesus is printed. This print was 




Changes in Marriage Ceremonies: Some Reflections on Problems in the 
Urfalli Community 
Introduction 
As analysed in the last chapter, Urfallis developed idealised characteristics for 
their community when recounting its history. They recount that they cooperated together 
in order to affiliate themselves to Syrian society and improve their social position there. 
Unity of the community, which they have achieved through community's activities, is 
one of the most important characteristics of the Urfalli community. Despite their 
idealistic statements of love and unity, there are conflicts and differences between 
community members. This chapter examines how their statements of such ideals do, in 
fact, reveal that there are social differences among community members which divide 
them. This chapter, also, relates the changes in their marriage ceremonies, and the 
reasoning behind them. Urfallis maintain that they have promoted changes in marriage 
rites in order to create good relationships between affines and between community 
members. As a result of their efforts, ideological changes have occurred and enable them 
to establish good relationships between community members. Such historical accounts 
can be seen as a dialectical reference for comprehending past events, whilst indicating 
current problems in their community. In fact education, professions, and marriage 
choices, create social differences between them. 
All members in the community have been involved in marriage negotiations or 
attended ceremonies. They can share such experiences and can demonstrate reasons 
why they have changed marriage customs. Thus, the community develops a collective 
repository of knowledge of how adaptation have been made to customs so as to deal 
with problems in the community. As Fentress and Wikharn mention, personal experience 
and collective knowledge are brought together and thus emphasises the relevance of the 
former for understanding the latter (1992: 99). 
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Both cider and younger generations maintain that the transformation of 
marriage started in the 1960s. This was the time when the economic situation of the 
Urfalli community improved and they developed the desire to establish a better social 
position in Aleppiene society. In the 1960s, the first educated generation among the 
community members acquired qualifications to enable them to become senior 
government officials, and young artisans expanded new economic opportunities. As 
Baron has mentioned in her study of Cairene society, when a younger generation 
introduces more efficient ways of improving lives both economically and socially, they 
challenge traditional ideas about the family and, consequently, reshape its relationships 
(1991: 287). As Urfalli youth acquired modem values and skills which are effective 
means for climbing the social ladder, dependence of the younger generations on their 
fathers and elder family members was no longer obligatory, and the balance of power 
between the generations started to shift. In this process of social change, the community 
has started to discard traditional ways of marriage negotiations and ceremonies. 
Urfallis embody strategies for distancing themselves from what they conceive 
to be archaic marriage customs which had been practised in their time in Urfa. In their 
history of marriage, Urfalli Christians explain that they discarded the traditional ways of 
marriage negotiations and wedding celebrations in order to create good relationships 
between the bride's and the bridegroom's families and to enforce conjugal unity. This 
idealistic statement reflects two interrelated facets. First, by adopting the Aleppiene way 
of wedding celebrations they try to conceal their origin as outsiders and claim their 
affiliation to Aleppine society. Second, they attempt to demonstrate improvement in 
their social position by showing their economic ability to prepare a flat for a newly-wed 
couple and hold a wedding reception, in a similar way to that of middle class 
Aleppienes. These new customs have created a financial burden on the groom's side 
who are responsible for these expenses. This change affords the bride's side the 
leverage to negotiate with the groom's side. The former can request the latter to follow 
the new customs. The new customs, which they maintain have contributed to 
constructing good relationships between the two families, in fact, create tensions 
between them. A contradiction is found between their ideal statement of the 
relationships and what is actually brought by the changes. 
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As Friedman has mentioned, current practices of constructing social identity 
reflect ways of reconstructing a community's history (1992: 853). The historical 
narratives on the transformation of Urfalli marriage customs are attempts to let slip the 
old values which had been maintained since the Christians' time in Urfa. Their 
description of old marriage rites does not always reflect what they used to be. By 
examining how Urfalli Christians perceive these changes, it becomes clear why they 
need to demonstrate them in a particular way and what problems the community has 
faced and are facing. Urfallis recount the changes of marriage rites as if they have 
contributed to promoting changes in family and conjugal relationships and so has 
become a source for constructing their new identity. For example, the rites which 
formally displayed control exercised by elders, the bridegroom's parents in particular, 
were discarded and were replaced with new rites which present ideas for respect and 
equality between spouses and for creating good relationships between their natal 
families. These ideas in fact reflect problems, such as a husband's control over his wife 
and alienation of affines, which the community currently face. Furthermore, they stress 
their respect for 'modem' values, which new marriage ceremonies embody, and are 
proud of such an attitude as a positive characteristic of the community'. Ironically to 
forget the old customs means to lose group's characteristics, which they have succeeded 
for generations and which are proof of the endurance of their community. 
Problems of Contemporary Marriage 
The community reproduces itself by maintaining the tendency to choose their 
spouses from among community members. Second and third cousin marriage of both 
maternal and paternal sides have been common. However, the marriage law of the 
Syrian Orthodox Church used to forbid marriages between first cousins and marriage of 
a person to his/her sister/brother-in-law. Since social differences based on professional 
qualifications emerged in the community in the 1960s, social stratification of the 
educated, well-off artisans and traders, and ordinary and poor artisans has gradually 
became apparent within the Urfalli Syrian Orthodox Christian community. Thus, their 
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marriage choices can be related to current social problems in the community. Marriage 
choices became a marker for indicating social position and, therefore, widen social 
differentiation among community members. Educated men and well-off businessmen 
choose girls who are educated as their appropriate spouses. Consequently, marriages 
between educated men and women are conducted across family lines and contribute 
towards creating a socially respected social stratum. By contrast, poor male artisans, 
who are less educated and have only small financial resources, are finding it difficult to 
find girls with good qualifications or those from professional families. Similarly, less 
educated daughters of such artisan families have limited opportunities for being 
proposed to by professional men. Consequently, the idea of strengthening the unity of a 
family through marriages between close relatives has become of significance in order to 
justify and facilitate marriages of ordinary and less educated community members. 
Marriages of close relatives, marriage between first cousins in particular, have 
been of a great concern for the Urfalli community in Al eppo. As poor artisans tended to 
choose marriage partners within a circle of their relatives, such popular demand has 
influenced the Syrian Orthodox Church to change its marriage law and accept first 
cousin marriage in the early 1970s. Such a change has promoted a preference to choose 
close relatives as spouses and has enhanced the idea of the community maintaining its 
homogeneity. 
However, marriage between patrilateral first cousins, first parallel cousins in 
particular, is religiously and biologically regarded by community members as 
undesirable due to their closeness. The solution they adopt in order to reduce possible 
number of marriages between patrilateral first parallel cousins is for the father to choose 
his brother as his son's godparent (qadbo) when the boy is baptised. This boy and the 
daughters of his godparent are regarded as quasi-siblings (who are also in the 
relationship of patrilateral first parallel cousins) and, therefore, are forbidden to marry. 
They thus overlay biological kinship with fictive kinship. In the case of a girt, either her 
father's brother's wife, or her father's sister if her father's brother is not married, 
becomes her godmother (qadba). This relationship between the godchild and her 
godparent forbids this girl to marry her godparent's son (who is either her patrilateral 
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first parallel cousin or patrilateral first cross cousin). Marriages between close relatives 
have changed the choice of godparents who used to be chosen from non-relatives. 
Although the previous pattern of choosing godparents is no longer traceable, community 
members remember when it began to change. 
Changes in settlement patterns at marriage coincided with the improvement of 
economic situation of the community. There has been a movement from patri- 
virilocality to neo-locality. A married couple used to remain in the bridegroom's 
family's household. Small and poor limestone houses with galvanised tin roofs, which 
the first generation of the community built after their purchase of the land, were the 
houses of extended families (newly-wed couples having joined the grooms' families). 
Even though these limestone houses are too small to accommodate big extended 
families, due to the poor economic situation, they had no choice but to share this small 
space. These houses have gradually been replaced by modem flats. This movement 
started in 1936, when building contractors demolished old houses and built concrete four 
or five storey blocks, on the condition that the previous owners exchanged their right to 
the land for ownership of flats in the new buildings. However, the majority of the 
community lived in poor housing until the end of the 1960s. According to their 
memories, many people still slept on the paths in front of their houses in 1967 at the 
time of the war against Israel. 
In order to demonstrate the improved economic condition, Urfalli Christians 
started to buy flats for conjugal couples and neo-local residence has become a marker of 
indicating one's economic status. In the 1990s, such a change of settlement pattern 
obliged a bridegroom to prepare a flat for his marriage. People now comment that such 
changes in the settlement pattern have isolated families and distract from the unity of the 
community. This makes some yearn for 'the good old days' when many slept on the 
house paths in summer and everything was shared. Sharing goods in common was one 
of the special characteristics of the community whose members trust one another 
(aman). 
III 
Transformation of Marriage Rites and its Ideology 
The current problems of the community are caused by the expanding separation 
between ordinary artisans and professionals, which reflect on marriage choices, and the 
isolation of families as a result of changing settlement patterns from patrivirilocal to 
neo-local, which, as explained earlier, demonstrates improvement of one's economic 
status. These problems which distract unity of the community are not mentioned in 
public. Narratives on the transformation of marriage rites imply such current problems 
and therefore emphasise the ideal of cooperation and good affinal relationships. The 
Urfalli community respects the family values of maintaining good relationships between 
the bride and her bridegroom. However, the marriage ceremonies manifest the 
traditional idea of a contest between the two families. As marriage is arranged through a 
process of negotiation between the two families, their authority which is displayed in the 
marriage rites often creates tension between them. They recount that the changes of 
marriage rites attempted to reduce such tension. 
Most wedding ceremonies take place on Sundays and its associated activities 
start one week before the ceremonies. On Monday, the bride's family ask close relatives 
and friends to help them display the trousseau (iihiii) in one room of her natal family. 
This is a traditional custom for Urfalli Christians. The trousseau consists of sheets, 
pillowcases, duvet covers, bed skirts, cushions, night-dresses, underwear, dressing- 
gowns, towels, pot-holders, aprons, table cloths, dresses, clothes, shoes, jackets, 
cosmetics, bottles of perfume and so on. Girls used to spend years decorating bed linen 
and sets of tablecloths with embroidery and lacework. However, nowadays they buy 
most of these items in the market. On the Tuesday and Wednesday, the bride's relatives 
and friends are invited to see the trousseau. On the Thursday afternoon, it is the turn 
women of the bridegroom's family, e. g. his mother, sisters, brothers' wives, paternal and 
maternal aunts and uncle's wives, come to see the trousseau. The bride's family offer all 
the guests who visit them to see her trousseau coffee and sweets. Accepting coffee is a 
sign of keeping good relations with the host. Sweets symbolise happiness. 
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Since the trousseau is the only property which the bride takes from her natal 
family at her marriage, the display of the trousseau is an occasion for demonstrating the 
financial status of the bride's natal family. However, the people's attitude in the Urfalli 
community has changed. They now consider that spending a large sum of money for 
preparing the trousseau is only for displaying the vanity of the bride's natal family and is 
not practical. Even though the trousseau contains enough clothes and shoes for the bride 
not to have to buy them for some years, in these days, young people do not wear clothes 
and shoes which can soon become out of date and unfashionable. They try to indicate 
how the community's economic situation has improved. Naima, who immigrated to 
Aleppo in her childhood, recollects that her mother, who used to worked as a seamstress 
in her days in Urfa, stopped working after the exodus as there was little demand for new 
clothes. This account suggests that community members were not able to afford to buy 
new clothes. By having experienced such hardship, the trousseau used to be a display of 
economic and social status of the bride's family. However, community members insist 
that, in modem marriage, the welfare of the new couple should be considered first. This 
attitude contributes to establishing good affinal relationships. Therefore, it is preferable 
for the bride's natal family to present materials which the newly married couple will 
require in order to establish their new life, e. g. a refrigerator, furniture etc., instead of 
spending a large amount of money on the trousseau. What they attempt to do is to negate 
the old value system, which had endured since their time in Urfa, by indicating that 
today's trousseau is of less practical value. Urfallis attempt to abandon the custom which 
reveals economic and social differences among community members. Although such an 
idea is widely accepted, in practice, when a daughter marries, it is difficult for her family 
to abandon the old value system advertising their status by displaying a luxurious 
trousseau. Consequently, her family need to prepare both trousseau and modem 
equipment as a gift to the couple to show their status in both traditional and modem 
ways. The introduction of a new idea imposes a financial burden on the bride's side. 
Ironically, their attempt to introduce new customs results in revealing social differences 
among community members. 
On the Friday afternoon, the trousseau is carried to the place where the new 
couple will live. Sisters, female relatives and friends of the bride used to carry the 
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trousseau to her bridegroom's house on foot. In the past the parents of the bride and the 
bride herself did not join the procession. The bride now comes along with her relatives 
and friends to the groom's house. When they arrive, the male relatives of the bride- 
groom then leave to visit the bride's family in order to collect the rest of the trousseau. 
The bride's sisters and female relatives enter the still-empty nuptial bedroom in order to 
make up the new couple's bed, display cosmetics and bottles of perfume on a dresser, 
and put other clothes and sets of table cloth in a wardrobe. Then, they start to dance. 
Sweets and drink are offered by the bridegroom's side to the guests. 
As marriage is a matter of negotiation between the families of a bridegroom and 
his bride, the transfer of the bride's property to the bridegroom's house means that her 
family announces their permission for the bride's transition to her new husband. 
However, the absence of the bride's parents shows that the transition of the bride is not 
completely admitted by her family. Such an old social value still remains alive in the 
ceremony of transferring the bride's property. However, the bride's participation now in 
this ceremony means that the bride tends not to be a passive participant in her marriage 
negotiations, which formally were dominated by the elders in her family, but to express 
publicly her will to accept the marriage. The bridegroom's family, who used to look on 
while the bride's relatives put her trousseau into the bedroom, now also give a hand to 
them. This cooperation is based on the new idea of constructing good relationships 
between the two families. 
Marriage is regarded as an indissoluble sacrament based on Christian belief and 
morality. Both bridegroom and his bride together with the elders of their families, who 
are usually their fathers or brothers, go to the church on the Friday morning. The couple 
make a confession of their belief, and kneel down in front of the altar in order to tell God 
about their sins, so that a priest can ask God 's forgiveness. Then, they receive the 
Sacrament of Eucharist. (It is sin for Syrian Orthodox Christians to participate in a 
sacramental act without first cleansing themselves of sin. ) Apart from this rite, there is a 
rite which symbolises that any disputes between the bride's and the bridegroom's 
families have been removed. The two elders of the bride's and the bridegroom's families 
also hold a big loaf of flat bread which they pull from each side. By splitting the bread 
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into two pieces, both families indicate that they wish to break away from any causes of 
dissension. Which elder obtains the bigger piece is a matter of chance. It is believed the 
bigger the piece is, the more fortunate will be the elder's family. The priest blesses the 
bread and then it is distributed to relatives of both families. One can see thus as a social 
rite paralleling the religious rite of the Eucharist. In both cases breaking bread together 
creates conviviality, union, and harmony. Distributing bread is a communion with 
family members who share the feelings of joy and happiness at the new marriage. This 
rite indicates that the marriage is negotiated between the both families and the elders are 
the representatives of this negotiation. In this rite, the Urfalli community respects the 
family values of maintaining a good relationships between the bride and her bridegroom 
on the one hand, and on the other hand, stresses that marriage is an occasion for 
negotiations between the two families. The following presents what procedures take 
place involving both families when an Ur-falli couple marry. 
On the Saturday evening, the bride's family invites her relatives and friends, 
and holds a henna party, separately from her bridegroom's party. At midnight, the 
mother of her bridegroom, with the tray of henna on her head, together with her female 
family members dance in procession, intrude into the party and approach the bride. The 
mother produces with three items from the tray which are: henna, candles and an apple. 
Candles symbolise the light which represents God. This symbolism of light is observed 
in Syrian Orthodox Church architecture. In the central altar, one can see two windows 
which channel the light of God to the earth. Although association of light with God is 
recognised by Urfalli Christians, their awareness of the symbolism of apple and henna is 
obscure. It might be related to the statement in the Old Testament that an apple is a 
symbol of something precious and of affection (e. g. the apple of one's eye, Deut. 32: 10, 
Ps. 17: 8; apples, Pr. 25: 1 1, S. of S. 2: 5 ). As henna often stands for blood, the henna in the 
tray may associate with the blood which the mother gives to her child and spills in 
giving birth to the child (Combs- Shilling, 1981: 194). However, the symbolic meanings 
of the henna tray is not fully recognised by the community's members. 
The significance of the rite is that the bride dips her little finger into a henna 
paste. At midnight, to coincide with his future bride's ceremony, at the bridegroom's 
115 
party, the bridegroom dips his little finger into the henna, which was mixed by his 
female relatives. Here, this ceremony in the henna party contains two aspects. One is the 
celebration of unity of the new couple. Participants in the party either dip their fingers 
into the henna paste or bring a portion to home share the joy of celebrating the conjugal 
unity. The other is the authority of the bridegroom's family, his mother in particular, to 
acknowledge that the bride will contribute to reproducing his family line as Delaney has 
mentioned in a Turkish wedding (1987: 32-3). However, in the present idea of marriage, 
celebration of the conjugal unity of the new couple is emphasised. 
Memories of marriage suggest that, until the 1960s, marriage was to separate 
the bride from her natal family. The female party of the bridegroom's side used to sing 
songs in Turkish when they offered henna to the bride. The songs are farewell songs that 
express the sadness of the bride's family caused by the departure of the bride from her 
natal family. According to the older women who used to sing these songs, it was at this 
time that a bride usually started to cry because she suddenly realised her departure had 
come. The songs take a form that the bride and her family exchange farewell greetings. 
Bride: "I am going, Oh, my father! " 
Father: "Be in peace. God will help you. " 
Mother: "You are leaving. I am sad. I am crying. God is with you. Good fortune 
will be yours. Your brother comes. He will hold the reins of the horse [on 
which you will ride] and will take you to the church. " 
Women: "A carpet is on the one side and another carpet is on the other. Our 
bride is tall like a carnation. " 
Another song expresses the words of the bride's mother to her daughter on parting. 
Mother: "My daughter, you want to leave your family and move [to your 
husband's]. Your mother is not there. When you will go there, [I wish] you will 
be happy. Your brother, and your father, who is crying, say, "you will be 
comfortable and happy with your husband. " 
It was not easy for me to find elder women who remembered these old marriage 
songs and were able to translate these Turkish songs into Arabic. Since these songs had 
not been sung for forty years, many women have already forgotten them. As these were 
sung in Turkish, this evidence suggests that the Urfalli community had had this tradition 
before their emigration from Urfa to Aleppo in 1924. They explained the reasons why 
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these Turkish songs were forgotten: "The less Turkish was spoken, the less popular 
these songs became. " After their emigration, Turkish, which was their ordinary 
language in Urfa, was gradually replaced by Arabic, which has been the lingua franca in 
Syria. However, they did not translate these songs into Arabic. They have completely 
died out. This fact suggests that they tended to erase this tradition, which reminds them 
of their origin as refugees from Turkey. But it also suggests that certain traditions are 
embedded in a fundamental way in language, and therefore when languages change, 
traditions are abandoned. By abandoning these songs, they became free from their 
traumatic past and tried to integrate themselves into Syrian society. Marriage rites are 
also very important serniotic markers of a community's identity. Abandoning Turkish 
songs would also have been a means to conceal their 'otherness', their alterity in Syria. 
In the 1990s, in order to justify their attitude of concealing their pastý they attached 
negative meanings to these songs. As these songs forced the separation of the bride from 
her natal family, they maintain that due to such characteristics of these songs, they 
discarded them. Community members think that such impositions on the bride's family 
are not appropriate for their current idea of marriage, i. e. respect for good relationships 
between natal families of both the bride and groom. Such new values also justify their 
current views that they respect women and wish for equality between the two families. 
There is another rite, whose meaning in the past is now forgotten. After the 
wedding ceremony at the church on Sunday, the bride used to break a fragile item before 
entering her new home. The bridegroom's mother or his elder female relative used to 
hand over the bride a valuable fragile item, such as a glass or a vase, and ordered her to 
drop and break it. They had smuggled this item out from the bride's natal family at 
either one of these occasions: on their visit to her family on the Friday to see her 
trousseau or on the Saturday night at the henna party. They indicated that the glass or the 
vase was now in another house as part of the bridegroom's family, and that the bride 
could not return to her natal family as a 'whole piece', just like the fragile article. As 
she had agreed to join them, then she 'belonged to' her new group. If she broke this 
contract of agreement, she could go back as a 'broken piece' and could not get back to 
the situation as it used to be. 
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This traditional rite revealed a process of negotiation between the elder women 
of the bridegroom's family and the bride. Nowadays, community members explain that, 
from the perspective of her natal family, the bride is precious for them, just like the 
fragile valuable of her family, and, therefore, her family cannot accept the rite which 
makes the bride a victim of such bullying by the bridegroom's family. Community 
members maintain that this rite diminished the relationship between the two families 
and, therefore, has been abandoned. This is a total fabrication of their past in order to 
justify their new value system. They adopt a new way of expressing the transition of 
women's status at marriage. These days, a bride prepares a piece of pottery and fills it 
with things which symbolise the future happiness and prosperity of the couple: sweets, 
such as sugar-coated almonds and candies, to bring blessings and welfare; coins 
symbolising wealth; rice meaning fertility. When the bride breaks the potý she 
demonstrates her departure from her maidenhood protected by her natal family and her 
will to construct a new happy family. This new rite symbolises the bride's agreement of 
her transition into the new status and promotes unity between her natal family and her 
bridegroom's family. The transformation of forms and meanings of this rite show how 
Urfalli Christians transform their past and try to demonstrate their ideal of community's 
unity. 
Marriage used to be only for the perpetuation of the bridegroom"s family and, 
therefore, its patriarch used to exercise control of the bride's transition into a married 
woman engaged in sexual and reproductive activities for the bridegroom's family. On 
the first night of her marriage, the bride was obliged to sit silently in the bedroom of her 
bridegroom's parents facing a wall waiting for her father-in-law's permission to 'go to 
bed'. This ceremony which promotes the patriarch as a figure of authority to control the 
bride's initiation into reproductive activities is no longer practised. In the present idea of 
marriage, the conjugal unity of the new couple is emphasised. 
The current idea of conjugal unity respects the privacy of the newly wed 
couple's sexual relationship. The rites, which announce the young couple's sexual 
relationship to the public as a means of displaying family honour, no longer take place. 
The morning after the wedding, the bridegroom's mother and old women of his family 
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used to ask the bride to show the sign of her purity, i. e. virginal blood on the cloth, 
which also demonstrated the groom's masculinity. At eleven o'clock, the bride's mother 
visited the bridegroom's family in order to receive the sign. The mother took the piece 
of cloth to her home and, then, showed it to the bride's relatives with pride. The bride 
who has remained "pure" until her marriage, even to this day, honours both herself and 
her family. It proves her good character, modesty and obedience to her parents, and also 
verifies the good discipline of her family in ensuring the respect of family honour which 
women's sexual misconduct ruins. A bride carries an immaterial or conceptual value for 
social exchange because her chastity enhances the honour of both bride's and 
bridegroom's families (Gilmore, 1987: 4). The rite of displaying her purity demonstrates 
the bridegroom's family's ability to conduct a fair exchange, i. e. spending a large sum of 
money and receiving a woman of social worth, which is similar to marriage in Cyprus as 
Argyou mentions (1996: 83). 
The social significance of a woman's sexual virtue and her husband's 
masculinity has not changed. The idea of constructing good relationships between the 
wife and the husband shows respect for their privacy and, consequently, the rites have 
lost its Public character. The Syrian Orthodox Christians regard sexual virtue as a matter 
which should be sorted out by the couple. The objection of displaying the evidence to 
the public is found in another society in the Middle East, as Eickelman reports the 
perception of women in Oman that a bride would be too "embarrassed" to have such an 
intimate part of herself displayed in public (1984: 107). The Syrian Orthodox Christian 
women, both elders and youngsters, object to the old custom of displaying a proof of the 
bride's virginity due to the reason that this obligation becomes a psychological burden 
for a newly wed couple. They say, "a bride may feel extremely tense at the first night of 
her marriage. Her husband may need to make her feel relaxed and postpone having 
sexual intercourse". What they imply here is that others should not force the couple to 
engage in sexual intercourse at the first night and it should be conducted on the couple's 
mutual consent. 
Such a change is related to the new idea of respecting conjugal unity, which 
suggests that closeness of the newly wed couple is highly evaluated. For example, male 
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friends of a bridegroom used to tease and prick him with thick needles, which 
symbolises a phallus, when he dipped his little finger into a henna paste in the party on 
the Saturday night. The public display of manliness used to be encouraged. 
Abolishment of this rite means that the public should not intrude into the sexual 
intimacies of the couple. The diminution of these conventional ceremonies reflects the 
new morality and ideas of marriage which recognise the right of a new couple to keep 
their privacy and create intimate bonds of conjugal relationship. 
Nowadays, due to the spread of new ideals of *conjugal unity and mutual 
respect, a young couple may have sexual intercourse by their own consent after their 
engagement. Yet, it is believed that few young couples engage in pre-marital sexual 
activity. Both the bride and the bridegroom are often not willing to gamble their futures 
by engaging in sexual intercourse before marriage. After the engagement, the couple are 
permitted to visit each other's family and attend social meetings organised by the Centre 
for Religious Education in the Syrian Orthodox Church. The engaged couple usually do 
not go out alone, so that the girl can avoid gossip which can ruin her reputation. 
Community members highly value a young man who respects his fianc6e's sexual 
honour. If an engagement is called off after long-term courtship, a woman may be 
suspected of having sexual intercourse with her fianc6. If her sexual honour is 
compromised, she and even her sisters may lose the opportunity of being asked for in 
marriage by men who 'respect' themselves. Therefore, long-term engagements are not 
preferable. If something goes wrong after the engagement, and the man wishes to end it, 
if he has had sexual intercourse with his fiancde, or if he has been engaged to her for a 
long period, he may be afraid that his fiancde's family may try to 'tie him down', to 
maintain their honour. This can act as a deterrent to having sex before marriage. 
Families and the Church warn young engaged couples not to create family problems by 
indulging in sexual activities before marriage. Therefore, young people respect female 
sexual virtue for their own sake as well as the honour of their families. The 
bridegroom's family tries to receive a woman who respects her sexual virtue, and the 
bride's family tries to protect her honour in order to maintain the honour of her family. 
In this sense, female sexual virtue is used by both sides in order to have a good deal in 
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marriage negotiations between these two families. The old system of sexual virtue is 
maintained in contemporary marriage negotiations. 
Ideals of the relationship between the bride's and groom's families were 
brought into practice when Urfallis introduced new ways of celebrating marriage. One of 
the significant changes in marriage rites is that the bride's family acknowledges her 
transition by attending the wedding ceremony on the Sunday. In the old ceremony, the 
bridegroom's female relatives, holding a big tray with sweets and fruits, went into the 
bride's house. They surrounded the bride, covered her face with a shroud and took her to 
the church. The bride's family and her relatives, gathered there, but did not go with her 
nor attend the wedding ceremony at the church. Only her brother, who held the reins of 
the horse on which the bride rode, took her to the church and handed her over to her 
bridegroom in front of the church door. The ceremonial abduction, in which the bride 
was taken away from her natal family by the bridegroom's relatives for the wedding 
ceremony, highlighted the authority of the bridegroom's family who proclaimed their 
acceptance of her as a mother of their descendants. Their acknowledgement of her social 
value as a virtuous woman and a respectable member of her natal family allowed her to 
enter the life cycle to achieve a woman's ideal goal, i. e. gaining dignity by becoming a 
dedicated mother and a good housewife. After marriage, a woman used to move into her 
husband's household whose members, her mother-in-law in particular, in part, treated 
her well, but also, continually emphasised her subordination to them. 
Marx (1967) reports of a similar ceremony which was practised among the 
Bedouin of the Negev and deduced that this ceremonial abduction of the bride was the 
action of the bridegroom's group for transgressing the boundary of their rights without 
asking her family for final agreement to her transition; the bride's family has not 
completely agreed to her transition and therefore, she retains membership of her natal 
family (ibid.: 104-6). With the Syrian Orthodox Christians, marriage is regarded as a 
sacramental tie between the bride and the bridegroom. When she accepts the sacramental 
tie in the wedding ceremony in the church, she is now not able to retain the membership 
of her natal family. Her parents no longer have direct responsibility for her sexually and 
financially, which is now transferred to her husband. Yet, a married woman retained her 
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maiden name which was associated with the name of her father, signifying her 
incorporation into her agnatic line?. 
Urfalli Christians explain that the ceremonial abduction hurt the feelings of the 
bride's family and discouraged them from keeping good relations with the family of the 
bridegroom. They maintain that the termination of this rite reduced potential tension 
between the two families. In the 1960s, the bride's family started to attend the wedding 
ceremony in the church. At the beginning of the 1970s, people became able to hold 
wedding receptions, as other Aleppienes do. This is an attempt to affiliate to the wider 
society of Aleppo. Both the bride's and the bridegroom's families attend the reception. 
On the practical level, however, their ideal that attendance of the bride's family at both 
the wedding ceremony and the wedding reception creates intimate relationship between 
the bride's and the bridegroom's families is not achieved, and a married woman still has 
marginal status. 
If a woman becomes a widow, the ambiguity of a married woman's status is 
revealed. Many widows in this community, both in the past and at present, receive little 
support from either her husband's or her natal family. A widow, even today, easily 
becomes the object of gossip. As many widows have to work outside the home to bring 
up their children, community members keep a close watch on them to see whether she 
has contact with men. Such a concern is closely related to her ambiguous status in that 
she is not fully protected by both her natal and her deceased husband's families, as she is 
not fully recognised as a member of either of these families. Many widows have 
suffered from the 'public eye' and, consequently, refrain from attending public meetings 
as they are wary of being regarded as 'being there in order to look for men'. Moreover, 
some people maintain that her conjugal tie with her deceased husband never religiously 
breaks off and this interpretation prevents young widows from remarrying. As time 
goes on and she grows older, the widow, with children, may gain the dignity attached to 
being a good mother and a good housekeeper. In the Urfalli community material control 
such as accessibility to productive resources (which is regarded as a source of male 
authority) is not a key to understand women's authority and power, as suggested in the 
case of Greece (Dubisch, 1986). The fulfilment of the maternal ideal is not only 
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important for a woman to establish her position in the household, but also embodies 
important social values of society that a woman is able to achieve her status by 
symbolising and recreating female ideology which separates her roles from a man's. 
(ibid.: 21-2). 
Even though Urfalli Christians maintain that the introduction of the wedding 
reception has produced close affinal links, it in fact has created tension between the 
bride's and the groom's sides in the course of their marriage negotiations. Marriage 
negotiation is always started by the bridegroom's side as the notion of female sexual 
virtue restrains a girl from expressing interest in a particular man. When a man or his 
parents identify a girl as a potential bride, he and his family ask their relatives and 
friends about her and her family. If she is deemed as appropriate for him, the 
bridegroom's side sounds out her and her family's intention with regards to marriage. If 
the girl's side shows interest in the marriage and tends to agree with the marriage 
proposal, female elder members of the bridegroom's family visit the bride-to-be and her 
family in order to investigate them. When the elders regard her as a suitable woman, the 
bridegroom's family informs the bride's family that his family, including the male 
members, i. e. the bridegroom, his father and his brothers, would like to pay an official 
visit to her family in order to ask her hand for marriage. Shortly after their visit, a 
guardian of the bride-to-be, i. e. her father or her brother, officially gives consent to the 
marriage. From this stage of marriage negotiation, the bride's side has some leverage 
over the marriage negotiations. 
The most important matters for the present marriage negotiations concern the 
future 3. Whether or not they will hold a wedding reception and the residence of the 
newly-wed couple are matters of discussion between the two families. Since the 1970s 
the wedding reception has become a means of showing the improvement of the 
economic state of the family as well as social status. However, the introduction of this 
new communal celebration brings great financial burden to the bridegroom's family, as 
the bride, in principle, provides only trousseau at marriage in terms of financial 
resources. The bridegroom's side pays for all the expenses of the wedding ceremony and 
wedding reception, including the wedding dress of the bride in a modem Western style. 
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Moreover, a movement from patrivirilocality to neo-locality obliges the bridegroom to 
provide a separate household at marriage. As the wedding reception and neo-locality are 
symbols of economic development of families, a man who is not able to hold a wedding 
reception and provide a flat at marriage is regarded as a poor loser. These men 
obviously cannot attract young women. Young men, therefore, desperately need to 
establish themselves financially in order to marry. In the past, it was the bridegroom's 
side who created tensions by performing the ceremonial abduction which provided them 
with leverage, whereas at present it is the bride's side who are able to use of men's 
vulnerable situation and exercise more control in marriage negotiations. 
In the late 1990s, a well established self-employeed artisan earned 10,000 
Syrian Liras ($20OUS) per month, whereas the salary of an educated governinent 
employee is only 5,000 Syrian Liras ($IOOUS). Young men say, "artisans start their 
career earlier than university graduates and can earn more money than those being 
educated. The longer a man spends time on his education, the more he needs time to 
economically establish himself for marriage. We are in a difficult situation". Until the 
early 1980s, educated young government employees earned higher salaries than artisans 
and, therefore, education fulfilled their social as well as economic demands. Higher 
education is still an important social marker for Urfallis as they are regarded by others in 
Aleppiene society as a working class community, and believe that through education 
they will acquire a higher social position in society. However, education no longer 
guarantees economic success. Young girls ideally want to marry educated and 
financially established men. Young men have financial, social and psychological 
burdens and, consequently, marry later than in the past. 
This situation where young men are desperately obliged to achieve male full 
ability through marriage advantages a bride and her family when negotiating a marriage 
arrangement. This creates tensions between two families. Sometimes the bride asks for 
the holding a wedding reception which could be beyond the financial ability of her 
bridegroom. If the bridegroom respects his bride's wish, he may enter deeply into debt. 
There is an example of a couple who held a big wedding reception, due to the bride's 
wish and because of overdue repayment, her bridegroom faced a financial crisis and 
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obliged to part with their new flat. Despite the fact that tensions were created by the 
bride's side who abused their advantageous position in marriage negotiations, Urfallis 
consider that these families wished to show off their financial ability and spent huge 
amounts of money for their vanity. In the late 1990s, the community started to recognise 
that the bridal couple should live within their means. In negotiations between the 
bridegroom's and the bride's families, including the young couple, they are able to say 
that instead of spending a large sum of money on the wedding banquet, it would be more 
useful to spend the bridegroom's savings in preparing the couple's new flat, as a face 
saving exercise. Tlis ideological shift seems to work by gradually reducing the financial 
burden on the bridegroom. However it, in fact, only changes the standards for 
evaluating the bridegroom's financial ability and social position. The expenses of the 
wedding reception are replaced by the cost of purchasing electric equipment and 
furniture for their new residence. 
A young man has to fulfil certain financial requirements in order to ask a 
woman to marry him. This situation advantages the bride's side in marriage 
negotiations between families of the bride and her bridegroom. Although marriage 
negotiations ideally provide opportunities for enhancing affinal bonds, shifting power 
balances between the families, in which the bride's family can demand more say in the 
negotiations, creates potential cleavage between them. Moreover, after marriage, a wife 
keeps close contact with her natal family and often visits them, whereas her husband 
maintains his close links to his parents and his siblings. Such attitudes do not contribute 
to generating close affinal links. 
Current Problems in the Syrian Orthodox Christian Family 
The ideals of conjugal and affinal unity, introduced in local accounts of the 
evolution of marriage, actually conceal current community problems. I will now 
examine these problems, which divide the community. 
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One of the current problems faced by the community is related to their marriage 
choices. Many Urfalli young men abandon their education prematurely for practical 
economic needs and tend to enter artisanal work, but their choice raises a social dilemma 
in that they are unable to escape from the working class. These men tend to choose as 
their spouses their close relatives from artisan families who maintain a similar economic 
standard to them and understand their limited finanicial resources. Moreover, a 
bridegroom bears less of a finanical burden for the marriage ceremonies and presents 
for his bride when he marries a woman who is a close relative. This is a wide spread 
marriage strategy among people in Syria to conserve the economic resources of the 
family. As I indicated at the beginning of this chapter, ordinary artisans tend to marry 
close relatives in order to retain their family resources, while professionals seek partners, 
who have similar educational and financial levels, across family lines in order to 
consolidate their status and establish alliances. Consequently, differences in marriage 
choices accentuate the class differences between artisans and professionals within the 
community. Due to this problem, accounts of the transformation of ideas constituting 
marriage rites, i. e. introducing the idea of creating good relationships between the 
bride's and the bridegroom's families in marriage negotiations and respect for conjugal 
bonds, are important to integrate the community. Holy's analysis of Middle Eastern 
families shows that when the agnatic solidarity is maintained by emphasising patrilateral 
relationships, affinal relationships are regaded as less important (1989: 122). In the case 
of Urfallis, whilst ideologically they promote good affinal relationships, in practice, 
marriage between relatives and close contact with natal families results in a weakening 
of affinal and conjugal ties. 
The idea of conjugal unity is emphasised in narratives of the transformation of 
marriage rites. Changes of marriage rites can be correlated to the change of the roles 
between husband and wife when they started to use marriage ceremonies as a means to 
manifest their economic and social status. In the 1960s when the change of the rites 
started, their economic situation also started improving, even though both male and 
female household members, including children, had to work in order to sustain their 
living. By the 1970s, when economic conditions in Syria as a whole improved, men 
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became able to earn enough money to sustain their households. Housewives stopped 
going to work to provide financial support for their family. 
That married women used to work for an income is, for them, the main sign of 
poverty in the past. The improvement of the economic situation in the community and 
the introduction of neo-local residence had a great influence on husband-wife 
relationships. Here, a conservative and idealistic family value has been introduced. A 
husband, as a head of his independent household, financially supports his family by 
providing them with food, a house, clothing, educational costs and social expenses. He 
bears sole responsibility for the lives of all his family, i. e. his wife and children in the 
contemporary urban setting. As Davis has mentioned generally in his survey of 
Mediterranean societies, men's economic ability to protect women is a sign of a 
successful performance of an honourable role (1977: 77). Marriageable single women 
perceive that a married woman's role is to take care of her family and do not think that 
they should work after their marriage. Throughout the Middle East, the greater the 
poverty, the more female labour outside the house is demanded, whereas, with the 
increase in wealth, more women may be expected to remain within the compound 
(Altorki, 1986: 23). For example, in a poor urban quarter in Cairo, when economic 
situation became difficult, more married women in the quarter became street vendors. In 
such an economic situation, women working in market are not touched by the innuendo 
of loose morals (Early, 1993: 84-9). Similarly, when the Urfallis were poor, women 
working in factories were respected due to their economic contribution to the family. 
However, when economic conditions improved, the Urfalli women, as well as their men, 
started to follow the general pattern of attributing financial responsibility to husbands in 
conjugal relationships. This displays an improvement of their economic status and their 
attempt of showing their social position by adopting the standards that are shared among 
the population of Aleppo. 
The exception is highly educated professional women. For example, for female 
medical doctors, whose occupation is highly respected, it is regarded as worthwhile for 
them to continue with their careers, because both men and women say that these women 
are distinguished and competent to serve their society. Gender norms restricting female 
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labour outside the house are likely to be more applicable to less educated women and 
artisan families. Thus, gender separateness correlates with male dominance. This is 
reflected in the view of young male artisans toward women's work. They say, "A lower 
ranking government employee earns only 3,000 Syrian Liras ($60US) per a month. Why 
do such female employees earning such a small sum of money need to keep their jobs 
after their marriage? There is a great gap between lower ranking government employees 
and higher ranking officials, and therefore, working conditions of these women is not 
good". A lower ranking government employee symbolises an exploited poor worker 
without any hope of promotion, whereas higher ranking officers use personal 
connections (wasta) and take full advantage of their position for their own personal 
benefit. The status of these lower ranking employees overlaps with the social position of 
the Urfalli Syrian Orthodox Christians in the society of Aleppo. Therefore, a Syrian 
Christian husband, an artisan in particular, cannot accept the domination of other higher 
ranking officers, usually men, over his wife even at work. To leave his wife in such a 
socially subordinated situation shows the world his inability to protect and provide for 
his woman. 
Different meanings are attributed to married women's economic activities. For 
artisan families in the Urfalli community, that married women give up their economic 
independence is a way of demonstrating their economic affluence and, hence, a sign of 
their climbing the social ladder. Moreover, the current increase in marriage between 
close relatives in this stratum directs the majority of people in the community to value 
ties with their natal families. Such a tendency is opposed to conjugal and affinal 
solidarity. Such marital relationships, as Goody suggests the case in some southern 
Mediterranean societies, correlate to a lack of women's economic independence and 
strengthens male dominance, (1983: 29-30). Their attitude of keeping close contact with 
their natal families and the male misuse of their authority, which is strengthened by 
married women's economic dependence on their husbands, weaken ties between 
husband and wife. By contrast, highly educated women usually marry highly qualified 
men and maintain their independent economic role after marriage. Their families 
constitute an upper stratum of the community. Couples in this stratum are not restricted 






1,500 families in the community, joined one of eight 'family' groups. I participated in 
their meetings for over a year between 1997 and 1998 and observed their changes. Each 
group was composed of between twenty and twenty-five couples. About five couples in 
each group formed the core members, who recruited their relatives and friends and 
organised the group's activities. They aimed, first, to get to know each other. They 
included both white collar and artisan families in a 'family' group. Since the differences 
between the two strata have enlarged, they have a little opportunity to talk each other. 
'Family meeting' provides them with such an opportunity. Each group aimed to consider 
the community's problems, such as the community's welfare, child education, support 
for disabled people, care of elders, relationship between younger and elder generations 
and learning their liturgical language of Syriac etc. 
Once established, three couples in each group are put in charge of organising 
meetings for three months and then another three couples take over. The hope is that in 
order to prepare for the meetings, the chosen couples need to meet many times during 
these three months, which will give them the opportunities to get to know each other's 
family and construct close links between families, including each other's children. 
Another purpose of these meetings is to reconsider husband-wife relationships. 
In the present gender division, wives are unable to become the spokesperson of their 
families, and never express their opinions in public especially when they are with their 
husbands. His authority requires a display of female modesty and self-restraint, which is 
a mark of the honour for the less powerful gender. Such a display of power relations 
between wife and husband is observed in the different part of the Middle East (Abu- 
Lughod, 1986: 107-8). As the 'family' meetings recognise problems of domestic 
violence and alienation of husband and wife, the meetings provide opportunities for 
members to be involved in activities which help them to realise more equal relationships 
between husband and wife and mutual support. 
The acknowledgement of women's active participation and the members' 
respect for women's opinion are expressed during the meetings. One example is that 
wives read passages from the Bible at the beginning of the every meeting and give their 
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own interpretation. They timidly read a paper which they prepared for the reading, when 
the meetings were launched. They gradually understood what the members of the 
&meetings' expected of them. Their positive participation and presentation of their 
opinions during discussion are understood to be part of the process for overcoming 
family problems. Men also started to experience women's work at communal meals 
which are the most enjoyable occasions for the participants of these meetings. It is 
husbands who take the lead in serving sweets and victuals during the meetings and 
cleaning up dishes, i. e. activities in which they are not normally engaged at home. By 
doing so, each community member, irrespective of social differences between them, 
supports the idea of conjugal unity by introducing the notion of sharing roles between 
husbands and wives. This is an attempt to promote the ideal of unity within the 
community by dealing with shared problems of conjugal relationships. 
Conclusion 
Urfallis recount that the changes in their marriage rites are related to their 
demand for adopting modernised moral values. New values, such as affinal ties, 
conjugal relationships and gender equality replace old ones, which displayed the 
authority of elders and constrained to develop good relationships between community 
members. They transform the meaning of the marriage rites in the light of their present 
concern about the division among community members. Their attempt is related to two 
facets. First, in order to conceal their refugee origin, Urfallis try to diminish their old 
marriage customs connected to their past in Turkey and demonstrate their integration in 
Aleppiene society. When their economic situation has improved, they attempt to 
affiliate themselves with the middle class Aleppienes. Urfallis introduced wedding 
receptions and modem values of conjugal and affinal relationships, which they believe 
are similar to those held by Aleppiene families. Consequently, marriage rituals of 
Urfallis become standardised and diminish their traditional characteristics. The 
community conceal the evidence which relates them to their past in Urfa and, 
consequently, abandon the means of proving the endurance of their conununity. Second, 
they talk as if they have already achieved ideas of creating good affinal and conjugal 
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relationships by having transformed marriage rites. In fact this attempts to conceal 
current community problems, such as class divisions, alienation of affines, and 
husbands' domination over their wives. 
Urfallis recount that the changes in marriage rites contribute to enhancing bonds 
between the bride's and bridegroom's natal families. This ideal is supported by the 
practice of choosing spouses from relatives due to the reason that genealogical 
relationships are renewed by creating affinal ties between them. However, such an ideal 
is postulated as a means of justifying marriage practices that ordinary artisans, who have 
limited choices, due to their qualifications and limited financial means, marry daughters 
of their relatives who belong to the same social stratum. By contrast, professionals tend 
to choose their spouses from families whose financial and educational status is similar to 
theirs. Such preferences in choosing spouses from the families who have the similar 
financial and educational backgrounds increases the gap between professional and 
artisan community members. The Urfalli community recognises that these current 
problems threaten their community's unity. Therefore, they express, in narratives, how 
the community transformed marriage rites in order to construct good relationships 
among community members, epitomised by the relationships between the bride's and 
the bridegrooms' families. The meanings of the old marriage rites which the present 
Urfallis explain are not necessarily derived from their memories of the old marriage 
rites. They explain the transformation of marriage rites from their present perspectives. 
Urfallis in the past may have interpreted the meaning of marriage rites different from 
those which the present Urfallis do. In this sense, Urfallis create a different past. 
Artisans in particular have adopted a popular idea spreading in Middle Eastern 
societies that the economic advancement of a family is shown by the confinement of 
married women's economic activities. Consequently, the husband becomes the dominant 
figure in conjugal relationships. By facing this problem, Urfallis promote the ideals of 
intimate conjugal relationships in their accounts of the historical transformation of the 
marriage rites. They look for ways of coping with current problems, such as changing 
the relationship between husband and wife, the expansion of social stratification within 
the community, which all have a detrimental affect on the unity of the community. They 
132 
also try to deal with the problems by attempting to put these ideals fnio practice by 
holding community activities, such as 'family meetings'. Thus the proposed ideals work 
on two levels: warning them about their community's problems, and presenting 
modernised moral values which they hope will symbolise their unity. 
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Chapter 4. Notes 
1 On the level of community activities, innovative attitudes are encouraged and community members show 
interest in improving the community's welfare. Even younger generations are able to propose plans, for 
amending the old customs, to community elders, such as the Board of Trustees, who are respected and are 
authoritative figures in the community. For example, young people suggest that the community should 
take the initiative in adopting a more efficient way of giving wedding presents, instead of presenting gold 
accessories to brides. One of the proposals is that a community committee will prepare envelopes and set a 
money box in front of the newly wed couple and their families, when they stand in a row in front of the 
attar to receive the blessing of everyone at the wedding ceremony. The suggestion is that instead of gold, 
people can give the couple money as their gift. This means that they have more control over the amount, 
according to their income level, which they can spend on the gift. 
2 To what extent the control of a woman's conduct is transferred at marriage from her natal family to that 
of her husband is unclear in Middle Eastern societies (Meeker, 1976; 416; Meneley, 1996: 75-6; Pitt- 
Rivers, 1977: 43,49; Tapper, 1979: 128). 
' Another example is that the demand of the bride's side for securing her future is respected in the 
marriage negotiations. Before an engagement, a young-couple-to-be must exchange their health and single 
certificates (issued by their church). It used to be only a bride-to-be whose health was investigated. A 
sister of her bridegroom-to-be used to be sent to the bride-to-be and stay with her overnight before 
marriage. They say, "the sister checks the bride's breath. If the breath of the bride-to-be smells, she has 
health problems". The exchange of the certificates is intended to give the future bride and bridegroom 
equal opportunities to discover each other's health record, in order to predict whether their marriage has 
good prospects. However, there is gossip about several cases of forgery of health certificates which came 
to light when the husband died shortly after the marriage. This is interpreted as a sign that such a husband, 
or his family, paid little or no regard to the bride's future; showed disrespect for women; and that men do 
not consider that marriage involves shared responsibilities. Changes in attitudes towards the marriage 
partners allow for more leverage in marriage negotiations by the bride's family. 
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Chapter 5 
Transformation of Marriage in Qabt5nIya 
Introduction 
As discussed in Chapters 1-3, Syrian Orthodox Christians in Qabidnlya, M51k-iya 
and Urfallis in Aleppo recount that their community has been oppressed by external 
forces, such as tribal power and state persecution. They feet that external threats render 
them vulnerable as a small group. In facing such a difficult situation, Syrian Christians 
have made various attempts at unifying their community in faith and claiming that their 
religious traditions prove their Syrian origin and, therefore, their rights should be 
protected. However, it is not only external forces, but also the Christians themselves 
who create internal divisions within the community and make their position weak, as 
having discussed in the cases of the M51kiya and Urfalli Christians. A similar 
phenomenon is observed in the Syrian Christian community in Qabt5nlya. This chapter 
examines the relationships between social changes brought from outside the community 
and marriage choices of the Christians and how the changes in their marriage choices 
weaken ties of community members and accelerate divisions between them. 
The changes in marriage choices among the Qalýtdnlya Syrian Orthodox 
Christians are related to their population movements. In the 1970s Christian villagers 
found new economic opportunities in the town and emigrated there. The massive scale 
of their immigration abroad in the 1980s was triggered by the regime's persecution of 
dissidents in the guise of religion. Due to the continued emigration, the Christian 
population in Qabt5n! ya has decreased. They feel that their political position has 
weakened. In facing such a situation, there has been an increase in preference for close 
kin marriage. 
Owing to political fear and the lack of economic and political prospects, 
marriage between close relatives became to be practised for the following two practical 
reasons. First, many people want to emigrate abroad in order to expand their 
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opportunities. In order to pursue this aim, many people in Qabtwiya seek to arrange 
their children's marriages with close kin who return from abroad for short visits. Second, 
in urban settings, personal networks are an important resource in order to find a job and 
to facilitate legal procedures. The Christians, who are a minority group, require intensive 
kinship networks to strengthen their economic and social position. However, such 
practical demands for strengthening ties between close relatives are difficult to achieve 
due to the marriage rules of the Syrian Orthodox Church which prohibited close kin 
marriages. One of the aims in this chapter is to present the changes in the marriage 
ideology held by Syrian Orthodox Christians, in which the demands of lay people for 
establishing ego-centered kinship relationships emphasize the changes in the rules for 
regulating kinship and marriage. It is necessary to investigate how such ideological and 
practical changes have been brought about and how these changes have affected their 
social position. 
Syrian Orthodox Christians do not express a forinal or religiously sanctioned 
preference for marriage between patrilateral kin. However, they need to discover some 
legitimation for their increasing practice of certain types of close kin marriages. This is 
what has been called "official strategies" (Bourdieu, 1997). By contrast, in various 
Middle Eastern Muslim communities, marriage preferences are graded according to 
patrilateral genealogical distance. Analytical attention paid to marriages between 
patrilateral cousins indicates that this kind of marriage expresses an indigenous ideology 
of marriage preference in terms of kinship distance (Holy, 1989: 27). A preferred 
spouse in the Middle East is the patrilateral parallel cousin, i. e. ibn 'amm, father's 
brother's son (abbreviated in this text as FBS) and bint 'amm, father's brother's daughter 
(FBD). These terms can also apply to descendants of the patrilateral grandfather's and 
great grandfather's brothers. This recognition can even go back about five generations of 
offspring in the male line. This principle of differentiating kinship relations is applied so 
as to constitute ego-centred kinship relations, in which an individual defines one's 
relationship to the other in terms of the kinship categories in which both of them are 
included (Lancaster, 1981: 152). 
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As the Christians used to use Kurdish at their time in Turkey and now use 
Arabic, their languages may have influenced on the categorisation of kinship 
relationships. However, there are fundamental differences between the marriage 
ideologies of the Muslims and those of the Christians. Among their Arab and Kurdish 
neighbours, normative endogamy within the category of FBD marriage is not often 
practised, but presents the preference for endogamy with patrilateral relatives (cf 
Lancaster, 1981: 38,61; Stirling, 1965: 201; R. Tapper, 1979: 140-1; Patai, 1965: 334). 
By contrast, Christians are reluctant to accept marriage between close relatives despite 
the fact that the present social situation requires it. 
On the other hand, Christians now emphasise changes in the Church's marriage 
laws. The Syrian Orthodox Church has been obliged to acknowledge marriages between 
close kin due to popular demand and practice. Thus the main difference between the 
Muslims and the Christians is that the former express a formal preference for close kin 
marriage, whilst the latter accept it "reluctantly" as aforce Majeur imposed on them by 
circumstances. In practice, therefore, there may be less differences between the two 
communities, although there are some difference. This echoes the work of Cole and 
Wolf (1974) who conducted comparative fieldwork in the Bozen/Trento region of 
northern Italy/ Austria where formal differences between the 'Italians' and 'Austrians' in 
their inheritance system (equal partible /unigeniture inheritance) was subverted by 
common practices. The rule of marriage prohibition between close kin was a distinctive 
feature of the Syrian Orthodox Christian community. Christians are now losing such an 
ethnic marker by adopting ideas and practices of marriage similar to their neighbouring 
communities. This negates their ideal of establishing their rights by claiming that their 
community has had an intact culture for generations in this locality. Furthermore, their 
increasing demand for emphasising ties between close relatives and changes in marriage 
ideology ironically make their networks smaller and weaken ties between community 
members. It also contributes to a decreasing Christian population in Qabt5n! ya. The 
Christians thus generate problems from within. 
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Marriage Choices among Syrian Orthodox Christian villagers 
There was a great demographic disruption when Syrian Orthodox Christians in 
Tur 'Abdin in Turkey escaped from the massacre of 1915 and settled in villages in the 
area of Qabt5diya. They found spouses who were not related, but were from a similar 
background. This may have created new opportunities for marriage with previously 
unknown people. For example, many women married men who were also refugees and 
shared common experiences of the atrocities at the time of the religious intolerance. 
Some women who had been obliged to marry Muslim men during the time of the 
religious intolerance ran away from their husbands and their families, and asked a Syrian 
Orthodox priest, Malke, in Qdmishli, who was respected by both Christians and 
Muslims, about returning to their Christian faith. The priest accepted their request and 
also sanctioned their marriages to Syrian Orthodox Christian men. 
The political situation of Jazirah was quite complex and the area was not fully 
settled until 1963 when the Ba'ath party assumed power. Since the 1930s, the northern 
Jazirah became an important area for Syrian agriculture due to its high precipitation 
pattern and the fertility of its terrain. As discussed in Chapter 1, Syrian Orthodox 
Christians who settled there as agriculturists had confrontations with both Kurdish and 
local Arab tribes in order to maintain their agricultural land. One example is a Syrian 
Orthodox Christian village called RUt5n. The Syrian Orthodox Christian villagers were 
fearful of Kurdish massacres in 1915 and left their village. After their return in the 
1920s, they had to fight the Kurds, who had squatted in their village and on their 
agricultural land, in order to get their land back. They had the assistance of regional 
police and so got their land back. The authorities were required to strengthening the 
guard at the border between Turkey and Syria in order to prevent raids from the Turkish 
side. The authorities wanted to use the Christian villagers in RUt5n, which is located 
close to the border, as border guards in order to establish the French control of the 
region. When the regional situation was unstable, bargaining vAth the authorities was an 
important skill for the Christians to practice. 
The enonnous possibilities for growing wheat and then cotton, whose production 
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was introduced in the 1940s, caused problem for Syrian Orthodox Christian peasants. 
The introduction of machinery in 1948 made it easier for tribal sheikhs, who regarded 
themselves as nomads and were politically dominant, to engage in cultivation without 
lowering themselves to the level of common peasants. This accessibility to cultivation 
stimulated their interest in agricultural businesses (Sato, 1997: 199). Syrian Orthodox 
Christians perceived that the authorities supported the domination of tribal sheikhs in the 
area in order to stabilise the region and ignored them, i. e. peasants, who were obliged to 
pay tribute to the sheikhs for housing and for the land they cultivated. 
Syrian Orthodox Christians, who were being exploited by the tribal sheikhs, 
needed to fight hard to hold on to the right to the land they cultivated. For example, 
some Syrian Orthodox Christians constructed new villages, such as Qasr-uk, which was 
part of the territories of an Arab Shammar tribal sheikh, Daham H5di. Although the 
Syrian Christians paid tribute to the sheikh, they tried to be as independent as possible. 
As a result of the massacre and immigration, many family members were 
dispersed throughout Jazirah. Old village communities in Tur 'Abdin were broken up. 
However, the Christians recount that relatives and former neighbours of villages in Tur 
'Abdin heard of fellow survivors, so they settled together in new villages. This suggests 
that migration was very individual and spread out over time rather than collective and at 
a single point of time. 
Due to the threats posed by an oppressive and tyrannical tribal power in 
QaýOnliya, an alliance between Syrian Orthodox Christian neighbours was required, 
This was reflected in marriage strategies. Syrian Orthodox Christians married locally at 
least within a closed geographical area, i. e. their own village or neighbouring ones. As 
they obtained information about their former neighbours and some family members who 
were separated, village communities gradually came to be composed of kin and former 
neighbours of Tur 'Abdin. Villagers tended to marry their peers. Marriage between 
neighbours meant that people knew the family history with whom the marriage was 
planned because of geographical vicinity. An example of marriage practices between 
Syrian Orthodox Christian villagers in the village of Gergeshamo near Qaýt5nlya is 
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presented. 
Musa and his household members related their family's history of marriage (see 
Figure 4). It was at the time when the Armenian deportation order in 1915 was 
issued (in Arabic it is called 'the time of the order', al-funndn, and in Syriac 'the 
year of sword', seyfo). Syrian Orthodox Christians were also attacked by their 
Kurdish neighbours who took the advantage of this policy of intolerance to the 
Christian inhabitants. Musa's father, Hanna, fled from a village called Arbo in 
Tur 'Abd-in to Gergesharno in the area of Qabt5n! ya with his neighbours, Rahdu, 
and his daughter, Farida, when Musa was a boy. Hanna knew that his MB was 
in Gergeshamo. There was no time for them to check where their family 
members were before escaping. Hanna's FBS, Haido, was a small boy and was 
found alone by a Muslim family. He was brought up by this family in Qab! 5n! ya. 
He, therefore, became a Muslim. Haido's brother, Isa, stayed at 'Arbo and 
became rich and owned land and property. Since then his three sons immigrated 
to Sweden, he moved there at his old age and subsequently died. 
Musa married the daughter of his neighbour, Hana. Her father, Ibrahim, became 
an orphan when his father was killed by the French army due to his betrayal of 
them. He was a French army soldier, but had been secretly communicating with 
the Syrian Nationalists (qawmi SUA). Although after his father's death, a Muslim 
family took care of him, his 1713 eventually brought him to Gergeshamo. Ibrahim 
married his neighbour's daughter, Gada, whose real father was a Kurd. Her 
mother Naima was obliged to marry the Kurd at the time of the massacre in 
1915. After his death, Naima left her deceased husband's home with her only 
daughter Gada. Naima heard that her F13, who was the only survivor in her 
family, was in Qdmishll. She asked him for his protection and returned to 
Christian faith. Brothers and sisters of Musa's wife, Hana, married their 
neighbours who were Syrian Orthodox Christians living in Gergeshamo and in 
its neighbouring villages. 
In the past, they used to be many people who became sick and died young. Both 
Gabriel and Fatahalla, i. e. Musa's elder brothers married three times due to the 
death of their wives. Fatahalla's first wife was his MBD and who died during 
childbirth. His second wife who was from Ijassake died of cirrhosis. He married 
again a neighbouring woman after moving to Qaht5niya. Musa's mother, Farida, 
remarried Hanna, after her first husband's death. iýusa's younger brother, Samir, 
loved a Syrian Orthodox Christian in Qdrnishli. The bride-to-be's mother's 
brother's vAfe (MEBW) interrupted the marriage arrangement and demanded a 
high naqad which was the money presented to the bride's family one week 
before the wedding. He and his family were not able to afford this large sum. 
The couple, then, eloped. They asked a powerful Syrian Orthodox Christian man 
in Ijassake to help them. The couple sheltered with him for three months. The 
case followed the tradition that at the end of the couple's three months 
protection, he took them to a priest and obtained his permission for their 
marriage. The families of both the bride and her bridegroom were obliged after 
140 
the wedding to accept the marriage. The guardian's effort to settle the matter 
proved successful. Both families now have good relations. 
Figure 4. Marriages of Musa's family 
.11 
AA0A 




Farida Hanna Gada Ibrahim Haido Isa 
AAAA0 
Gabriel Fatahallah Samir Musa Hana 
The marriage history of Musa's family shows characteristics of Syrian Orthodox 
Christian marriage, which were prevalent in this area until the 1960s. The first 
generation who experienced the massacre in 1915 were separated from their family 
members. Orphans, like Musa's FFBS, Haido, who were brought up by Muslims, and, 
consequently were converted to Islam. A Christian girl, who separated from her family, 
like Musa's wife's MM, Naima, was obliged to marry a Muslim. Both Muslims and 
Christians admit that there were many Syrian Orthodox Christian boys who were 
adopted by Muslim families. Syrian Orthodox Christians also say that Syrian Orthodox 
Christian girls who were obliged to marry Muslim men (Muslims believe that their 
marriage contracts were exchanged based on the mutual consent between bridegrooms 
and their Christian brides). Syrian Orthodox Christians est-imate the number of families 
who are descendants of these converted Muslims at three hundred in Jazirah. Like 
Musa's father, Hanna, people sought their relatives and settled in the village where their 
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relatives lived. Villagers tended to marry within their community, such as Musa and 
Hana, Musa's father, Hanna, and Farid. They needed to establish alliances between their 
neighbours when living in unstable social situations. 
Since Musa's family did not own land, they, like other tenant farmers, paid 
tribute to their landowner. Many Syrian Orthodox Christians worked as agricultural 
labourers. Therefore, he had no inherited property when he wanted to marry and set up 
his own household. In the early stage of his life, he worked as a shepherd and 
economised to set up his household. In village families, men married at around twenty 
years of age and women were between thirteen and sixteen. In the past, they married 
younger. Since village families owned little property, young people did not expect to 
receive a share of family inheritance. So there was no need for them to wait. Young 
men, who become old enough to maintain households independently from their parents, 
were able to marry at an early age (cf, Segalen, 1986: 118-9). 
Marriage is regarded as an indissoluble sacrament and divorce usually is not 
permitted. Both men and women were able to remarry after their spouses' deaths. A 
man, in practice, needs to remarry so that his new wife can take care of his deceased 
wife's children. Good examples are Musa's brothers, Gabriel and Fatahallah, who 
remarried after their wives' deaths. Musa's mother married his father, Hanna, after her 
first husband's death. Similar to the case of Greece discusses by Du Bouraly (1974: 
122), remarriage is socially important for women, in particular, as they can put away all 
signs of her former mourning and reverts totally to the full status of a married woman. 
Many people who immigrated to this area gradually found their relatives and 
reconstructed their family ties. Some people of the second and the third generations had 
chosen their maternal cousins, including matrilateral first cousins, as their spouses. 
Musa's brother, Fatahalla, who firstly married his MBD was such an example. Marriage 
with matemal cousins is also common amongst their Muslim neighbours. This was the 
time when the villagers started to emigrate to towns. Due to Syrian land reform, local 
tribal leaders, whose financial resources used to be the huge amount of land they 
dominated, and whose rights to their land was acknowledged by the political authorities, 
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now found their power reduced. The centralisation, which was accelerated by the Ba'ath 
party, contributed to the stabilisation of the region. Such new circumstances gave hope 
to the Christian villagers to find new economic opportunities in the towns. 
Consequently, Syrian Orthodox Christian village communities gradually dissolved. 
Women, mothers in particular, play an initial role in organising marriages and arranged 
marriages with their BDs for their sons. As for mothers, their BDs are their close 
relatives and they can expect intimate relationships with their daughter-in-laws, if their 
BDs would marry their sons. This was a practical device for enabling mothers to retain 
their sons in their village at a time when young people had started to emigrate to towns. 
Syrian Orthodox Christians who discussed their marriages with me believed that 
patrilateral first cousin marriage was forbidden or was regarded as incest., However, 
matrilateral first cousin marriage was easily accepted. Throughout my fieldwork, I met 
only a small number of Syrian Orthodox Christians who married their patrilateral 
parallel cousins. Under the Syrian Orthodox Christian Church law, both paternal and 
maternal first cousin marriages used to be forbidden. So why do contemporary Syrian 
Orthodox Christians regard only marriage with one's patrilateral first cousin as 
unfavourable? This makes them very different to Muslim Arabs who 'prefer' this type of 
marriage. In order to investigate this, the official ideology presented by the Syrian 
Orthodox Church should be examined. 
The Ideology of Marriage 
Under the legal system of the Syrian Arab Republic, members of the Orthodox 
Churches of Syrian, Greek and Armenian, Evangelist and Catholic Churches, are 
deemed to be religious minorities and are to be treated as equal to Muslims. Each of the 
religious minorities is considered as a sect (Tiiifa plural: Tawdif) and given a limited 
legislative and judicial authority in the field of marriage law. For example, the Syrian 
Orthodox Church has the right to enforce its own marriage laws on its believers and to 
amend its laws as long as it takes place by legal deed with the Ministry of Justice. 
Islamic jurisprudence and Ottoman legislation are the sources of religious law which 
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give judicial autonomy to non-Muslims. Syrian legislation has divided Syrian citizens 
into three religious categories: Muslims, Druze, and Christians and Jews. (Berger, 1997: 
117). 
Since marriage in Syria is based on religion, Christian marriage has to be 
celebrated by a priest and must be registered at the Civil Registry (al-Syill al-madani). 
The marriage certificate must contain the signatures of the priest and two witnesses. 
Syrian Orthodox churches in every diocese function as places for consulting matters 
relating to marriage. A bishop has authority to make final decisions in each case. 
If an inter-sect marriage takes place, the wedding ceremony is conducted at the 
church to which the bridegroom's family belongs. Although the ritual follows the 
liturgy and law of the Church where the marriage is celebrated, a priest of the bride's 
family also joins the celebration, which means the acknowledgement of the marriage by 
her Church. Marrying a Muslim is not permitted. In Syria's judicial system, a Muslim 
man can marry a non-Muslim woman, but not vice versa. This follows Islamic law. For 
a Syrian Orthodox Christian, the community does not allow either case. If a Synan 
Orthodox Christian married a Muslim, Syrian Orthodox Christian law could not be 
effective for this marriage. Muslim family law applies to the case. A Christian woman 
who married a Muslim man is no longer regarded as a Christian by Syrian Orthodox 
Christians and her children are, without choice, Muslims. At the time of religious 
intolerance in Turkey in 1915, many Syrian Orthodox Christian women were forced to 
marry Muslim men. It was a sign of their subjugation. Since the Qabtanlya Christians 
remember these events, which threatened the existence of their community, they would 
never consider marrying Muslims. 
The reason that they marry in church is not only due to their faith, but also due to 
their social needs to legalise their marriage. If a couple seek marriage outside the 
Church, the couple lose their position in their community. However, in the 1950s some 
Syrian Orthodox Christians started to challenge the Church law and its prohibitions of 
marriages between close kin. As discussed in Chapter 4, in the Urfalli community in 
Aleppo, there were another reasons which encouraged marriages between close 
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relatives, such as isolation and poverty. in urban areas, such as Aleppo, concern about 
close kin marriage started earlier than in the countryside, such as the area of Qabtanliya. 
In the area of Qabtdrilya, this phenomenon seems to have started when villagers began to 
move to the towns in the 1960s and their village communities decreased in population. 
In order not to lose its congregation, the Church had to adjust to the social need for 
marriage between close relatives. The Church was afraid that its congregation would 
convert to other denominations whose churches allow marriages between close relatives. 
The Syrian Orthodox Church sought to remedy the situation by providing its 
congregation with more possibilities for expanding their choices of marriage partners. 
The Church justified the change in the marriage law by reference to God who said, "it is 
not good that man should be alone; I will make a help mate for him" (Genesis 2: 18). In 
1954, the Church announced its resolution for dealing with the issue of marriage 
between close relatives. The Church allowed the following marriages: 
a. A man can marry his brother's wife's sister 
b. A widower can marry his deceased wife's sister 
c. The marriage of a man with a woman who is a sister of his sister-in-law or a woman 
who is a sister of his brother-in-law 
In this resolution, marriage between first cousins was still prohibited. However, 
according to the Church authorities, the demands for first cousin marriages, which 
required permission of the Patriarch, increased and such demands gradually paved a 
ground for further change in the marriage law. In the early 1970s, the Church issued a 
resolution allowing first cousin marriages. The Church considers it to be an unavoidable 
strategy for maintaining continuity of the community and the Church. 
However, lay people understand these changes to the marriage law differently. 
The 1954 resolution is regarded as the Church's declaration permitting marriages 
between matemal first cousins, and the 1970s resolution as the final decision of the 
Church by which it accepted marriages between paternal first cousins with the Church"s 
advice and consultation. The understanding of lay people thus differs ftorn what the 
Church intended. The exchange of marriages between two fwnilies whose children 
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marry each other are permitted in the 1954 resolution. This ideological change might be 
reinterpreted by lay people in the course of marriage practices, even though in the 
official ideology marriage between first cousins was prohibited in this stage. However, 
this is not able to explain why Syrian Orthodox Christians considered the prohibition of 
matemal first cousin marriage was suspended, whilst that of paternal first cousins was 
sustained. One possible explanation is that in patrilineal society, maternal relatives 
belong to a family different from one's own and, therefore, marriage exchanges between 
the two different families were permitted. Matrilaterality and agnation constitute 
different cultural categories. When cousin marriage takes place, this social relation has 
to be labelled and defined with reference to existing cultural categories. If the marriage 
were defined as patrilateral first cousin marriage, it would contest both the Church laws 
and their social norms which define it as incest. Such contestation should be avoided. A 
cultural category which conforms to normative expectation has to be applied for 
defiming the relations in order to reduce tension in actual management of social relations, 
as Comaroff has noted in his studies of cousin marriages in Tshidi in South Africa 
(1987: 66-7). Matrilateral relations are less formal than patrilateral one in the agnatic 
society of Syrian Orthodox Christians. The permission of matrilateral first cousin 
marriage was reinterpreted by them, owing to the reality of increasing marriages 
between close relatives. 
Such perception is related to their concept of 'closeness' between kin and 
relatives. However, Syrian Orthodox Christians, due to the dispersal of their families 
and their peasant origin, cannot trace back genealogical relations between kin to the 
same degree as that of neighbouring tribes. Therefore, their conception of patrilineal 
descent is not enough to explain mutual obligations between patrilateral kin in terms of 
genealogical distance. However, Syrian Orthodox Christians share a perception with 
Arab tribes of constructing ego-centred kinship relations. The concept of 'who is closer 
than whom to ego' seems to determine the Christians' understandings of the change to 
the marriage laws and in the arrangement of their marriages. This categorisation of 
relationships between patrilateral relatives is a common feature which is observed in a 
local Arab tribe, the Tai, and Syrian Orthodox Christians. Therefore, in order to clarify 
the perception of kinship relations among the Syrian Orthodox Christians and 
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obligations attached to them, the following case of the local Arab tribe, the Tai, is 
presented. 
The Perception of Kinship Relations - The Case of Local Arabs in Jazirah 
Tai is one of the largest local Arab tribal confederations in the northeastern 
Syrian Jazirah. Their tribal territory stretches from Mount Singar in the south to 
Diyarbakr in the north, and from al-Malkiya in the east to Qdmishri in the west. Existing 
or proposed relationships between groups are based on the mutual recognition of their 
genealogical relationships. A genealogy legitimises present relationships. Therefore, 
when they define a relationship in the present, they refer to common ancestors. As 
Lancaster mentions in the case of Rwala, ancestors are seen only as a link to the larger 
segment of the tribe and this only has meaning when seen in relation to complementary 
groups of real, living people (1981: 152). An ego-centred kinship network expands by 
tracing ancestors and including their descendants, who exist at the present time. In the 
context where group relationship is considered, this relationship is understood in terms 
of individuals who are related patrilineally. For example, two individuals can understand 
the kinship category by which their relationship is defined, if they can trace a 
relationship (patrilineal) to the same ancestors. They are not trying to find the exact 
genealogical relationship between each other in the process of categorising their 
relationship. The exact genealogical relationship between the two is not a matter for 
consideration. Moreover, which kinship category they use in order to explain 
relationship between kin can change, depending on who wishes to recognise the 
relationship with whom, and in what context. Insider-outsider opposition is crucial in 
categorising relationships between kin. The notion can only explain what they conceive 
their kinship affiliation to be (Gellner, 1969: 41-44; Peters, 1967: 270). 
As Eickelman suggests in the case of the Bnl Bat5w in Morocco (1977: 47-52), 
the genealogical linkage to the past continues to pervade the present, and past events, 
which directly related to the social order, provide a positive value to the present 
relationships. In the case of the Tai, patrifiliative descent indicates that there is social 
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distance between them. The cognition of present kinship relations, which defines one's 
relation to others, is the ego-centred and is contextual in terms of the kinship category in 
which both of them are included. 
Obligations between patrilineal kin are to be understood with reference to the 
notion of kinship relations between the persons involved, such as brother (akh), 
patrilateral parallel cousin (ibn 'amm) and patrilateral kin (qardib). The Tai perceive that 
the closer they are, the more obligations they bear to each other. For example, when 
conflict occurs between different groups within the tribe, they can expect support from 
kin whose relationship to them is closer than that of kin which is more distant. This is 
the ideal situation, but in many cases, this support is absent. (Dresch, 1986: 320; 
Salzman, 1978: 61,80). 
Terms indicating kinship relations between the persons involved, such as Father, 
Mother, Brother, Sister, ibn 'amm (classificatory patrilateral parallel cousin), and qarlffib 
(patrilateral kiý), determine obligations in their relationships. Ibn 'amm and qar-Aib are 
kinship categories in a classificatory sense. How they recognise these relationships 
changes according to the contexts in which the relationships are mentioned, so further 
description of these two relationships is necessary. Qargib (single: qafib), which means 
patrilateral kin, is a word derived from qurba, meaning 'to get close'. An 'amm means 
literally a person whose relationship to ego is as a son of a paternal uncle. In the 
classificatory sense, this category is applicable to patrilineal kinsmen who share with 
ego an ancestor up to five generations back. These close relationships, such as qarffib 
and ibn 'amm, are not only determined by categorising kin in their relation to ego, but 
also by maintaining mutual obligations required by the relationship. They are expected 
to maintain obligations between them, according to the norm of supporting each other 
(musj'ada maa baad). These obligations are maintained, in particular, on the occasion 
of funerals when expected roles are allocated to people based on their relationship to the 
deceased. Past genealogical relationship is simply a presupposition, which mutual 
obligation can bring into play as present relations are constituted. If a person does not 
carry out his/her expected roles on these occasions, he/she is no longer considered close 
to the family of the deceased. Tai members sometimes complain about the qaiiib 
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behind their back: "qarffib cannot be close if they fail to fulfil their obligation (ijbdr) by 
supporting each other. They understand that co-operation and mutual support is 
important in maintaining relationships between kin. 
When relations between patrilateral kin are referred as ibn 'amm, the relation is 
understood by the Tai as different from the qarjib relationship, which, in this context, is 
the relationship between kin who are more distant than those of the ibn 'amm. The 
relationship between ego and ibn 'amm is regarded as a close relationship and, therefore, 
the relationship is often understood by referring particular obligations between these 
two. As the Tai conceive marriage between ibn 'amm and his bint 'amm (patrilateral 
female parallel cousin) is preferential (even though first patrilineal parallel cousins are 
not frequently arranged), in order to define the relationship, particular obligations are 
imposed on this relationship. For example, women gossip about a woman's marriage 
and say that she was obliged to marry her ibn 'amm. They recognise the bride's 
obligation to accept a proposal from her ibn 'amm, and regard this obligation as a part of 
the recognition of the kinship relation between her and her ibn 'amm. The principle of 
closeness works to classify men included in the category of ibn 'amm. In the case 
mentioned above, one of the women explained the reason for the bride's acceptance of 
marriage; "the bride feared that no one wanted to propose to her as long as this ibn 'amm 
had not given up the idea of marrying her. " Her husband was her first patrilateral 
parallel cousin, and, therefore, had the primary right to marry her, more so than other ibn 
'amm whose genealogical relation to her was more distant. The closeness between her 
and her ibn 'amm defines whose proposal she is obliged to accept. 
Syrian Orthodox Christians also classify kinship relations according to ego- 
centred genealogical closeness and use kinship terms such as ibn 'amm and qarffib, in a 
classificatory sense in order to define their patrilateral relationships. They also have a 
similar classification of kinship rights and obligations. For example, in funerals different 
roles are allocated to kin according to their relationships to the family of the deceased. 
Close kin and relatives have to visit each other at the occasions of the Christian feasts as 
local Arabs do during Islamic feasts. They recognise relationships between kin by using 
ego-centred kinship classification. The distance between patrilateral kin is not only 
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defined by genealogical relationships, but also by norms of obligations, which 
accompany particular relationships, and its practices. These obligations apply to 
patrilineal relationships and, therefore, matemal relatives are not involved. 
The major difference between local Arabs as well as Kurds and Syrian Orthodox 
Christians is that Arabs and Kurds use the norm of rights and obligations of patrilineal 
parallel cousin marriage for describing the closeness of the relationship between two 
persons concerned. However, Syrian Orthodox Christians use patrilateral parallel cousin 
marriage, marriage between first patrilateral parallel cousins in particular, as the sign of 
closeness between them and, therefore, the closer the relationship between them, the 
more strict is the obligation for avoiding such a marriage. Therefore, the marriage 
between first patrilateral parallel cousins was regarded as incest and the couple who 
breached this rule used to be ostracised. This seems to have been a marker of 
differentiating them from Arabs and Kurds. Marriages between second and further 
distant patrilateral cousins are more acceptable due to the distance between them. 
Whereas, marriage between maternal first cousins was not and is not regarded as the 
breach of norms of the community, due to the fact that maternal relatives are considered 
less bound by the obligations between paternal kin. As will be discussed later, the 
practical demands of marriages between close relatives weaken the norms for keeping 
people away from patrilateral first cousin marriages. Syrian Orthodox Christians now 
introduce another obligations for defining relationships between close kin by imposing 
on paternal closest kin obligations of Godparents, who used to be unrelated persons or 
distant relatives and are now chosen within one's own agnatic group. Before starting this 
discussion, the social background which accelerates marriages between close relatives 
and their practices will be examined. 
Emigration and Changes of Marriage Practices 
Political and economic changes in the early 1960s gradually brought about the 
abandonment of Syrian Orthodox Christian villages. As a result of Syrian land reform 
which started in 1958, peasants were guaranteed the right of cultivating the land, i. e. the 
right of lease-holding by the government. Many peasants still do not own land they 
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cultivate, but are entitled to cultivate it. They, therefore, were no longer the tenant 
farmers of big landowners and tribal leaders. Many Syrian Orthodox Christians became 
freed from the confinement of being controlled by big landowners and tribal leaders. 
However, the state did not always distribute the same land to the tenant farmers 
that they used to cultivate. Instead, some received land which was located far away 
from their villages. Some contemporary Syrian Orthodox Christians interpret this 
government policy as an attempt to dissolve the Syrian Orthodox community and 
weaken its solidarity. This policy was applied to some villages whose landowners and 
tenants were both Syrian Orthodox Christians. For example, in a Syrian Orthodox 
Christian village Qaýr-uk, whose landowner was a Muslim tribal sheikh, the State 
allocated Syrian Orthodox Christian villagers the right to cultivate their village land. 
However, there is insufficient documentary material available to support this contention. 
By contrast in the village of Gergeshamo, where both the landowner and his tenants 
were both Syrian Orthodox Christians, each tenant acquired the right of cultivating only 
a few hectares of the village land and several hectares in a village which was located far 
away from their own village. Moreover, these former tenant villagers were not able to 
earn enough income from the land which the State provided for them. Despite such 
economic difficulties, the government's campaign through the slogan 'Land reform 
liberates peasants from landowners' inspired Syrian Orthodox Christian tenants not to 
work any longer for their previous landowners. 
Until the late 1960s, the occupations followed by Syrian Orthodox Christians in 
the town of QahtAnIya were as ironsmiths, drivers, bakers, bricklayers and shopkeepers. 
There used to be no industry in the town which could absorb many of the Christian 
villagers into urban occupations. However, Syrian oil production in the late 1950s 
brought about regional industrial development, which was able to provide former tenant 
villagers with job opportunities in the National oil company at Rumeil5n which 
increased the number of its employees from the beginning of 1970s to the beginning of 
1980S. 2 These workers moved into Qabt5n! ya as the company provided bus services for 
the commuters to the oil company's premises. The development of both the oil industry 
and the agricultural industry increased the demand for workshops, vehicles and 
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mechanics. One street in Qabtdniya is occupied by such mechanical workshops most of 
which used to be run by Syrian Orthodox Christian immigrants from the villages. 
Figure 5. Proportion of Christians to Muslims at the School 








The change of occupations has accelerated the immigration of Syrian Orthodox 
Christian villagers to regional towns, such as Qabt5n! ya and Q5mishfi, and, as a result, 
has reduced the village population. Small landowners of Syrian Orthodox Christians 
started to invest money earned in agriculture into their own businesses in the towns, such 
as shops and restaurants. 
I conducted a demographic survey on the number of primary school pupils in 
Qahtdnlya. The school, established in 1952, is the oldest primary school in Qabt5n! ya 
and is located in the oldest quarter. Pupils who attend this school are Syrian Orthodox 
Christians and Kurds. All the Syrian Orthodox pupils were registered in this school. 
Among 279 pupils registered in the year 1960/1, Syrian Orthodox Christians were 22, 
whereas the number of Muslims were 257. In the year 1966/7, the number of Syrian 
Orthodox Christians was 24 and that of Muslims was 249. Syrian Orthodox Christians 
occupied only 7.9 percent of the pupils in total in 1960/1 and 8.8 percent in 1966/7. 
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During the 1960s, this school was the only primary school in Qabtdnlya and therefore, it 
reflects the population composition in Qabt5n-iya in those days. The number of pupils 
registered in the year 1980/1 was 1181 among whom Syrian Orthodox Christians were 
306 and Muslims were 875. The number of Christian pupils comprised 26 percent of the 
total. This number reflects the population of two old quarters and a new Syrian Orthodox 
Christian quarter where in 1976 the immigrants from villages started to build their 
houses. It is obvious that immigration of Syrian Orthodox Christian villagers increased 
the number of Christians in the town. By 1997/8, the number of Syrian Orthodox 
Christian in this school was only 64 among 980 pupils in total. This is 6.5 percent of the 
total pupils. The ratio of Syrian Orthodox Christians in this town dropped dramatically 
due to their emigration abroad and influx of Kurdish and Arab villagers into the town. 
These figures suggest why Syrian Orthodox Christians found it advantageous to 
marry close relatives. In the 1960s, their population in the town was still small and, 
therefore, the Christian immigrants were anxious about living in the town which 
contained a large Kurdish population as they did not wanted to interact with them. From 
the view point of Christian villagers, it was the young people who started to immigrate 
to the town and the older generations, mothers in particular, who tried to retain their sons 
in the villages. These two different intentions increased demands for strengthening ties 
between relatives and accelerated the change in marriage ideology, which allows them to 
marry their close relatives. As ties between neighbours in villages were reduced due to 
continuous immigration, kinship and affinal networks became more important for 
developing opportunities in urban settings. For example, Musa in the previous example 
(Figure 4), whose mother first married a man in the town of QRnishl! and had children, 
asked his half-brother, who was an government official, to help him to get a job in the 
oil company. Personal connection (wasfa) is important for facilitating the processes of 
job application, getting a place in university and obtaining legal permission. Intimate ties 
between relatives are useful in order to expand opportunities in urban life. 
When the Syrian Christian population reached its peak at the beginning of the 
1980s, there were five hundred Christian households in Qabt5niya, according to a priest 
who is knowledgeable about demography, due to the fact that he visits every household 
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in his parish every Easter. By 1998, only two hundred and seventy-five households were 
resident in Qahtýiniya itself and with another sixty households in villages in the parish. 
The decrease in their population in the parish is due to emigration to Europe, which 
continues to this day. Their destinations are principally Sweden, Holland, Belgium, 
Germany, Switzerland. As having mentioned in Chapter 1, the emigration reached the 
peak after the massacre in Hama in 1982. 
Urbanisation and immigration have created two different tendencies for their 
marriage choices. There is a tendency to marry persons who are not relatives, but are in 
similar social position. Another tendency is that marriages between close relatives are 
getting popular. First, the former phenomenon will be discussed. Immigration to 
Qabt5n! ya made it possible for villagers to have daily contacts with Syrian Orthodox 
Christians from different villages. Even their mobility has increased. They go to 
neighbouring towns, such as Qdmishl! and Ijassake for business, prayer, attending 
colleges and social gatherings. This affects their marriage choices. One example is given 
below of marriage in which the bridegroom's and his bride's family did not know each 
other until their marriage negotiations had commenced. 
Joseph who lived in Qdmishl! gave a ring to Rula's family who lived in 
Qabt5mya in order to show his intention that he would like to marry her. Joseph 
and the families did not know each other. He said that he saw her at a church in 
QZimishl! when she attended a service as a member of the choir. Then, Rula's 
family started to investigate who he was. 
It is common that if a young man and his relatives do not know the family of a 
prospective bride, they make inquiries about her family's reputation and economic 
situation, the girl's personal character and educational level. If his relatives consider the 
girl suitable, he asks the girl's family to arrange for an opportunity to meet them, 
including the girl. Joseph undertook a similar process. He used his personal networks to 
find out about her. Her family were of humble origin, former villagers who had moved 
into QabtWiya when her father got a job in the national oil company. All her siblings 
were educated to a certain levels, and Rula was finishing her studies in a college in 
Ijassake. The girl's family also investigated the man, who asked for her hand, and his 
family. Rula's family found from whom Joseph received information about her family 
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and how he obtained it. Joseph was a university graduate engineer and has two brothers. 
One was a medical doctor and the other ran a shop in Q5mishh. For Rula's family, 
objectively speaking, this match would be an ideal one. 
Joseph asked Rula's family to allow him to visit them in order to state his 
intention to marry her. At the time of his visit he got a positive reply from Rula's 
family suggesting the possibility of the marriage. Then, he also asked their 
permission to speak to her on phone in order for them to get to know each other. 
It is a general view in the Middle East that a modem marriage should be based 
on compatibility of the families and ideally conformity of the couple (Hoodfar, 1997: 
62). Syrian Orthodox Christians often say, "in conformity with the couple's wishes, the 
arrangement will go ahead. " The couple's mutual consent is regarded as one of the 
important conditions for determining the choice. It is possible for the bride or bride- 
groom-to-be to express opposition to the marriage. However, if the two families think 
the marriage of their children is in their best interest, girls, in particular, feel that they 
should give their consent. It means that the ultimate aim of marriage strategies is to 
maintain or establish a social position for oneself and one's own family. Since the 
honour of the family is determinant of social status, young men and women have to 
consider whether their choice of marriage partner is appropriate in order to maintain 
his/her family's social status. In the case of Joseph and Rula, the proposed marriage was 
regarded as suitable by their families, and the young couple liked each other through 
their communication on phone. Then, Rula's family gave consent to her marriage. 
In these days, there are many cases of marriages between persons who did not 
know each other until when the man saw her at a church services or a wedding reception 
and became interested in her. Such marriages between persons previously unknown to 
each other, occur because they find that they are in a similar social position. This 
happens not only in the cases in which the couple live in different towns, but also 
between people who both live in Qalýtdniya. Urban life Provides them with the chance of 
a modem life style, educational opportunities, professional experiences and broader 
social networks, which are means of improving their social and economic status. 
Consequently, social differences among the community members emerge and affect 
their choices of marriage partners. When they lived in villages, many of them were 
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agricultural labourers and, therefore, stratification among these peasants had not 
developed. However, urbanisation generated differences between the former peasants. 
They now tend to marry people who occupy a similar social position, as the marriage 
between Joseph and Rula suggests. 
Syrian Orthodox Christians in a town of Qabtdnlya believe that education is one 
of the means for improving their economic and social status. Although many villagers 
have, at best an elementary school education, after their moving into Qab! 5n! ya, they 
have more opportunities to send their children to junior high schools and secondary 
schools. Since national school education has been free, education has been a means for 
poor Syrian Orthodox Christians to climb the social ladder. If they obtain high marks at 
the examination of the Baccalaureate, they can study at colleges in Uassake and go to 
the university in Aleppo to become teachers, medical doctors, pharmacists and 
engineers. Joseph and Rula in the previous example improved their personal status 
through education. It is ideal for men to have a university degree and for women to 
finish college education. It is not preferable for girls to go on to university. Parents do 
not like to send their daughters to a big city, such as Aleppo, as there it is difficult for 
them to control their daughters' behaviour. This may create possibilities for darnage to 
the family honour. Considering the economic condition in the region, there is little need 
for women to study at university. When they finish their college education, they are able 
to obtain enough qualifications to become teachers, which is the only preferable 
occupation for women. 
The reason that Syrian Orthodox Christians developed their idea that education 
enhances one's social position is related to government policy. Until the beginning of 
1980s, the government policy of investing in the public sector increased the number of 
employees (muwaiial) in the public sector (Perthes, 1992: 45). Only people who had 
obtained university degrees have the possibility of becoming higher-ranking officials. 
The public sector is the only place where people without property can find a respectable 
job, since the private sector in Syria consists of fan-tily business which are usually run by 
rich families. This is also applicable for women, who obtain higher qualification as 
teachers, to be employed in the public sector. Even though the Christians develop ideals 
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what educated Syrian Orthodox Christians can achieve, in reality, only a small number 
of people graduated in universities and became urban professionals. 
3 
This ideal is that Syrian Orthodox Christians are people who desire to improve 
themselves (mutaqaddim). This ideal of improving their social status prevents them from 
doing menial working, e. g. vendors and porters. Most of these roles are undertaken by 
Kurds. Syrian Orthodox Christians also no longer wish to work as agricultural labourers 
as they regard them as underdeveloped and uneducated. This attitude makes it more 
difficult for them to get a steady income, particularly in a rural town, since economic 
stagnation and rapid inflation at the end of 1980s has reduced opportunities for local 
employment in the public sector. Even Syria's open economic policy, which was 
launched in 1991, has brought few economic opportunities to the Jazirah. The most 
reliable income source is still agricultural land, if they own or lease enough land. Many 
people who do not have enough land find it difficult to sustain their families solely on 
their agricultural income. Syrian Orthodox Christians perceive that the lack of a steady 
income, or a low salary in public sector makes it difficult for their young men to 
establish their independence for marriage. 
Consequently, Syrian Orthodox Christian men now tend to marry at an older age. 
Despite the fact that this is due to the pragmatic economic situation, they provide an 
idealistic statement to explain this: "if a man wishes to marry, he, first, has to complete 
his education and find a job. When his income reaches a level to enable him to sustain 
his own household, he is then ready to marry. It is for this reason that the average age of 
our men at marriage is over thirty. " In reality, there are only a small number of 
university graduates in the community and even many graduates do not have 
opportunities to use their skills and education. Many men are engaged in urban 
professions such as artisans, mechanics and carpenters, self-employed drivers, shop 
owners, and lower ranking employees in the national oil company. Christians wish to 
portray their community as one of urban professionals. A similar statement is applicable 
to women: "it is preferable for a woman to be educated, because an educated mother can 
train her children better. When a woman graduates from a local college at the age of 
twenty, she is ready to marry. " This statement is a symbolic representation, showing that 
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the Christians are interested in female education, which many of Kurds and local Arabs 
do not regard as important. Female education is not a means for Arabs and Kurds to 
improve their economic and social status. They are rather afraid that outsiders whom a 
girl encounters at school and on her way to school may create possibilities for damage of 
the family honour. By contrast, Christian girls are given equal opportunities to boys for 
attending schools. They try to differentiate themselves from their neighbouring Muslim 
population in terms of education, even though in fact there are not many women who 
pass examinations and obtain a Baccalaureate. However, women have a more practical 
view: "if a woman is educated, she has more opportunities to marry a well established 
man and also may be able to be employed as a teacher on her 'rainy days'. This is the 
only job women can find here". 
Another factor affects marriages between close relatives. As there is little hope 
that the government can improve the salary of the employees and that the private sector 
will bring more economic opportunities into the region, it is difficult for young people to 
establish themselves. Many youths, hoping to obtain a better life in future, want to 
emigrate abroad. Girls prefer Syrian Orthodox men, who emigrated to Europe and then 
returned to seek brides, to men locally established for their spouses. This is because 
women worry about social and economic uncertainty of their future in Syria. By 
marrying emigrants, they can get the opportunity to emigrate. 
However, there is no official way for them to get permission to emigrate abroad 
and it is also difficult for them to obtain visas for travelling abroad. Due to the demands 
of local Christians to emigrate, temporarily returning emigrants enjoy the advantages of 
being able to find desirable spouses in Syria and take them back to their new countries. 
Although more emigrant men than women visit to find spouses, nowadays, the number 
of young female emigrants who prefer to marry men in Syria is increasing. For 
emigrants, marrying people in their homeland or people sharing the same origin is a way 
of maintaining ties with their native community and confirming the source of their own 
identity which might have become tenuous after a substantial amount of time living 
abroad as emigrants (cf. Maher, 1974: 160). They usually stay with their relatives. If 
they no longer have relatives in the town, they stay with the family of their godparents. 
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Their host families usually search for their prospective spouses from their close 
relatives. If the host family cannot find a suitable one, they ask their friends and 
neighbours to find appropriate candidates. One example is presented here. 
A Syrian Orthodox Christian man, Yacoub, who was brought up in Sweden, paid 
a visit to his mother's natal family in Qabt5nIya. The purpose of his visit was to 
find his bride. He is a successful young man whose family is engaged in 
restaurant business in Stockholm. Yacoub's MZ was interested in marrying her 
daughter, Mazida, to Yacoub (see Figure 6). Yocaub's father and Mazida's 
father are in the relationship of patrilateral relatives whose family used to be 
neighbours; of their mothers' family when they lived in Tur 'Abd-in before their 
emigration to the area of Qabtdnlya. Yacoub and Mazida are maternal first 
cousins (MZS and MZD) and are also patrilateral relatives. Mazida's father was 
not economically and socially successful in comparison to her mother's brothers 
who were engineers. Therefore, for the sake of Mazida and her parents, the 
match would give her a chance to be better off and, therefore, it was desirable. 





When Mazida obtains her Swedish citizenship, her parents may get the 
opportunity to emigrate to Sweden. If the parents can obtain Swedish citizenship, their 
other children may also enjoy the opportunity to emigrate there. Mazida's marriage with 
Yacoub would provide a great opportunity for her family. This example suggests that 
marriage between an emigrant and his/her close relatives in Qabt5n! ya might give their 
relatives in Qabt5n! ya opportunities to emigrate. Due to the 'closeness' between their 
families, who know each other well, the emigrants do not have enough information on 
other people in this locality, but feel secure arranging a marriage with a close relative. 
159 
However, the couple's mutual consent is regarded as an important condition determining 
the choice in order to present their marriage as modem. In the case of Yacoub and 
Mazida, they said that they liked each other and married. When the emigrant cannot find 
his/her spouse-to-be among close relatives of the host family, his/her host family make 
enquiries among their distant relatives, friends and neighbours, as to whether or not there 
is an appropriate person for the marriage. The search follows a pattern of concentric 
circles emanating from the host family. The closer he/she is genealogically to the host 
family, the more possibility she/he has in introducing to the emigrant by the host family. 
Despite such a demand for marriage between close relatives, as referred earlier, 
marriage between patrilateral parallel first cousins is not regarded by Qabtanlya 
Christians as desirable. Moreover, marriage between non-relatives whose social 
positions are similar has become an important social asset among the Christians. These 
tendencies do not provide patrilateral close relatives, such as families of ones' FB, FBS, 
with opportunities to strengthening their kinship ties through marriage. Mutual support 
by, for example, offering to introduce appropriate persons through their personal 
connections (wasta) when looking for jobs and taking steps to speed up a solution to 
problems is important in urban life. Patrilateral relatives ideally must support each other. 
However, there are no particular rules for defining what mutual support is expected. As 
mentioned earlier, local Arabs maintain the ideology of preference for marriage with 
patrilateral parallel cousins as a symbol of the close relationships between patrilateral 
kin, and the rights and obligations attached to them. There is no such definite rule among 
the Christians. The Christians, therefore, generate a device for defining mutual 
obligations expected of patrilateral kin. The custom of godparenthood is chosen as such 
a device. 
Who can be Godparents? 
A godparenthood relationship involves two sacraments: baptism and marriage. A 
godparent carries his/her godchild at his/her baptism. A godfather (qant-bo) can only 
have a boy as his godchild and a godmother (qarfba) a girl. The term qani-bo refers to the 
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relationship between the two sides, i. e. a godparent and his/her godchild. It is also used 
as a ten-n of address. The couple who act as witnesses of their marriage are composed of 
a man and a woman are also in the relationship of qadbo. The two sacraments create this 
ritual relationship which is believed to be sanctioned by God. The qafibo relationship 
involves two parties in baptism: the family of a baptised child and the fanffly of his/her 
godparent. The family of a baptised child includes the child's father, mother and 
siblings. The family of the godparent means the godparent, his/her spouse and their 
children. Marriage is prohibited between these two families. Ideally, the family of a 
child's qadbo will continue to support not only the child's but also the child's family 
members and be a sponsor of his/her siblings. The relationship is in this sense unilateral 
and potentially renewable. A godparent is expected to present a white dress, a cap and a 
pair of gloves which the child will wear after baptism when the child is taken by this 
godparent to the altar to receive the cross of holy oil (on forehead) and a piece of 
consecrated bread. The child's family in turn often invites the godparent to a meal to 
celebrate the child's union to the Church. A male witness to a marriage is chosen from 
the family of the bridegroom's qadbo and is usually a son of the bridegroom's godparent 
who carried him at his baptism. As a female witness of marriage, the son's wife or if he 
has not married, his sister takes the role. Members of the family in qadbo relations are 
under obligation to renew the relationship in the succeeding generation. 
Qafibo relationship shares similar characteristics with the laff relationship of 
Muslims in this region. KrIf refers to relationship between the family of a circumcised 
male child and the family of the male sponsor at the circumcision. Both relationships are 
referred as spiritual kinships. Spiritual kinship relations in both Christian and Muslim 
societies are described as relationships based on friendship and mutual trust (e. g. Davis, 
1977: 224; Magnallella & TUrkdogan, 1975: 1630-1; Pitt-Rivers, 1976: 323). Tapper 
says that the tie of friendship is fragile and, therefore, is converted to a ritual relationship 
which required continuous reinforcement between the family of the circumcised boy and 
that of the sponsor (1977: 138). Pitt-Rivers mentions that the godparenthood 
relationship in Sierra provides an irrevocable tie of both formal and sacred friendship 
and mutual trust, which is stronger than kinship because it owes its existence to the free 
consent of both parties (1971: 107-8). This relationship based on the social and spiritual 
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ties between two families is similar to the qazibo relationship among Syrian Orthodox 
Christians in the Jazirah. Among the Christians, marriage is prohibited between these 
two families. This is also applied to families who are in krifrelationship. What makes 
kdf relationship different from qarlbo one is that mate siblings have different sponsors 
of their circumcision. Since the choice of krif is made by a household head, usually the 
father of the boy-to-be circumcised, the kfif candidate is asked whether or not he will 
consent to sponsor the ritual. The sponsor is not a relative of the boy's family. Before 
the massacre in 1915, Syrian Orthodox Christian men used to act as sponsors of Kurdish 
boys at their circumcisions. The boys' fathers were friends or neighbours of these 
Christians. Syrian Orthodox Christians also call this relationship qalibo. There are 
stories of Syrian Christian women, who, when they escaped from the massacre, asked 
for the protection of their Muslim qafibo. This relationship was ideally based on mutual 
aid and trust. Therefore, they helped these Christian women. Since male members of 
their Liflqadbo families were prohibited from marrying women in the relationship of 
kdf1qarfbo, women's sexual virtue was protected. However, elders do not transmit these 
stories to the young. They tend to conceal memories of their good relations to Kurds at 
their time in Turkey. 
Members of the family in krif relations are under no obligation to renew the 
relationship in the succeeding generation. By contrast, qadbo relationships between 
Syrian Orthodox Christians are regarded ideally as successive. However, there was a 
disruption in its continuity. Since the massacre in 1915, and their subsequent 
immigration, old village communities were disbanded, and former villagers needed to 
build new qazibo relations in their new settlement. They used to choose their neighbours 
who were unrelated or were their distant relatives to sponsor their children and its 
relationship contributed to reinforce extant neighbourhood ties. It was employed as a 
mechanism for integrating village communities. 
It has been over seventy years since these Syrian Orthodox Christian 
immigrants started to construct new qafibo relationships. Massive population 
movements from villages to the town of Qabldnlya and their consequent emigration 
abroad disbanded qafibo relationships, which they had established when they lived in 
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villages. Although qani-bo relationships contribute to establishing ties in a village 
community, such relationships lost their meaning when most of Syrian Orthodox 
Christian villagers left for towns and abroad. Therefore, it is impossible to trace how 
qadbo relationships succeeded over generations. There are cases where emigrants pay a 
visit to their qarfbo in Qabt5nIya and ask for their support to find their spouses there. Yet 
such relationships are often not renewed in the next generation. For example, if a 
couple's qarlbo at their wedding emigrated abroad, the child of the sponsored couple 
would be borne at its baptism by the couple's qaribo's brother or his son (in cases of 
girls, by either his brother's wife or his brother's daughter). Emigrants are not able to 
fulfil their obligations as qadbo and consequently fail to maintain the relationship. This 
fact suggests that people are more concerned about establishing horizontal kinship 
networks in their locality. As a father and his sons, even after their marriage, are 
regarded as members of one family, the bridegroom's qadbo is replaced by a qadbo's 
brotheribrother's son. 
Ideally, godparent relationships having been created between the two families are 
succeeded by the family segments whose member baptised the children of the 
sponsored, as Hammel found in the case of the Balkans. He says if the sponsored 
household split, individuals within the sponsoring group took special responsibility for 
particular segments of the sponsored (Hammel, 1968: 45-50). However, among the 
Syrian Orthodox Christians, it is difficult to realise such ideals of the qaribo relationship 
succeeding from fathers to sons over generations, because of their leaving for abroad. 
As a result of their emigration and having broken up their village community, 
many families are no longer able to maintain old qaribo relationships. Many people 
nowadays choose their qadbo among their close kin, i. e. father's brother's family. Their 
statement that it used to be impossible for them to choose a man's patrilateral relatives 
as qadho suggests the dramatic change of their choice of their qarfbo. Their concern is 
now shifted from establishing good relationships with their neighbouring villagers to 
maintaining ties between patrilateral relatives by introducing obligations of qaribo 
relationship, in the situation that even relationships between patrilateral relatives are 
gradually disbanded due to their emigration abroad. An example of this is given below 
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(see Figure 7). 
A son and a daughter of Saad, were witnesses of Edwar's marriage. Saad was 
Edwar's father's brother. It means that the marriage prohibition between people in 
qadbo relationship is applied to Edwar's children and those of Edwar's qazibo. By 
following the ideology that qadbo relationship should be renewed at the time of a child's 
baptism, when Edwar had a daughter, he chose the wife of his other father's brother, 
Dawud, as his daughter's qadba at baptism due to the reason that the female witness at 
their marriage, i. e. the daughter of Saad, married out. Through this relationship, 
Edwar's child is not able to marry one of Dawud's and his wife's children. 
These qaz-ibo relationships which include, at best, two generations of their family 
are obliged them to carry out such duties as performing ritual exchanges at the time of 
baptism, mutual support and abiding marriage prohibitions. The succession of the 
relationships from one generation to the next and the obligations imposed on them 
contribute to maintaining close relationships between these patrilateral relatives. Their 
choices of qadbo suggest that all Edwar's FBs and their family members are in qafibo 
relationship to the family of Edwar. Edwar's FBs are regarded by Edwar's household 
members as an agnatic unit because they are all brothers. They also keep genealogically 
equal distance from Edwar. This understanding is based on ego- (in this case, Edwar) 
centred recognition of genealogical distance and kinship relations. 
Edwar did not choose his brothers as his qadbo. This was due to the reason that to 
establish qadbo relationships with his father's brothers and their children was an 
important social strategy for Edwar to maintain a wider kinship network than by 
choosing his brother as his qazibo. However, there are many cases where a bridegroom 
chooses his brother as his marriage witness, qarfbo. Consequently, children of these 
brothers, who are first patrilateral parallel cousins, are not able to marry. Due to this 
rule, some Syrian Orthodox Christians interpret the current phenomenon to chose the 
bridegroom's brother's family as their qadbo as their strategy for avoiding marriage 
between patrilateral parallel first cousins. 
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However, this is only one aspect for promoting such choice. The rules of qadbo 
relationship, which define obligations and mutual support across generations, are used 
for putting into practice the idea of mutual support and trust between a patrilateral kin. 
The first weakening in this close relationship between patrilateral kin occurs when 
brothers form separate households. It is important to retain good relationships between 
them. However, the ideology of the Church law discourages marriages between children 
of the brothers. In order to maintain close relationships between patrilateral kin, Syrian 
Orthodox Christians require alternative means to regulate exchanges between them. 
Godparenthood is chosen as such a device. It enables linkages to be maintained between 
kin who are normally moving apart due to the normal process of fission and 
segmentation. One could see it as an agnatic enforcing link, perhaps even similar to the 
ideology of agnatic harmony as found among the Arabs, but the crucial difference here 
is that godparenthood is an individual strategy of choice that can be renegotiated at each 
generation or birth. It enables individuals to maximise and balance out their long term 
obligations and strategies. 
Conclusion 
Syrian Orthodox Christians believe that the dispersal of their village 
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communities and later by emigration abroad have changed not only their life style, but 
also ideas which they formerly nurtured. Their understanding of these changes is 
expressed in a Syriac folk song called 'Gergeshamo'. This song appeals to these 
Christians as it describes how a former villager of Gergesharno expresses nostalgia for 
his home and his dilemma when he is no longer able to return to his previous village life. 
The song says, "when I lived in the village it was my world and it was mighty. After my 
emigration I became aware that it was just a village. " The former villager recollects the 
annual feast of St. George which he celebrated with his neighbours and danced with 
music played with a drum and a clarinet. He asks himself, "when will I visit our 
village? " and says, "I will never forget our village". 
This song suggests that norms, relationships between villagers and practical life 
in the village constituted the entire world for him. However, these are no longer able to 
be maintained in urban setting or as emigrants in a foreign land. This former villager's 
nostalgia for his village does not mean that he wants to return to his village, for to 
become educated and sophisticated urban professionals is the ideal for present Syrian 
Orthodox Christians. However, the former peasant recognises the importance of intimate 
relationships between community members. Such relationships are difficult to maintain 
in the current situation of the dispersal of their community and weakening ties between 
relatives. 
The Qotdnlya Christians maintain that people look for better economic and 
political prospect and therefore emigrate. Economic and political anxiety reflects their 
vulnerable position in Syrian society. However, the Qabtdnlya Christians themselves 
create a situation that they weaken their social ties as well as their social position. Their 
marriage choices accelerate such a tendency. Their individual desire for improving their 
social position in urban settings involves choosing marriage vAth a partner whose 
educational and social status is similar. This results in expanding social differences 
among community members, which were hardly found when many of them were 
peasants. The desire for emigration abroad leads locals to marry the emigrants of their 
relatives (when they return on visit). Then they themselves leave the community which 
accelerates its dispersal. Their emotional and practical demands require a change in the 
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rules determining whom one can marry. To allow marriage between what were once 
considered 'too close' relatives now assists in reinforcing kinship ties between close 
relatives. Ironically this change resulted in reducing their social networks. 
Even in the situation that relationships between patrilateral relatives are gradually 
disbanded due to their emigration abroad, patrilateral first cousin marriage is not socially 
and morally preferable. This hinders re-establishing ties between close patrilateral kin. 
Then the rules of godparenthood, which defines obligations across generations, are used 
for putting into practice the idea of mutual support and trust between a patrilateral kin. 
Their concern is now shifted from establishing good relationships with their neighbours 
to maintaining ties between patrilateral relatives. This demand required changing the 
rules of who are able to be one's godparents. Their attempt at enforcing agnatic bonds, 
seems to be similar to the ideology of agnatic 'closeness' found among Arabs. The 
agnatic genealogical relationships proliferate at every generation and automatically 
impose obligations on people who are involved in the relationships. By contrast, 
godparent relationships can be renewed at each generation. Godparent relationships 
having been created between the two families are succeeded by the family segments 
whose member renewed the relationship. Therefore, its network does not expand in a 
similar way of agnatic genealogical relationships. Christians try to maximise their 
strategies for dealing with problems generating from outside the community. However, 
their attempt at strengthening ties between close relatives ironically prevents them from 
establishing wider relationships. The anxiety about the break-up of their community is 
ever present. 
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Chapter S. Notes 
1 Bj6rklund who conducted research on Syrian Orthodox Christians who emigrated to Sweden reports that 
he has never of heard first patrilateral paraflel cousin marriage being practiced (1981: 75). 
2 The principal oil fields lie in northeast Jazirah. Output here increased sharply from four million tons in 
1970 to a record level of ten million tons in 1976 (Meyer, 1987: 48). 
3 The number of university graduates in 1988 in Syria in total was 13,860 and in 1996 was 14,294. The 
estimated total population between twenty and twenty-four year old was 654,000 in 1989 and 1,419,000 in 
1998 (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1989: 348,349,60; Central Bureau of Statistics, 1998: 374-5,68). 
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Chapter 6 
Choir Activities in Three Communities 
Introduction 
The Syrian Orthodox Christians face difficulties of proving the continuity of 
their group due to the fact that they have concealed memories of their past before their 
departure/expulsion from Turkey. The only means which is available for them to claim 
continuity of their community is Syriac. However, as I mentioned earlier, classical 
Syriac had a very restricted currency among the Christians. Therefore, Syriac hymns 
which Syrian Orthodox Christians assumed to have been handed down over generations 
become important as a proof of transmission of Syriac heritage. 
Barth points out that social actors usually can choose from a variety of cultural 
traits which they wish to emphasise in order to claim membership of a particular group 
(1969: 14). However, in the case of Syrian Christians, their choice is limited to one, that 
is Syriac, due to the historical background mentioned above. By singing Syriac hymns, 
they pride themselves on being the heirs of ancient Christian traditions. Furthermore, the 
musical tonality, as well as Syriac language, leads support to their claim that they have 
maintained pre-Islamic traditions of Syria. As Cohen proposes (1969: 2,27-9), political 
ethnicity focuses on a strategy for organising cooperate actions which articulate 
distinctive features of their cultural traditions in their struggle for establishing a secure 
social position. The communities of Syrian Orthodox Christians, i. e. those of Qalýtdnlya, 
al-Wlkliya and Aleppo, organise choirs as community activities which attempt at 
articulating their identity. This chapter focuses on these activities in the three 
communities, and aims to show different orientations in their musical performances, 
which are due to each group's own interpretation of their way of attempting to establish 
their position in the wider society of Syria. 
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Syrian Orthodox Hymns 
Hymn singing is assumed by Syrian Orthodox Christians to be traditional. 
Emphasis is now placed on the work of St. Ephreim, the patron saint of the Syrian 
Orthodox Church, of his musical 
, 
tonality and hymns in the Syriac language. Hymns are 
an oral tradition which is self-contained and dependent on the continuous recitals within 
the community, as Syrian liturgical books lack musical notation (Qureshi, 1991: 163). 
Their knowledge of music has been handed down from senior to junior. They believe 
that this method has been adopted for generations to transmit Syriac hymns. Until to this 
day, Syrian Orthodox Christians learn hymns by using this oral method. They learn 
hymns by attending Sunday school, young people's meetings, and the Choir, which are 
organised by community members, both men and women, and provide a wide forum for 
cultivating a shared concern for the very survival of their hereditary music. Singing 
hymns is the only domain in which the laity, without being trained to become deacons, 
can take an active role in the Mass. 
Only male professionals, i. e. priests and deacons, can enjoy opportunities to learn 
the eight modes of Syrian Christian music for reciting psalms and singing the same 
religious texts to different melodies. Mode is used in a week order and the chants are 
organised in an eight-weekly modal cycle (Husman, 1980: 475). As these musical tunes 
are one of the heritages of ancient Christians, these are regarded by Syrian Orthodox 
Christians as one of the distinctive traditions, which characterises their group. Women 
are unable to become priests and are not allowed to inherit this musical tradition. This 
official ruling means that priests and senior deacons can only pass their musical 
knowledge to male juniors and, consequently, access to the modal system is confined to 
men. However, nowadays, only a small number of boys are interested in being ordained 
as deacons. 
Although women are excluded from such musical education, there are more girls 
than boys attending classes for studying religion and leaning hymns. Young women are 
more interested in teaching voluntarily in Sunday school and other courses for religious 
education than men are. It is not only community's religious education, but also the 
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church services in which women are eager to participate. Women play a dominant role 
in their communities' religious activities, and yet, are unable to have a position which 
officially allows them to be involved in both liturgy and musical tunes. Due to such 
discrepancy between religious representations and actual roles which women take in 
religious practices, all the three communities, with which the present discussion is 
concerned, share the view that women can learn and sing independent hymns in public, 
particularly those which are not categorised according to the eight weekly modal system. 
The maintenance of the survival of their musical tradition is seen as a source for 
establishing their Syrian identity, and, therefore, women's participation in musical 
activities is encouraged. Consequently, the only opportunity open to women at present to 
sing with a congregation is to join a Choir. 
Christians seek historical evidence which proves women's participation in the 
Choir and explain the importance of women singing hymns. They maintain that they 
follow the teaching of St. Ephreim (d. 373), who is the prominent Father for the 
Christians: 
St. Ephreim introduced Syrian Christians singing hymns. He composed Syriac 
poems in accordance with the doctrine of the Church and wrote hymns. 
Christians were charmed with the elegance of the diction and the melody which 
were found in his hymns. By singing hymns, he encouraged Christians to keep 
their faith. He wrote hymns for a women's choir and taught them how to sing 
(Comments by young and middle-aged women). 
As his hymns have been transmitted orally only by the Syrian Orthodox Christians and 
have survived until present day, this makes it possible for them to follow teaching of the 
Saint, who acknowledged women's choir. Another important point which is suggested in 
this account is that St. Ephreim was always close to the laity. He adopted the method of 
preaching to the laity through the teaching of hymns, which were composed of Syriac 
poems in accordance with the doctrine of the Church and which charmed the Syrian 
Christians. Such contributions by St. Ephreim to the laity are acknowledged by Church 
authorities. The Archbishop of Aleppo says: St. Ephreim taught Christianity through 
hymns which touched people deeply. His hymns convey profound meanings expressed 
by simple words. They encouraged his followers, not only the educated, but also the 
common folk (Ibrahim, 1996: 11). Musical practice of hymns is therefore one of the 
171 
proofs that women and the laity have succeeded in maintaining the traditions of Syrian 
Christians. 
The Community in al-M51kiya 
Although Syrian Orthodox Christians in al-M51kiya, Qabt5n! ya and Aleppo share 
the view that hymns are the heritage of the laity and an proof of endurance of their 
group, each community shows a different attitude towards women becoming 
representatives of their musical tradition. First, the case of the community in al-M51k-iya 
is discussed. The distinctive character which this community shows is that the Choir, 
which is composed of single women, is allowed to read the liturgy with Syrian Christian 
musical tunes in the weekday services. This is not allowed in the other two 
communities. In evening services, the inception of the liturgy, sung to the melody, is 
given by a group of male deacons, and is answered by a choral refrain, which is 
conducted by a group of the women. Many of these women are teenagers, and their 
leaders are middle-aged single women. A few knowledgeable male deacons read the 
liturgy with the women during the services. Male deacons and priests are eager to teach 
the women how to read the Syriac liturgy with its tonality. 
The al-Milkiya community were the first Syrian Orthodox Christians who 
requested the Archbishop to ordain female deacons. Their proposal was acknowledged 
in 1997. Single women who had learrit religious discipline and were able to read Syriac 
were ordained. This system has gradually penetrated into other communities within the 
diocese, such as that in QabVinlya. However, female deacons are not included in the 
promotion system of male deacons in the Church. The Church establishes three grades 
for the male deacons' participation in spiritual life. Some of them are further trained and 
become priests. In the society of Syrian Orthodox Christians as well as others in Syria, 
masculinity and femininity are measured by their ability to procreate, i. e. a 'true' 
man/woman having children. Men can marry and become priests, and, therefore, they 
are able to pursue both social and religious values and serve in churches without 
sacrificing their masculinity. By contrast, in the case of women, only single women are 
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allowed to serve in churches as deacons. Female celibacy has no social value. When 
they marry, they have to give up serving in churches and become mothers. 
Why is only a single woman allowed to be a deacon? Why does female 
deaconhood become important to the community? Men explain the reason: "Young 
women will become mothers and are expected to transfer their knowledge to their 
children. Therefore, single women are encouraged to study religious discipline by 
singing hymns and learning the Syriac liturgy. " Single women carry the social virtue of 
female virginity, which should be maintained until their marriage in order to keep their 
family's honour. Their celibate chastity and obedience to God, which is shown by 
playing active roles in religious life, are associated with the Virgin Mary. Single women 
are expected to become mothers and contribute to the community by teaching their 
children its religious traditions, such as hymns, liturgy and the Syriac language. These 
women learn such traditions from older generations and pass them on to the coming 
generations. They take on the role of intermediaries between generations, as the Virgin 
intercedes on behalf of present day Christians, and try to maintain these markers, which 
define the characteristics of the community and prove its endurance. A female deacon 
becomes an official representative of the single women's chastity. Therefore, this role is 
highly valued in both social and religious domains. 
As Davis (1984: 29) has noted, men utilise Mariology to explain women's 
involvement in spiritual activity. Women do not show much interest in such theoretical 
discourses on the Virgin as they consider that their becoming mothers loosens their 
identification with the Virgin. 'Me potential role of present single women is to transfer 
the community's cultural heritage to her future children, but this is hardly ever 
mentioned by the women. They do not think that celibacy permits single women to 
devote herself to the Virgin. For women, the change of their social position from single 
to married means to abandon their virginity and prepare to become mothers. Therefore, 
it is totally different from the situation of Immaculate Conception of Mary which made 
it possible for her to be a mother without losing her virginity. 
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Women understand that their life stage defines which community's activities 
they can join. For women, affiliation to the Choir symbolises their status as single 
women. When they marry, their legitimate union leads them to motherhood. They are 
able to affiliate to a married women's group, which also constitutes one of the 
community's activities. Their social position is elevated above that of single women. 
However, they hardly play any religious roles in the official domain. Their roles are 
rather more confined. Married women often ask for intercession by the saints, in order to 
solve problems of their family members, by fasting and going barefoot to a church. 
Elevation of their social position and their religious dedication do not make it possible 
for women to satisfy all the qualities which the Virgin Mary fulfilled, i. e. virginity, 
chastity, motherhood and dedication to family and children. Women, therefore, do not 
regard themselves in any stage in their lives as being close to the Virgin. 
Men's discourse on single women's role in church activities is different from 
what women think of as theirs. Men introduce a Mariological explanation and try to 
connect single women's potential roles of reproduction and child education with those of 
the Virgin in order to allow single women to be involved in church services, otherwise 
there is no opportunity for women to take a position in the official Church hierarchy. 
Such ideological representation of women, which is presented by the men, has little 
affect on women who do not develop their sense of femaleness through the Choir 
activities. As Strathern suggests, what female actors feet and think about femininity 
formulates their internal identity (Strathern, 1988: 59-65). They consider that female 
gender identity is associated with women's roles in domestic and social domains. 
Women regard Choir activities as religious and social activities to unite the community 
in faith and confirm its distinctive characteristics, i. e. musical traditions, which reinforce 
their claims to historical continuity in Syria. Men expect the female Choir to carry such 
political messages. For 'political' reasons they allow women to enter what is ordinarily 
a male domain. 
In fact this is not the only activity in which women play important roles in 
constructing community identity. For example, as discussed in Chapter 2, women's 
weekly visit to the church of the Virgin Mary in the old quarter in al-Mdlkiya enables 
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the community to remember its past, which is the source for unifying the community. 
Their memory confirms their identity as the descendants of the survivors of the 1915 
siege in kzakh, during which the Virgin miraculously saved the Christians. By visiting 
the church from where oil miraculously sprung, they refresh their memory that this 
church archeologically proved that Syrian Christians are original inhabitants of the 
region. Their claim to their land in al-M5lkIya was supported by divine power, owing to 
the fact that the government abandoned its plan to demolish the church of the Virgin 
Mary after finding that the miracle was genuine. Women's regular visits to the church 
of the Virgin contribute to recollection of the community's past, and are closely related 
to the community's protest against the Kurds. 
Christians are afraid of being incorporated with the Kurds due to their political 
ambition of becoming independent of Kurdistan. Kurds maintain that Kurds and Syrian 
Christian are ethnically in the relationship of 'brothers'. However, the Malklya 
Christians conceal the fact that they used to be in close relationships with Kurds before 
the massacre of 1915. The fact that Christians spoke Kurdish is one of the examples of 
how they shared cultural traits with their Kurdish neighbours. Christians recognise that 
they cannot ignore the Kurdish claims and, therefore, strive to establish a separate 
identity from them. The state might oppress the Kurdish political movement and the 
Christians might be persecuted as constituting part of Kurdish population. The only 
means to differentiate them from Kurds is their religious heritage, i. e. Syriac and hymns, 
which Christians have maintained and which Muslim Kurds cannot share with them. 
These traditions are also able to prove Christians' different ethnic and cultural origin 
from that of Kurds: Syrian Christians, whose language is Syriac, derived from ancient 
Aramaic, are ethnically Arameans, who dominated Syria in ancient times. 
Thus female Christians in al-M51kiya are a driving force to solidify their 
collective identity. Their religious activities convey political messages to claim their 
community's endurance and Syrian origin, which are supported by the Virgin. As the 
M51k-iya Christians believe that their community has survived under the patronage of the 
Virgin, women's dedication to the Virgin and Mariological ideology by men provide 
women with an important role of manifesting community's identity through musical 
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activities. Furthermore, the reason that such a role is allocated to women is related to the 
fact that political movements in al-M51kiya are restricted due to its strategic location 
being close to the Turkish and Iraqi borders, and its importance as a military base and as 
the centre of Syria's oil production. In this situation (the Government censors political 
movements), women who are outside the Church hierarchy are not regarded as 
representatives of the male dominant community, so are more capable than men of 
carrying political messages. 
The importance of Syriac hymns as an ethnic marker is borne out of the fact that 
their everyday language cannot be an identity marker. They used to speak Kurdish 
before their emigration from Turkey. 'Me present older generation can understand 
Kurdish, but try not to speak it. As they did not transmit Kurdish to the younger 
generation, who are educated in Arabic, the latter cannot understand Kurdish. Their 
common language is now Arabic. Syriac has had and still has a limited circulation in the 
community and has a role only as the liturgical language. In fact many people have only 
a limited knowledge of classical Syriac. Historically speaking, classical Syriac ceased to 
function as an everyday language hundreds years ago (Block, 1997: 363). Singing in 
Syriac, which can appear incontestably as an 'invented tradition', is the only way that 
every one can participate and prove that Syriac has been their language. 
The Community in Q4Ginlya 
The Syrian Orthodox Christian community in Qotiinlya faces problems similar 
to those of the al-M51k-iya Christians. Their population has decreased since the early 
1980s when they started to emigrate abroad, whereas the population of their neighbour 
Kurds, who constitute the largest population in this area, has increased due to their high 
birth rate. Moreover, the government allocated houses in Qaýt5nlya to an Arab tribe, the 
'Gamar, whose villages used to be along the River Euphrates, but were demolished in 
the 1970s due to the construction of the Tabqah Dam. These Arab immigrants, as well 
as a local Arab tribe, the Jowala, have increased their numbers. Syrian Orthodox 
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Christians feel that they are becoming a small group of the area and, therefore, are 
anxious about the increase in populations of other groups. 
Such fear also derives from their historical experiences. Christians believe that 
the conversion of their ancestors to Islam occurred due to political oppression and that 
this diminished their population. They maintain that: "once Christians converted to 
Islam, they abandon cultural traits which used to be shared with their fellow Christians. " 
This indigenous notion of ethnicity is that one's religious affiliation defines one's ethnic 
identity (qawmlya) and, therefore, Syrian Orthodox Christians (Suriyjn) who became 
Muslims and forgot the religious and cultural traditions of the Christians are no longer 
considered to be ethnically Suiiyjn. 
The present population consider themselves as eye-witnesses to the conversion 
and, therefore, their interpretation is considered by them to be the 'correct' version. At 
the time of the religious intolerance in Turkey in 1915 and afterwards, many Syrian 
Orthodox Christian boys and girls in Tur'Abdin were helped or abducted by Kurdish 
and Arab Muslims and were brought up as Muslims. Some good foster parents of these 
children, later, gave them opportunities to chose whether they should return to the 
Christian faith or not. Some of them became Christians again. Others remained 
Muslims. Many young women were forced to marry Kurdish and Arab men. 
Consequently, these women as well as their children, who were automatically affiliated 
to their fathers' parilateral descent groups, and so became Muslims. 
An example of former Christians who were brought up by Muslim foster parents 
is presented below. This information is based on that given by a Syrian Orthodox 
Christian family in Qabtiinlya. One evening, they received two male visitors speaking 
Arabic in a local Arab tribal accent different from the one Syrian Christians spoke. The 
household head said to them, "hello, ibn 'ammi (it means literally my FBS, but in this 
context, it means a paternal male relative in general). Come in! " Young women, who 
were the daughters of the household head, came into the reception room and exchanged 
greetings each other. Then they left the room. I asked to the girls who were these 
visitors. Their explanation was the following: 
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At the time of the religious intolerance in 1915, our grandfather (FF) escaped 
Kurdish attack and fled with his mother from his natal village Arbo in Tur 
'Abdin to a village called Gergesharno near Qabldniya, where he know his MB 
lived. His family members were separated because they fled in all directions to 
wherever they could find shelter. The father of our visitors was our FFFBS, 
Yusef He was brought up by an Arab family in Qabtdnlya. When he became 
eighteen years old, his foster family asked him whether or not he would like to 
return to his natal family. His foster family knew our FF was in Gergeshamo. 
Yusef spent six months with his family. Yet, they did not get along well. So, 
Yusef returned to his foster family and then married five women. Our visitors 
are his children. 
Even though the host and his visitors were relatives, the host family regarded 
them as Arab Muslims and kept a distance between themselves and the visitors. Women 
usually sit together and talk to male relatives when they visit the women's family, and 
this is an expression of their closeness. However, the sons of Yusef, an ex-Syrian 
Christian, were not regarded as men with whom young women were allowed to have 
intimate conversation. Due to different religious affiliations, there is nothing shared 
between the descendants of converted Muslims and their Christian relatives other than 
biological fies. For Syrian Orthodox Christians such kinship lost its social meaning. 
Like Yusef and his sons, converted Muslims and their descendants abandoned Syrian 
Orthodox Chr-istian culture and adopted local Muslim tradition. They switched from 
monogamy to polygamy, abandoned the language of their natal group, i. e. Toroyo (a 
Syriac dialect spoken by people whose origin is Tur 'Abdin) and adopted a local tribal 
Arabic dialect which their affiliated group speaks. Such evidence suggests that Syrian 
Orthodox Christians who converted to Islam, willingly or unwillingly, are permanently 
separated from their natal Christian group. Their historical experiences enforce the 
indigenous theory of ethnicity. Marriage, language and religious tradition, such as the 
liturgy and hymns, which only the Christians have maintained, are therefore regarded by 
them as ethnic markers. 
Syrian Orthodox Christians encountered many cases of conversion to Islam. 
These individual experiences contribute to developing their view that their neighbour 
Kurds, who used to live in the southern part of Tur'Abdin, had been Syrian Christians 
and converted to Islam a few hundred years ago. 1 This argument is supported by the 
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observations of an English traveller, Southgate, who visited Tur'Abdin in the nineteenth 
century. He referred to these former Christians converted to Islam as the Kurds and 
mentioned that they remembered their Christian origin (Southgate, 1844: 84). However, 
contemporary Kurds do not remember their Christian origin and have no interest in 
tracing it. Syrian Orthodox Christians demonstrate their domination in the past and try to 
emphasise how religious affiliation is closely related to ones' ethnic identity. 
Although Christians maintain that Kurds were ex-Syrian Christians, they try to 
conceal the fact that Syrian Orthodox Christians who lived in Tur 'Abdin shared secular 
culture with their neighbours, the Kurds. In fact, the similarity between these two 
cultures is still visible. For example, the characteristics of Syrian Christian folk dances 
which are open-circle and line dances linking the arms of the participants tightly and 
including bounces, jumps and a strong rhythmical swinging of the arms are shared with 
Kurdish dance (Siloah, 1980: 317). Syrian Christian dance also has similar steps to 
those of Kurdish dance. The double-headed drum and mizmar (a wooden clarinet) are 
the most important instruments in both Kurdish and Syrian Christian secular music. 
They maintain that these have been Syrian Christian traditions, which Kurds imitated. 
Syrian Christians, however, conceal apparent evidence that they might be identified with 
Kurds. For example, old Syrian Christian wedding songs in Kurdish, which express 
their sorrow of a bride's departure from her natal family, are never sung and are 
remembered only by elder Syrian Christian women. According to Monawad, in the first 
half of the nineteenth century, English travellers reported that Syrian Orthodox 
Christians and Kurds dressed alike in Tur 'Abdin and in the city of Mardin (Monaward, 
1992: 134). The present Christians have abandoned their own folk costume and now 
wear Western clothes. Only remnants of traditional clothes remain among the old 
women. For example, their underwear which are still sewn by Christian women are a 
petticoat and a pair of bloomers which have only Kurdish names, bun kmiiske and 
sarkibe. These examples suggest that Syrian Christians and Kurds used to have a 
common cultural heritage. 
Moreover, as Sykes reported, many tribal confederations in Tur 'Abdin were 
composed of Kurds, Christians and Yazidis (Sykes, 1908: 470-474). The present 
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Christians forget, or refuse to admit, that many Christians in Tur 'Abdin used to ally 
themselves with the Kurds before 1915. The collective amnesia of the Christians is not 
only limited to the history of their former political alliance with the Kurds, but also, as 
mentioned above, includes their loss of memories that there used to be little cultural 
differences between them and the Kurds. Kurds regard Syrian Christians whose families 
were originally from Tur 'Abd-in as Christian Kurds who used to speak both Kurdish and 
Toroyo, and share cultural characteristics with Muslim Kurds. For the Kurds, religion is 
not a determinant for defining one's ethnicity. Since Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism and 
Christianity had spread throughout the Kurdistan before the rise of Islam, the Kurds 
believe that there are Kurds who have religions other than Islam. According to them, the 
contemporary Kurdish population is composed of Muslim Kurds (80 % of the 
population), Yazidi Kurds (10%) and other Kurds, such as Christian Kurds and Jewish 
Kurds (10%). 
It is my contention that Syrian Christian musical practice, as an expression of 
their group traditions, is a form of political expression within the church services and 
conveys a message for promoting ethnic identity. As Blacking has noted, music as a 
non-verbal expression within ritual is politically significant for generating collective 
consciousness (Blacking, 1995: 199). Syrian Orthodox Christians develop a 
consciousness of the political significance of their musical tradition and the Choir 
becomes one of the means of articulating their social identity. 
Although hymns are sung by both male and female community members in 
Sunday Mass, the Choir in Qahtanlya is composed solely of young single women. 
Qabtafflya community members do not use the discourse on the Virgin Mary, as those in 
al-Mdlk-iya do, in order to acknowledge that only single women participate in the church 
services. Unlike the M51kiya community, there is no involvement of male deacons in 
teaching women how to recite the liturgy and sing hymns. Consequently, the Choir 
members in Qabtdniya do not participate in reading the liturgy in weekday church 
services. However, both men and women advocate women's participation in Choir 
activities, which is supported by the antecedents of St. Ephreim who had trained the 
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Choir of young women for services of the Church. By reference to such a precedent, the 
Choir women take the initiative in organising their activities. 
Table 2. Differences of Musical Practices between the Three Communities 
Community/ Al-M51kiya Qalýtdniya Aleppo 
Characteristics 
Choir members Single women Single women Single women & 
Men 
Choir teachers Male deacons & Young single Middle-aged 
n-dddle-aged women who single woman who 
single women have knowledge have knowledge 
of Syriac of Syriac 
Ideology supporting Mariology St. Ephreim St. Ephreim trained 
trained female female choir 
choir 
Emphasis Syriac musical Syriac musical Unity of the 
tradition tradition community as Middle 
Eastern Xns 
Languageof Syriac/ Arabic Syriac Arabic/Syriac 
Hymns 
The local pfiest gives a relatively free hand to the Choir, even though he often 
sits with them and is involved in their training. Women in their early twenties play a 
leading part in singing as well as teaching early teenage girls. Due to their knowledge of 
classical Syriac and religious discipline, which they learnt in the courses organised by 
community members in activities at the Centre for Religious Education in their parish, 
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some of them are ordained as female deacons. These leaders give priority to the singing 
of Syriac words correctly. They read poems in turns at the beginning of the training 
session and then set the poems to music. The juniors memorise the texts under the 
supervision of their seniors. They can sing the hymns without liturgical mistakes. Their 
knowledge of a Syriac dialect, i. e. Toroyo, which is their everyday language, helps them 
study hymns in classical Syriac. However, Toroyo, which is different from classical 
Syriac, is not a literal language. Furthermore, they do not regard Toroyo as 'proper 
Syriac' due to the fact that it has adopted many words from other languages such as 
Turkish, Kurdish and Arabic, which are the languages of other ethnic groups. Classical 
Syriac, whose origin they believe is older than these languages, maintains the original 
forrn of their language and it is therefore important for Christians to learn classical 
Syriac hymns to claim their origin in the pre-Islamic period. 
Young people, both men and women, are involved voluntarily in activities for 
teaching children both their liturgical language, i. e. classical Syriac, and hymns in 
activities of the Centre for Religious Education, which is the only place for the 
Christians to be allowed by the government to orgamse community activities. Similarly, 
young female leaders in the Choir emphasise the importance of teaching both the 
liturgical language and music, both of which are representatives of the enduring cultural 
traditions of Syrian Orthodox Christians. Therefore, they teach the meanings of words 
which appear in hymns and give instructions in order for the Choir members to 
pronounce the words correctly. These young leaders take on roles to articulate the idea 
of the community's identity through educational activities. They are proud of 
maintaining such a heritage and believe that as far as their maintaining such traditions, 
they are able to differentiate themselves from their neighbour Muslims and claim their 
rights as Syrians. Even though the young people have less knowledge of the history of 
their community than older generations remember, it is a shared view that the loss of 
their religious tradition means the extinction of their community. This suggests that the 
Qabt5n! ya Christians do not attempt to construct their religious identity, which may 
separate them from the wider society of Syria. Rather they use classical Syriac and 
Syriac hymns as means of articulating distinctive features of their traditions, which is the 
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heritage of ancient Syria, in their struggle for rights with the society. In the activities of 
the Choir, women are acknowledged as being able to articulate such ethnic markers in 
public, i. e. in the Mass. Even though their activities are officially acknowledged as 
religious ones, their musical practice is a covert strategy for maintaining their 
community, whose existence is threatened both from outside and inside. 
The Christians of St. Ephreim Church in Aleppo 
Both Choirs in Qaht5n! ya and al-WWiya try to maintain their musical traditions, 
which they believe they have had for over 1,500 years. Despite the similarity of the 
means, which they use in order to claim their rights and identities, these two 
communities show different attitudes towards women's official participation in church 
services and present different expectations of the roles which each Choir plays. The 
Choir of the St. Ephreim church in Aleppo has the musical style quite different from that 
of the other two Choirs. Moreover, in its practices it tries to pursue not only the 
collective identity of Syrian Orthodox Christians, but also the ideal of unifying Middle 
Eastern Christians. However, their understanding of the community's history and 
current social situation which they face has to be examined in order to appreciate their 
relationship to the current activities of the Choir. 
As Syrian Orthodox Christians admit that there are two communities in the 
diocese of Aleppo. One is the community which is composed of people who emigrated 
from Urfa in 1924 and the other is the community whose members are composed of 
people who emigrated from different places in southeastern Turkey afler the 1915 
religious intolerance in Turkey. The latter have established themselves in the outskirts of 
Aleppo, in what is called as the Suleimaniya quarter, where they constructed the church 
of St. Ephreim. Later, their population increased due to immigration of Christians from 
the Syrian Jazirah region. The agricultural boom in Jazirah, which had started in the 
1940s, made Aleppo as an important agricultural business centre and, consequently, 
many Christians who sought business opportunities, as traders and mechanics, moved 
into Aleppo. 
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However, in 1895, the Suleimaniya quarter had contained only sixty-seven 
Christian houses surrounded by an orchard. The Syrian Orthodox Christian population 
at that time was only twenty-six among 726 Christians in the quarter (Mustafa Vali, 
n. d: 448-9). In those days, this area had only a small population. Memories of the present 
Christians exaggerate the situation: "at the beginning of the twentieth century, the family 
of Salim 'Aazar was the only big merchant family who had kept the Orthodox faith in 
Aleppo. " This account explains the situation of the Syrian Orthodox Christians when 
they immigrated to Aleppo after 1915. They believe that their co-religionists in Aleppo 
had lost their population due to the government's oppression of Christians and their 
subsequent emigration. Consequently, when the immigrants arrived at Aleppo, they 
found that only a small number of Syrian Orthodox Christians were left in Aleppo. 
There is evidence which supports this view of the Syrian Orthodox Christians. 
As Marcus (1989: 40-48) has noted, the Catholic missionaries working in Aleppo from 
the 1620s, promoted a campaign to establish commercial privileges, which was 
supported by the French and English consulates and traders who employed Christians in 
Aleppo as translators, clerks, salesmen, etc. They offered these workers extraterritorial 
privileges as foreign nationals, i. e. exemption from taxes imposed on dhimmi-s, i. e. non- 
Muslims, by the Ottoman government. However, due to the increase in the number of 
these 'privileged' Christians, the goverrument saw them as potential trouble-mak-ers, so 
they oppressed the Christians and abolished their privileges. This resulted in their 
emigration. By the beginning of the twentieth century, their community had become 
drastically reduced. Their history reminds Syrian Orthodox Christians of their present 
isolation in the big city of Aleppo; similar to the situation in the past. Their population is 
decreasing due to their immigration abroad, and they have become a small group 
surrounded by Muslims, with whom they have little personal contact. 
Partly, due to their knowledge of the history of Christians in Aleppo, they have 
started to adopt a defensive strategy, i. e. a Christian congregational unity in order to 
defend themselves and secure their social position. The youth of St. Ephreim church, 
including its Choir members, participate in activities such as lectures and church service 
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in various churches in Aleppo, which belong to different denominations. For example, 
they organise meetings with young people of different denominations and discuss how 
the Churches will be able to celebrate Easter on the same day by adopting a standardised 
calendar. Such meetings provide them with opportunities of getting acquainted with 
people belonging to other Churches, and discussions which may allow to establish their 
unity. These movements are supported by the Church authorities. The Middle Eastern 
Council of Churches has promoted the vision of Christian unity. The Council declared 
that there was no theological differences between Chalcedonian (Malkites) and non- 
Chalcedonian (Syrian Orthodox and Nestorian) Churches, although the division between 
the two occurred in the Byzantine period (451 A. D. ). There are eleven Christian 
denominations of Oriental and Orthodox Churches in Aleppo. The Council encourages 
the denominations to hold joint prayer sessions which emphasise the unity of the 
Churches. The Archbishops and priests from these Churches speak to the congregation 
about how they are interested in looking for the common fields of activities among these 
Christians. They also answer the questions regarding their attempt at unity. In a joint 
prayer session held on 6 June 1998, the Archbishop of the Syrian Orthodox Church said: 
Each Church has developed its tradition over one thousand and five hundred 
years. Our tradition is the soil which has cultivated us. Therefore, we cannot 
abandon it. In this historical context, we are able to say that the attempt of the 
Middle Eastern Council of Churches for our unity has just started. Keep your 
eyes on the activities of our Council. 
This statement suggests that cultural and religious traditions which have been 
nurtured by people in the different denominations are the sources of their identities. The 
Church authorities promote two contradictory strategies: they try to maintain the 
distinctive tradifions of each Christian community on the one hand, and, on the other 
hand, take a positive attitude and look at possibilities for their approaching a Christian 
unity across the boundaries between the denominations. As far the musical activities of 
the St. Ephreim church Choir are concerned, such official activities encourage the hymn 
singers to feel that they are in touch with the inherited musical traditions of their own 
community. At the same time, the official idea of a Christian unity suggests to them that 
they can express this idea in their musical practices by adopting musical characteristics 
which are practised in other Churches. For the Christians, to keep the Orthodox 
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Christian faith is a means of maintaining the integrity of the community. Their history 
tells them that the Syrian Orthodox Christian community in Aleppo had dissolved as a 
result of their having exchanged their conversion to Catholicism for money and 
liberation from their previously oppressed dhimmi status. Therefore, Syrian Orthodox 
Christians suggest that their identity and their traditions, which define the characteristics 
of the community, have to be maintained. However, considering their social status in 
the society of Aleppo as a small group, they promote a strategy for aspiring cooperation 
with all Christians in Aleppo. Musical practices of the St. Ephrcim Choir express 
contradictory aspects in their identity construction. 
In order to examine how they are establishing their identity through musical 
practices, a comparative method is adopted. By comparing the ways of singing hymns 
between the Choir of the Qabtdn1ya community and that of the St. Ephreim church in 
Aleppo, it becomes clear how the St. Ephreim Choir tries to realise the ideal of unity of 
Middle Eastern Christians. As discussed above, the musical practices of the Qabji-Inlya 
Choir focus on maintaining their endured musical tradition. By contrast, the Choir of 
the St. Ephreim church seeks techniques and hymns which contribute to refining their 
musical expression. The St. Ephreim Choir is innovative, while the Choir of the 
Qabtdnlya is 'traditional'. In order to explain such differences, which are expressed in 
their singing, I will examine how the two Choirs sing a hymn which is called Aireint- 
rmokh, i. e. 'I will exalt Thee', differently. This hymn is sung by both the Qa4l5niya 
Choir and that of the St. Ephreim at the first part of the Sunday Mass. 
At the beginning of the Mass, the sanctuary curtain is drawn aside with the hymn 
of Bnuhrokh hosai-naan noohro, i. e. 'By Thy light we behold light' being sung. The 
priest swings the censer contained burning incense. Some Syrian Christians explain that 
the fire in the censer symbolises God: The censer itself symbolises the Virgin Mary who 
conceived Jesus: Its lid is in the shape of a church dome under which the congregations 
gather. The Church building symbolises a censer in which the congregation are 
contained during the Mass. This implies that they are united in their communication 
with divine power. The priest says with a loud voice: 
Mary who brought Thee forth, and John who baptized Thee shall be suppliant 
unto Thee [o]n our behalf Have mercy upon us ( Samuel, 1967: 20). 
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Then, the first part called Responsory of Mar Severus starts. The Choir and the 
congregation sing 'I will exalt Thee'. This hymn summarises the Christian doctrines. 2 
The followings are my transcriptions of recorded hymn, 'I will exalt Thee', 
which was sung by the Qabt5n! ya Choir and the St. Ephreim Choir in Aleppo (see 
Figure 8). The discussion is focused on the musical style and the practice of the Choirs 
in both churches rather than those of the whole congregations. These two churches use 
the same tune, i. e. the tune of Mardin. The Syrian Orthodox Church uses five different 
tunes named after the areas where these Christians have lived over centuries. The tune of 
Mardin which is one of these tunes has been used in churches in Mardin and Tur'Abdin 
area in Turkey. The majority of both the Qabt5n! ya and the St. Ephreim church 
congregations are originally from this area. Since Syrian liturgical books lack musical 
notation, the Choir and the congregation depend on the cultural resources of their seniors 
for learning the melody. 3 In both Qabt5n! ya and Aleppo Choirs, singers are taught by 
the traditional method of repetition and memorisation. A leader sings the hymns, phrase 
by phrase, and the Choir repeats them until they are memorised. This knowledge is 
contained only among Syrian Orthodox Christians. The Christians believe that Syriac 
hymns show the most salient character of ancient culture of Syria as they are a very 
conservative and hereditary oral tradition and have changed little since ancient times. 
This hypothetically homogeneous continuity of their culture is a source for claiming that 
Syrian Orthodox Christians are descendants of the original inhabitants of Syria. 
However, the Choir in Aleppo extends beyond this hypothetical homogeneity. 
The hymn of 'I will exalt Thee' is cast in ABBBBB structure, even though the B 
part progresses with variations. Since Syrian hymns are musical settings of poetry, the 
correspondence between works and music brings the variations of refrained phrase B in 
which the melody does not follow the poetic line programmatically. Syrian music does 
not conform to a system of absolute pitch. Even though the pitch of Qabtfiniya version 
is slower than that of Aleppo in the recorded sounds, which I used for the transcription, 
these examples should not be understood as the representation of the pitch. In 
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QabtWiya, the tempo is constant throughout, whereas the Aleppo Choir changes it due 
to the skill of their emotional expression. 
The introduction of the Western keyboard into the Choir of Aleppo seems to 
have reduced the number of tones they use. The Aleppo Choir, however, have a good 
command of accent, tempo and phrase due to their training. These skills which provide 
the music of Western Europe with one of its main sources of mood portrayal and the 
mixed chorus, including young men attach great importance to harmony. This is a ne%v 
attempt far away from the Middle Eastern music tradition in which there is no steady 
progress to one peak of aesthetic tension in the course of a performance (Al-Faruqi, 
1975: 10-11). 
By contrast, the Qaht5n! ya Choir maintains the monophonic texture of the hymn. 
They do not use any musical instruments. The succession of parts progresses with no 
attempt to achieve one single climatic point. The quarter-tones are in practice in 
Qabt5nIya. The breath of division of this musical step is a crucial ingredient in the 
peculiar flavour of the Qabt5n! ya Choir. Their voices are monotonous without forced or 
throbbing voices. They do not pay any regard to accent (Julian, 1908: 1109). These 
characteristics of musical practice of the Qabtiinlya Choir reflects a tmditional way of 
singing Syrian Orthodox hymns. 
The St. Ephreirn Choir in Aleppo uses interval intonation, change of tempo and 
tone, and polyphony, which are not introduced into the musical practices in Qalýlfinlya. 
Members of the St. Ephreim Choir describe such musical orientation by using a term, 
tausPa rnuslqi, i. e. musical embellishment. They believe that these musical skills 
enhances the aesthetic value of the traditional hymns such as 'I will exalt Thee', which 
have endured since early Christian times. They also consider that good performers are 
endowed with the emotional power and technical skills to move the congregation in the 
Mass. They perceive that, technically, a performance, which has correct intonation, 
rhythmic accuracy and good judgement of tonal emphases, expresses the theme of the 
hymns. Such musical skills enhance the feeling that the hymn singers, as well as the 
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congregation, constitute a harmonious whole in their communication with the divine 
power. 
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The Choir consider that such unity of the congregation might be able to integrate 
Christians in Aleppo, if they could share the same aesthetic value shown in the hymns. 
Therefore, members of St. Ephreirn Choir attend services in other churches across the 
boundaries of denominations and listen to the hymns. They perceive the importance of 
the musical skills, i. e. tausia musiql, which are incorporated into singing in other 
churches, to express the theme of hymns, which give the congregation religious feelings 
which God has bestowed upon them. As Stokes has noted, we need to look at music less 
as a fixed essence with certain definable properties than as a wide field or practice and 
meanings with few significant or socially relevant points of intersection (Stokes, 1994: 
7). The St. Ephreim Choir tries to emphasise the shared musical skills across 
denominations, which are important for exalting feelings of a common faith. By 
encouraging communication through singing hymns, they attempt to establish a 
Christian unity. Hence, musical performance is linked to the social alignments 
Christians in Aleppo perceive in their interrelationships. 
Such social and religious orientations encourage the St. Ephreim Choir to stress 
musical training. While the Qabt5niya Choir gives priority to singing Sjriac worcls 
correctly, as it is very important for them to preserve it as their own language in order to 
prove that their community having endured since ancient times. Indeed, many of St. 
Ephreim congregation in Aleppo know little of classical Syriac. Even though traditional 
Syriac hymns are regarded as poetic and an expression of their religious aesthetics, it is 
questionable whether or not the Choir members fully understand the literal meaning of 
the hymns. They prefer singing of Arabic hymns whose meaning the congregation 
understand. 
Different orientations between the two communities toward classical Syriac are 
thus operative. Churches in the Jazirah, whose congregation are originally from Tur 
'Abdin, conduct their services by using both classical Syriac and Toroyo, i. e. Tur 'Abdin 
Syriac dialect. In the Mass in the St. Ephreim church, by contrast Arabic is used as the 
first language and classical Syriac has only a supplementary role. The reason why 
Arabic is used, even for reading the liturgy, is due to the fact that the St. Ephreim 
congregations is composed of people who have different origins. Syrian Christians 
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immigrated from Mardin have spoken in Arabic since their time in Mardin. Those who 
used to live in the area of Azakh had only spoken Kurdish. Only those who emigrated 
from Tur 'Abdin to the Jazirah and later moved into Aleppo spoke both in Toroyo and 
Kurdish. However, the Christians in the Jazirah learrit Arabic in order to retain their 
rights when they had to struggle against Kurdish and Arab tribal power. Currently, some 
people who have their origin in Tur'Abdin are interested in maintaining Toroyo. Due to 
the historical fact that the Christians immigrated to Aleppo from different regions and so 
spoke different languages, i. e. Arabic, Kurdish and Toroyo, Arabic, as the lingua franca 
of Syria, became an important communication tool between the community members 
and with other populations in this big city. Therefore, the classical Syriac has less 
importance in this community. The Aleppo community seems to have adopted the 
popular language, Arabic, as their liturgical language, similar to the Vatican 11 Council 
of the Catholic Church, which replaced Latin with each country's own language. By 
contrast, the QabtWiya community seems to have re-erected their classical language as 
their liturgical language to show that they are the descendants of the original 
'Byzantinians'. 
Many of the Choir members in Aleppo, therefore, are unable to understand the 
precise meaning of traditional Syriac hymns which they sing. This is one of the reasons 
why they emphasise the musical skills and musical form in the vocal composition 
performed by the chorus. However, they want to emphasise the poetic and religious 
aspects of hymns and, consequently, try to introduce more Arabic hymns which they can 
understand and give them religious and spiritual elation. They attempt to adopt Arabic 
hymns sung in other Middle Eastern Churches as well as their religious and musical 
forms. The Coptic hymn Ma AhIP, 'What redeems me', is one of the Arabic hymns 
accepted by the present Archbishop of Aleppo at the request of the Choir. 
Their attempt to introduce new hymns, whether they are new compositions or 
hymns sung in other Churches, has not been a total success. For example, the Choir 
tried to introduce a new Arabic hymn of 'Mary the Virgin' composed by a musician in 
the Choir. The melody of the hymn adopted popular Arabic musical tunes, to which the 
youth are accustomed and easily express emotional attachment. After mastering this 
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new hymn, the St. Ephreim. Choir held a session to sing this hymn in front of the 
Archbishop, who was to make a decision whether or not the Church should adopt it. He 
said, " the coming concert is the first and the last time you sing this hymn". Although he 
tried to concede to the requests of the Choir to introduce new hymns as far as possible, it 
is not possible for the Church authorities to acknowledge the hymn whose melody 
ignored the tonality of Syrian Church music. The musical tonality, which has been 
handed down over generations, is a means to claim their cultural origin going back to 
ancient times and their rights as Syrians. 
When all their efforts were in vain, and their requests were refused by the Church 
authorities, some of the youth blamed the Church: "whatever we wish, we are all in the 
hands of our Archbishop and his dictatorship. " This reveals that there are divisions 
between the Church authorities and the congregation. However, though the Church 
authorities may appear autocratic, in fact, they do not have enough power to impose 
their decisions. In the above example of the Archbishop's attempt to impose his opinion, 
the Choir were reluctant to accept his judgement. They do not think their attitude toward 
the hymns erodes the distinctiveness of the tradition of their community, as far as they 
respect traditional Syriac hymns and practice them. However, the Choir members try to 
find a way in which they can emotionally engage with music. What they try to introduce 
into their practices are hymns which are written in Arabic with popular musical 
melodies, which Middle Eastern Christians can share. Therefore, they regard their 
activities as inter-denominational. By doing so, young people aspire to create the unity 
of Middle Eastern Christians as a future-oriented Christian identity. They try to express 
this idea in their musical practices by introducing hymns whose language and musical 
style are popular among the young. Ironically, such movements bring them in contact 
with increasing Arabisation and, consequently, reduce the distinctive characteristics of 
Syrian Orthodox Christian music, i. e. Syriac and musical tonality. 
The Syrian Orthodox Church authorities promote the movement toward the unity 
of Middle Eastern Christians and introduce the idea to the laity in order to secure their 
social position in society where each denomination is composed of a small group in the 
wider society of Syria. However, for both the clergymen and the laity, including young 
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people, their musical traditions are the sources for claiming the endurance of the Syrian 
Orthodox Christian community in Syria. The Choir members are in a dilemma 
regarding how to maintain Syrian Orthodox Christian musical traditions, and at the same 
time to promote the idea of the Christian unity in their musical practices. The 
acknowledged strategy by both the clergy and the laity is to sing their own traditional 
hymns with the shared musical skills among Middle Eastern Christians, i. e. tausra 
musrqr. Objectively speaking, such musical orientation also brings with it Western 
musical influences, such as polyphony and the reduction of the number of traditional 
quarter tones. The St. Ephreim Choir seems to grope for ways of expressing the ideal of 
Christian unity without losing their distinctive musical traditions. 
Conclusion 
Syrian Orthodox Christians of the three communities, which have been discussed 
above, strive to establish their rights in Syrian society by presenting their own version of 
the cultural heritage of Syrian Orthodox Christians. They are afraid that religion 
(Christianity) might separate them from the wider society of Syria and might be used by 
the government as a pretext for persecuting them. However, as they concealed their 
memories of their past in Turkey, they have nothing but their religious traditions, i. e. 
Syriac hymns, which have been handed down over generations, to prove the endurance 
of their group since ancient times in Syria. In this sense, the musical practices of the 
Choirs are community activities which reflect political ideas of their group/ethnic 
identities. 
The Christians in the Jazirah region, i. e. the al-M51kiya and Qab! finiya 
Christians, are anxious about being ethnically incorporated with the Kurds. One day, 
Kurds might be subdued by force due to their political ambitions and Christians might 
be persecuted with them. Although Christians conceal the fact that they used to have had 
close relationships with Kurds, Kurds maintain that Syrian Christians are their 'brothers' 
and imply that they are ethnically Kurds. The only way for the Christians to differentiate 
themselves from Kurds is to claim their religious heritage and clarify their Syrian origin. 
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To lose their traditions means for Syrian Christians to lose their ethnic identity or to 
choose alternative ones, either Kurdish or local Arab identity. 
In al-M51kiya, despite the segregation of women in the Church hierarchy, single 
women's participation in the community's musical traditions is encouraged. Sending 
political messages through women's Choir activities is a safer way for reducing the 
community's risk of political persecution. By contrast, in the community of Qabldnlya, 
there is no distinctive role allocated to single women and their Choir. The Qabtaniya 
Christians clearly state that the disappearance of their religious traditions would mean 
the extinction of their community, as a separate entity and possibly their assimilation 
with the Kurds. Through Choir activities, the community can stress its endurance, its 
Syrian origin and their independence of the Kurds. 
Three Christian communities have different styles of singing through which their 
identities are constructed. The attitude of both al-MdWya and Qabtiinlya Choirs 
towards their musical traditions is that their music is entirely their ow-n and is not shared 
by others. By contrast, the Choir of the St. Ephreim church in Aleppo tries to find a way 
of establishing Christian unity in the future, without jeopardising the traditions of Syrian 
Orthodox Christians. Their musical practices reflect their struggle for establishing two 
contradictory identities. In their singing, they develop skills which arc shared with other 
Middle Eastern Churches. As a result, their musical expression of traditional Syriac 
hymns, is however unable to escape from influence of Arab music culture and Western 
musical techniques, which are easily accepted by young people. 
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Chapter 6. Notes 
' The conversion of Tur'Abdin Syrian Christians occurred in the Whand ITh centuries due to political 
oppression. The former Patriarch Barsourn reported that 6,000 to 8,000 Chdstians in the area of 
MuWlamiya in the southern Part of TurAbdin converted to Islam (1963: 352). In 1924 when the Patriarch 
wrote the book, the total number ranged from 12,000 to 15,000 (ibid.: 353). Considering these figures, it 
seems that a large portion of the population of MuWlamiya Christians became Muslims in the beginning 
of the seventeenth century. 
' The translation of the hymn is the following; 
I will exalt Thee, 0, King, my Lord, the Only-begotton Son, the Work of the heavenly Father, who are 
immortal in Thy nature; Who by Thy grace came for the life and salvation of all mankind, and did become 
incarnated of the Holy and Glorious pure Virgin, Mother of God, Mary; Who did become man, being God 
without change, and was crucified for us. 0, Christ our Lord, Who by Thy death did trample our death 
destroy it, Who are One of the Holy Trinity and are worshipped and glorified in the unity of Thy Father 
and Thy living Holy Spirit, have mercy upon us (Samuel, 1967: 29). 
' The first intensive attempt to transcribe Syrian Orthodox Church music is the transcription or the Bra 
Gazo, the texts of the modal stanzas of the chants. Five specialists of these Christians from diffierent local 
churches discussed the tunes of each chant. The result was that the Bet QaZ with a transcription 




Syrian National Identities: The Syrian Orthodox Version versus the 
Identities fostered by the Syrian Regime 
Introduction 
I have discussed various attempts of Syrian Orthodox Christians to establish their 
rights as the original inhabitants of the region where they now live in order to construct 
secure identities in Syria. In their increasing concern about their Syrian origin, many 
people have become interested in the ancient history of Syrian Christians and try to 
discover links between ancient Arameans and contemporary Syrian Christians. They 
have developed their group identity based on Aramean history and their language, which 
have endured in 'Greater Syria' since ancient times. Consequently, Syrian Orthodox 
Christians do not regard themselves ethnically as Arabs. As the regime promotes a 
SYrian-Arab identity, they feel that the government-fostered national identity does not 
acknowledge them as 'Syrians'. The Christians are anxious about this situation and so 
construct their own version of Syrian national identity, in which their community 
assumes a crucial role as descendants of original inhabitants of Syria. By doing so, 
Syrian Orthodox Christians try to promote themselves as one of the ethnic groups in 
Syria and integrate themselves into Syrian society. 
The Syrian national identity advocated by Syrian Orthodox Christians is affected 
by Syrian-Arab nationalism propagated by the regime. 'Me government promotes a 
secular Syrian-Arab nationalism, which combines two ideologies: Arab nationalism, 
which emphasises Arab unity, and Syrian nationalism, which is based on the prospective 
unity of the members of different groups in Syria. There used to be political conflicts 
between Arab nationalists and Syrian nationalists, who both advocated different 
ideologies for establishing the identity of Syrians. However, the present regime stresses 
the compatibility of these two ideologies in order to integrate supporters of both beliefs 
and ethnic groups. The regime emphasises the two characteristics of Syrian identity: 
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Syrians are Arabs who have inherited Arab and Islamic cultural traditions (Arab 
nationalism); these traditions are shared by inhabitants in 'Greater Syria' (Syrian 
nationalism). Being influenced by this propaganda, Syrian Orthodox Christians attempt 
to construct a Syrian identity in which they play a crucial role in integrating different 
ethnic groups in a Greater Syria. Ancient Aramaic is the language which used to be a 
common language of people in Greater Syria and historically speaking, their language 
and cultural traditions have contributed to constructing the culture and language (Arabic) 
of present Syrians. The Syrian Christian version of Syrian national identity tries to 
establish the rights of all the ethnic groups in the territory of Greater Syria. A 
comparison between the Syrian Christian version of national identity and that 
propagated by the regime is required in order to understand why Syrian Orthodox 
Christians, who are not only intellectuals, but also ordinary people, attempt to create 
such discourses. The data presented here was collected during fieldwork between 1997 
and 1998. 
The Development of Syrian Orthodox Christian Identity 
The construction of Syrian Orthodox Christian identity has been influenced by 
ideologies of nationalism since the Ottoman period. The ideology of nationalism was 
introduced by Ottoman intellectuals in the early nineteenth century and some Synan 
Orthodox Christian intellectuals became influenced by these ideas. One of the most 
famous activists is Na'Urn Riq in Diyarbakr. He attempted to revive their interest in 
their religious traditions and classical language, Syriac, in order to spread the idea of 
group solidarity at the beginning of the twentieth century, a time of political tensions in 
Turkey. He tried to popularise the idea through school education and the publication of 
Syrian Christian magazines (Syrian Orthodox Church, 1944: 182-184). 
In the 1930s there were two political ideologies: Arab nationalism and Syrian 
nationalism, which were initially opposed. Syrian Christians supported the latter. The 
Boy Scouts movements, which were supported by Syrian nationalists, flourished in the 
urban areas among Syrian Orthodox youth in Aleppo, QFanishli and Ijassake. Christians 
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were afraid that their political rights would be threatened by Arab nationalism, which 
was based ideally on the unity of all Arabs and their 'glorious' history, culture, Islam 
and the Arabic language. By contrast the SSNP (Syrian Social Nationalist Party) claimed 
Syrian identity was derived from the shared history and tradition of Greater Syria. By 
participating in the Boy Scouts activities Syrian Orthodox Christians began developing 
the idea of their ethnic origins as ancient Arameans whose language they had 
maintained. 
Young people led these activities because they had had a modem education in 
Arabic in Syria, which older generations had not had a chance to obtain, and, 
consequently, were able to absorb a growing trend toward movements of nationalism 
(Shambrook, 1998: 30,68,163,220,221). Education seems to have distanced between 
the young people and the older generation, who only had basic education in Turkish. 
One of the famous activists was a Syrian Orthodox school teacher, Shukri Sharmugri, 
who lived in Qdmishl! and followed the ideas of Na'Urn F5iq. He became the leader of 
Syrian Orthodox Christian youth. He tried to promote the idea of the historical identity 
of the Syrian Christians by involving them in the Boy Scouts activities. These young 
people were influenced by Syrian nationalism, which enhanced the consciousness of 
their group's identity. They became interested in activities which stressed the distinctive 
traditions of their community, including the classical language of Syria, Syriac. 
Many Syrian Orthodox Christians became involved in Syrian nationalism. Given 
Syria's unstable situation, such political alignment was a risky one. In the face of the 
rising ideology of Arab unity, represented by the Syria's unification with Egypt in 1958, 
and the expansion of Ba'ath party (a Socialist Reformist party), the political alignment 
of Syrian Christians with Syrian nationalists (SSNP) left the group vulnemble. They 
leamt that political alignments are risky strategies for the construction of their ethnic 
identity. Instead, contemporary Syrian Christians try to promote their own version of 
Syrian national identity. 
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Identities fostered by the Regime 
After the collapse of the Syria's unification %Nith Egypt the Ba'ath party seized 
power in a coup in 1963. Political and ideological changes, which occurred before Hafez 
Asad took power, are related to the two facts. Arab unity had lost its dynamism and the 
1967 War against Israel provided opportunities for Ba'athists to entrench themselves in 
the army. Consequently, Ba'ath leaders, who promoted Pan-Arab unity, were gradually 
replaced by the party's army officials. Personal and group rivalries were the most 
conspicuous features until Hafez Asad took over power in 1970 (Roberts, 1987: 82-99). 
The Party had lost its Pan-Arab dynamic and had no definite ideological direction. Asad 
needed to establish an ideology which would strengthen his power and integrate Syrian 
society. 
One of the strategies which Asad promoted was to advocate Arab nationalism 
through Syria's struggle with Israel. The government currently celebrates Asad's 
political 'victory' in the October War in 1973 with Israel. In fact, the October war was a 
military defeat for the Arab side, since Israel attacked sites vital to the Syrian economy, 
such as oil refineries, airports, electric power stations and military bases (Rondot, 1985: 
126-28). The economic loss to Syria, as well as damage to its political pride, was 
enormous. Syria lost its most important allies, when Egypt embarked on a separate 
cease-fire with Israel and accepted the mediation of the United States. Other Arab allies 
were also uncertain as to the correct response. Following the 1973 war, relations with 
Iraq had deteriorated, Saudi Arabia was uncommitted, and Jordan came to depend for its 
security on Western powers for maintaining a balance of power between the Arabs and 
Israel (Seale, 1988: 267,462). As a part of his internal and diplomatic survival 
strategies, Asad fostered an image of a stubborn Arab leader and the only effective 
challenger to Israel (ibid.: 267-276). Paradoxically, in spite of the military setbacks (and 
through them), Asad's regime sought legitimacy through Syria's struggle with Israel, 
Portraying Syria as the vanguard of Arab nationalism (Hinnebusch, 1995: 220). 
The anniversary of the Sixth of October, therefore, celebrates Asad's leadership 
in promoting Arab nationalism. Pupils, teachers and public sectors employees are 
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obliged to attend parades commemorating the 'victory' over Israel. They wave flags of 
Syria and the Ba'ath party, portraits of Asad, maps of Arab countries, and banners with 
such slogans as 'Hafez Asad, The Leader of the Arabs', symbols representing the unity 
of Syrian Arabs under the ideology of Arab nationalism. This commemoration has been 
enacted over two decades and is, therefore, a cyclical event creating the opportunity for 
people from all over Syria to confirm Syria's role in the Arab community, and enhance 
their solidarity as Syrian Arabs. 
Another strategy for enhancing Syrian Arab identity is to emphasise Arab 
Islamic traditions shared by Syrians. However, the present Ba'athist regime emphasises 
its secular identity, which is close to earlier view of a Ba'athists' leader, Michel Aflaq, 
who maintained that Islam is a culture for Arabs rather than afaith. Islam is revealed in 
the Qur-5n, which is written in Arabic and, therefore, embodies Arab values. Islam is 
used as the sublime expression of secular Arab nationalism (Seale, 1988: 30-1). 
However, the use of Islam as a political tool is a recent phenomenon. It dates from the 
late 1970s to the 1980s when some Sunni merchants and the Muslim Brotherhood 
expressed active opposition to the government. They were defeated in Hama in 1982. In 
the 1970s the government nationalised large section of the economy which came under 
the control of the Ba'ath party. Asad's group, Alawis, have heavily infiltrated the party 
from where they can obtain special privileges in tendering for public service contracts. 
This created tensions between the Alawis and Sunni merchants who had long dominated 
commerce (Roberts, 1987: 111). Hama became a 'showpiece' of massive state 
repression and was intended to be interpreted that way. The dynamics of opposition in 
Syria during the 1980s are complex, but it was clear that increasing economic 
dissatisfaction with the regime's inability to provide for the people in the face of a failed 
nationalisation policy was partly fluelled, sustained and rationalised by religious beliefs. 
The government tried to conceal economic dissatisfaction by rationalising its heavy 
handed oppression (the town of Hama was flattened) as a suppression of dangerous 
religious dissidents. Even though at the moment there is no particular Islamist movement 
inside Syria, they may cause problems in the future (cf. Hinnebusch, 1993: 185-187; 
Lobmeyer, 1994: 84-86; Perthes, 1995: 136-7). Since Islamists are afraid of brutal 
repression by the regime and their opposition activities have become rare, the regime is 
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able to use religion as its political tool to promote the unity of Muslims. Since the early 
1990s, the regime has encouraged the development of businesses in the private sector, 
which is the base of the economy prescribed by the Quran, and has protected private 
in%, estors, including suq traders on which urban Islam has its political base. Islamic 
feasts and the construction and renovation of Sunni mosques (for example the 
reno%, ation project of the Umayyad Mosque) are conducted under the patronage of the 
President Asad, as part of his policy of countering the Muslim Brotherhood and reducing 
the potential threat of the Sunni Muslims toward Alawis. 
The regime attempts to create ideological links between Arab nationalism and 
Islam. Syrian mass media and intellectuals, who support the government propaganda, 
regard Arab nationalism as an idea developed in Arab Islamic culture. For example, a 
newspaper article introducing discussions on the conference on the subject; 'the notion 
of the Arab at the end of the twentieth century', which was held at the University of 
Damascus on 4 April 1998, emphasised the connection between Islam and nationalism. 
The discussion at the conference hinged on the notion that Western nationalism was 
introduced by [Ottoman] middle class intellectuals. However, some Arabs mentioned 
that this notion was already present in Islamic ideology and that it had been developed 
among both the Arabs and the West; whereas Marxism and Imperialism, whose origin 
was in the West, had already lost their validity in most countries. The aim of the Arabs is 
to reconsider Islam in the light of new Arab nationalism (Tishreen, 4 April 1998). This 
article does not explain how they found the idea of nationalism in Islam. However, it 
suggests that although nationalism is a secular idea, which developed in both Western 
and the Arab worlds, nationalism for Arabs has been and should be nurtured within Arab 
Islamic culture. The ideology of Arab nationalism in contemporary Syria found its 
ideological base in the society where Arab Islamic culture has nurtured. 
The regime tries to describe similar characteristics which are found in both 
current reform movements, i. e. the Tishreen Corrective Movement (al-baraka al- 
tishrfnlya) promoted by the President Asad, and the reformation movement of Islam led 
by the Prophet Muhammad. The government presents through its media, in a rhetorical 
mode, the similarity between the President Asad's reform movement and the political 
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and economic leadership of the prophet Muhammad at the 'Gazswat al-Badr, the fight 
of Badr (Tishreen, 25/111998). Religious sheikhs emphasise the character of the Prophet 
as an able political and economic leader by looking at the effect of 'Gazwat al-Badr on 
the ancient Arabian economy (e. g. a Syrian TV programme 16/1/98,13: 45). 
Governmental propaganda and the religious authorities construct the nationalists' 
subjective version of 'Gazwat al-Badr and use it as a symbol of Asad's Corrective 
Movement (cf, Eickelman, 1996: 29; Fox, 1993: 8; Handier, 1990: 29). 
The regime attempts to find similarities between Asad's economic difficulties 
and political isolation at the time of the October War and the aftermath and those of the 
Prophet Muhammad at the time of the fight of Badr. When the religious movement of 
the Prophet Muhammad had reached a deadlock and he had little hope of increasing his 
followers in Mecca, he became isolated and emigrated to Madina. (Hýira). Due to his 
outstanding ability as a political leader, he controlled a major commercial route by 
intercepting caravans of Meccans at Badr, in the month of the Ram4dn 624, and won the 
first and decisive military victory for integrating Arabs (Rahman, 1966: 18-22; Hitti, 
1964: 116-118). Similar to the Prophet's effective leadership, the stand taken by Asad 
since the time of October War, was to pursue victory against Israel (despite Syria's 
isolation) and to encourage the unity of the Arabs in the Tishreen Corrective Movementý 
and thus promote Syria as the vanguard of Arab nationalism. The regime tries to 
connect current Arab nationalism and Arab Islamic traditions, both of which are shared 
by Syrian Arabs. 
The regime also attempts to combine Arab nationalism with Syria's territorial 
demands, primarily by cooperation with the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), 
which used to be rivals of the Ba'athists. This makes it ideologically possible for the 
regime to link- its claim on the territorial unity of 'Greater Syria' to Arab Islamic unity. 
For example, the authorities tend to use the commemoration of the October War to 
remind people of Israel's invasion into Arab land and appeal for the return of the 
occupied Golan. The authorities say that the persistent claim of Syria for a return of its 
land and their firm attitude in opposing the Israeli occupation have increased the 
sentiment of Arab solidarity, and have consolidated their faith (al-Kassan, al-Thawra, II 
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October 1998). Here, the regime maintains that Syria's struggle to stress its territorial 
integrity appeals to advocates of Arab Islamic unity. 
The main stance of Asad's policy toward the occupied land was to show how 
Israel threatens the territorial sovereignty of Syria. Asad presented his view at an 
interview on French television. He said that the peace process, launched by the 
American initiative, has supported the principle that peace should be accompanied by a 
return of the occupied land. Netanyahu, however, wants to take away this land and keep 
it in the hands of Israelis. This means that he has tried to substitute peace for an 
agreement of regional security without the return of occupied land; otherwise, he would 
withdraw from the peace process. According to Netanyahu's policy, Israel might invade 
Syria justifying it as a military action to establish regional security. Asad further stated 
that Syria would refuse to accept Netanyahu's justification for his actions, because Syria 
respects the will of 'our' people and UN resolutions (a]-Ba'ath, 16 July, 1998). This 
interview was broadcast many times on Syrian television both in Arabic and English, 
although the real voice of the interviewers and Asad was erased from the programme. 
Asad insisted on a comprehensive peace to restore rights over the territory to 
their original owners. When Asad accuses Israel of having an aggressive and cunning 
policy aimed at obtaining both power and land, he demonstrates his hard-line policy 
against Israel. It encourages Syrian citizens to believe that Israeli conspires to cause 
divisions among them and provides an interpretative framework for people to understand 
new critical situations. For example, during the deterioration of Syria's relation with 
Turkey, the latter accused Syria of backing the PKK in October 1998. People in Aleppo 
and the Jazirah, both of which are close to the Syrian-Turkish border, became worried 
about potential conflict between Syria and Turkey. They claimed, "it is Israel which 
encourages Turkey to make trouble with us". This view of the common people is 
congruent with that of the Syrian government, i. e. that Israel is behind the crisis (News 
talk radio, http: //interactive. cfra-com). Similarly, Syrian Orthodox Christians in al- 
M51kiya believe that the missionary work of the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Brethren 
of Lord in their town is fostered by Israel so as to disturb Syrian Orthodox Christians 
and split up their community. Political paranoia is both a function and a cause of 
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difficult geopolitics and cannot be rejected as 'untrue'. Like religious belief it is a 
Durkheim social fact which has definite social effects. 
A second strategy of combining Syria's territorial integrity with advocates of 
Arab Islamic unity is expressed by the notion of a historical Bilad as-Sham, i. e. Greater 
Syria. The regime attempts to portray the state of historical Syria as a real political 
entity, i. e. Bilad as-Sham. Greater Syria includes large parts of the ancient Arab Islamic 
Empire, Syria and Lebanon, and it is assumed that they formed a geographical, cultural 
and economic integrated area, before the area was carved-up by the colonial powers in 
1920. Thus, Greater Syria has a territorial implication and reality. Asad used the notion 
of a historic Syria to reconstruct the unity of the former classical community in 
contemporary Syria. This classical community, i. e. Bilad as-Sham, is perceived by 
people in Syria as 'real Syria', which does not correspond with the demarcated borders 
of the modem states, but is defined as a community linked by the Arabic language, Arab 
Islamic culture and the territory occupied by them. Such distinctive characteristics of 
Bilad as-Sham are portrayed as a means for confining membership within the 
community and creating the unity of people in this region. Thus, Bilad as-Sham with its 
territorial implication becomes a political entity which defines Syria's origin. In the 
present political situation where the old Bilad as-Sham is divided between present Syria 
and Lebanon, and where Lebanon has been in turmoil, the Syrian government regards 
Syria and Lebanon as one community based on language and culture, which act as 
factors for integrating the two societies. Asad did not draw a line between the unity of 
classical Syria (Bilad as-Sham) and the aspiration towards Arab unity (Seale, 1988: 
349). He did not expand on the territorial implications of Bilad as-Sham, as this raises 
Syria's complicated relations with Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine, which are historically 
regarded as parts of Bilad as-Sham (Pipes, 1990: 190). 
The historical and cultural unity of Syria and Lebanon is evoked to justify 
Syria's intervention into Lebanon. Despite careful avoidance of language suggesting the 
political unity of Syria and Lebanon, people in Syria from different religious and social 
backgrounds understand that Syria's attempt to establish a close relationship with 
Lebanon is on the regime's political agenda. As Asad indicated, Syria has to defend 
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herself against a possible Israeli invasion of Damascus. Syria had experienced such a 
crisis mice, at the time of the October War and in the Lebanese civil war in 1982. Israeli 
annies launched attacks against the Syrian positions in the Lebanese mountains and 
reached a position from which to threaten Damascus (Cobban, 1991: 39,42). As its 
defence strategy, the regime, therefore, uses the notion of a classical community and 
homeland to justi6, its military intervention in Lebanon, the pretext being to protect the 
land and people of Lebanon threatened by Israel. The Arabic transcript of Asad's 
interview on French television clearly stated that 'historically speaking', the Syrians and 
Lebanese, are the same people, who speak the same language, and have experienced the 
same situation. They acknowledge that Lebanon is a separate state (dawla). The 
consensus among the Syrians is that they will intervene in conflicts in Lebanon in order 
to establish good relations between the various sects in Lebanon. Asad stated that he was 
determined to accomplish this task, even though it meant that a large number of his 
soldiers would be hurt and even killed during the operations as well as 'our Lebanese 
brothers' (al-Ba'ath, 16 July 1998). 
Such beliefs in belonging to a wider Bilad as-Sham are promoted by an 
elementary school curriculum, pupils pay visits to families of soldiers who were killed 
during the 1982 Lebanese civil war. These visits provide an occasion for children to 
listen to stories by families of the deceased. The government aims to teach children to 
praise the families of these soldiers who are now martyrs, due to their contribution and 
dedication to the nation, i. e. Bilad as-Sham. Children's individual experiences of 
visiting these families are embedded in the national contexts of commemorating martyrs. 
The President also meets the children of the martyrs, praises the bravery of their fathers 
and wishes these children success on Martyrs' Day on the sixth of June 1998 (al-Ba'ath, 
7 June 1998). Formal educational activities allow each child to share and participate in 
the state's view of martyrs and give expression to the idea of a nation based on the 
classical community, i. e. Bilad as-Sham. 
As Anderson points out such systematic historiographical campaigns deployed 
by the state are a characteristic device for constructing the nation's origin, and for 
legitimising its policy (1983: 200-205). The regime takes on the role of guardian of the 
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past, in which Asad's leadership is assumed to be a centripetal force for emphasising 
Arab Islamic policy and traditions and reuniting the classical community of Bilad as- 
Shant. However, as the regime has fostered Syrian identity based on Arab Islamic 
traditions, this fails to provide Syrian Orthodox Christians with a sufficient base to 
acknowledge their rights in the state. They are thus obliged to construct their own 
version of Syrian national identity. An analysis of nationalism, therefore, requires one to 
examine the relationship between state propaganda and people's collective sentiments, 
which are the core of ethnicity, and on which modem nation states are founded 
(Smith, 1999: 13-15). 
Syriac-Aramaic as Original Unifying Language of Syria 
As the Arabic language is regarded as a cultural marker to promote Syrian Arab 
nationalism, Syrian Christians try to use the history of the Syriac-Aramaic language, as a 
marker of cultural unity of Syria. They believe that they all belonged originally to one 
Syriac-Aramaic language family. Syriac-Aramaic is the symbol of their associations. ' 
Ancient Aramaic was the language spoken in Galilee when Jesus taught there. (Palmer, 
1995: 1). 
Syrian Orthodox clergymen and intellectuals use local and Western theological, 
historical and archaeological sources to try to discover the origin of Syriac-Aramaic and 
to establish a line in its development. It is a process of cultural enactment through which 
they perceive that Syriac is a remnant of the ancient language of Syria and, therefore, it 
is to them, a way of validating its connection to their Syrian origins. Such a history 
argued '%ithin' the context of ethnicity is therefore distinct from the history of 
professional academics (Hobsbawm, 1992: 3). The sources used here were obtained 
from personal interviews with Syrian Orthodox Christians; ordinary conversation with 
them and their Muslim neighbours, and books and arficles written by Syrian Orthodox 
clergymen, laymen and Muslims in Syria. I am therefore presenting here a popular view 
of history. Yet in order to explore indigenous theories of language and ethnic origin, 
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mention must be made of academic discussions. Popular history makes selective use of 
academic sources. 
Syrian Orthodox Christians maintain that their liturgical language, i. e. Syriac, is 
actually an unification and a direct descendant of the original scripts of the region. There 
is a famous chart of alphabetic scripts which Syrian Orthodox Christians use to decorate 
the %%mlls of their offices and houses. It shows a putative development of Semitic 
alphabets (figure 9): 
Form 1. The Cuneiform Scripts 
Form 2. The Phoenician Scripts 
Form 3. The Old Aramaic Scripts 
Forrn 4. The 'Square' (Hebrew) Scripts 
Form 5. The Estrangela Script 
Form 6. The Eastem-Aramaic Scripts 
Form 7. The Westem-Aramaic Scripts 
Figure 9. The Development of Semitic Alphabets: The Syrian Christian Version 
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The message conveyed by this chart is that all of these languages were used in 
'Greater Syria' and there is a direct line of language development From ancient to 
modem Syriac-Aramaic. Cuneiform was used for the Sumerian and the Akkadian 
languages which eventually developed into Form 1, i. e. the Babylonian and the Assyrian 
dialects. 2 Form 2 developed when the Aramean tribes expanded their territory from 
Mesopotamia to the Phoenician border. Form 3, which was Old Aramaic, adopted a 
Phoenician linear alphabet which developed into the Aramaic style. Form 4 %%Ms New 
Hebrew script which Syrian Christians regard as an Aramaic script, al-7urjilpf. Form 5. 
which is still used for writing church scripts, is regarded by Syrian Orthodox Christians 
as the most authentic Syriac-Aramaic scripts as it dates from ancient times. Modern 
Aramaic has developed into Eastern and Western Syriac dialects which are 
contemporary liturgical languages. Form 6 is used among East Syrians, such as 
Nestorians; and Chaldeans. Form 7 is used by West Syrians, i. e. Syrian Orthodox 
Christians. This chart suggests that the ancient Arameans, whom Syrian Orthodox 
Christians believe to be their ancestors, took important roles in the development of tile 
language. 
Syrian Orthodox intellectuals emphasise the changes which took place in the 
Hebrew scripts that are found in the Old Testament. 3 Syrian Orthodox Christians say 
that the first five books of the Old Testament written before the Exile, werc in Old 
Hebrew. The texts which were written after the Israelites' return from the -Exile follow 
the Aramaic tradition. To a certain extent Syrian Orthodox Christians are right. Scholars- 
also agree that Aramaic had an influence on Hebrew writing after the Exile. ' Syrian 
Orthodox Christians say that during their Exile in Babylon Israelites used Aramaic and. 
therefore, after the Return to Palestine, they spoke in Aramaic and started to use 
Aramaic scripts. 
Syrian Orthodox intellectuals insist that the language Jews call New I febrew is 
actually al-Tarjim, i. e. translation (from Aramaic). The New Hcbre%v script is called b) 
Syrian Orthodox Christians as the Syriac 'Square' scripts, which, they say, can be found 
today in writings in the Synagogues. These Aramaic scripts which %verc used during the 
time of the Exile, and so are termed al-Alhuf, the Assyrian (Shahin. 1997119111: 3-6). 
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By claiming that one of the most important Jewish traditions, i. e. Hebrew. traces its 
origin to ancient Aramaic, this makes it possible for Syrian Orthodox Christians to refute 
the Jewish claim that they have a unique cultural tradition which is proof that God 
claimed them to be his 'chosen people'. Syrian Orthodox Christians can thus present 
Hebrew as one of the branches of Aramaic, and claim that Aramean culture had 
influenced Hebrew culture. Some Muslims interpret this as a true origin of Hebrew and 
that it denies the primacy of modem Israelis over their 'promised land'. 
Syrian Orthodox Christians believe that Aramaic, like Arabic today, was a 
written language as well as a spoken language and used to be one of the most important 
uniýýing cultural features of people in the Fertile Crescent. Therefore, ancient Syria had 
extensive communities which were linked by the use of Aramaic. One can observe that 
this argument is similar to government propaganda that Arabic is a centripetal medium 
through which Bilad as-Sham is conceived as a community. Syrian Orthodox Christians 
seek Syria's origin in pre-Islamic Syria. Syriac-Aramaic, i. e. the language of Syrian 
Christians, which has been kept alive until the present day, is used as an argument to 
prove Syria's cultural origin. As retainers of the ancient language of Syria, Syrian 
Orthodox Christians can acquire membership of the present community of Syria. 
However, because of their position in the current Syrian political situation, it is not 
possible for them to openly describe their ancestors as the dominant people in ancient 
Bilad as-Sham. This argument can easily lead to the political idea of Pan-Synanisin 
based on an Aramean cultural unity which is quite different from the prototypical unity 
being promoted by the Syrian government in its interpretation of the past, The chart of 
alphabetic scripts exemplifies Syrian Christian cultural identity and supports their 
argument that they are the descendants of original inhabitants of Syria. 
Descent-Genetic Origins: The Syrian Version of Biblical History 
As Arab Islamic history supplies the key for creating the relationship between 
the leadership of Prophet Muhammad and that of Asad, Syrian Orthodox Christians also 
look for historical proof that God had chosen their ancestors, i. e. ancient Aranicans, to 
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be the original inhabitants of Syria. They refer to the sacred texts of the Old Testament. 
They need this sacred history in order to ensure their right to their land and to 
reconstruct the thread between their past and present on which their identity is based. 
The Biblical history presented here is a reconstruction from the perspective of the Syrian 
Orthodox Christians and is analogous to the way the regime advocates Arab nationalism 
in its relationship to Islam. Therefore, it reflects these Christians' concern to reinforce 
their social position in Syria rather than as a religious and academic investigation into 
Biblical history. My purpose here in examining the Syrian Christian version of Biblical 
history is to identify the symbols of their ethnic identity and investigate their %, ic%v of 
contemporary politics as reflected in their reconstructed history. 
Figure 10. Abraham's Aramean Origin 





A Issac 0 Rebekah 
One discourse widespread among Syrian Orthodox Christians concerns the need 
to identify their place of origin as being that of Abraham. Syrian Christians have lived 
for centuries in the eastern part of Turkey, i. e. Harran in Biblical terminology, and Iraq. 
i. e. Mesopotamia. Abraham who had been in Ur in Mesopotamia, left his homeland and 
kin, and travelled to Harran. Abraham came from the same region that Syrian Christians 
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believe to be their homeland. Therefore, Abraham is regarded by them as their ancestor 
(Genesis 11: 31; 12: 1; 15: 7). The stories of Abraham are cast as history by Syrian 
Christians, but the only information we have about Abraham is found in the Old 
Testament (Magonet, 1992: 23). However, for Syrian Orthodox Christians, the stories 
depict both geographical and genealogical history. 
Syrian Orthodox Christians find evidence to show Abraham's Aramcan origin 
(e. g. Koriah, 1970: 3). Abraham's son Issac married Rebekah, his FBSD (father's 
brother's son' daughter) (Genesis 24: 1-4; 15 27,50,58,62). Issac and Rebekah were 
patrilateral kin (Figure 10). Genesis identifies Rebekah as a member of the tribe of' 
Syrian of Paddan-Arani or Aram-Nahraim, i. e. Arameans who occupied the region of 
Harran (Genesis 26: 20). Syrian Orthodox Christians believe Arameans were one of the 
major people in those days since Genesis mentions a group of Aramearts in order to 
explain Abraham's descent. Syrian Orthodox Christians also mention Abraham's 
descendants as being descendants of Aram, son of Shem who was the ancestor of all the 
Semitic tribes, including the Arabs (Genesis: 10: 22). Thus, Arameans are seen to be 
ancestors of the people in the Fertile Crescent and the original inhabitants of the region, 
Yet, Abraham is also regarded as the father of the Jews. The sacred texts they draw 
upon are the Hebrew/Israelite ones. Syrian Orthodox Christians present their theory of 
their descent and genetic origin as being the same as that of the Jews who were also of 
Aramean origin. However, Syrian Orthodox Christians generate a marker to differentiate 
themselves from the Jews. They maintain that it was the Jews who split from the 
Arameans. Syrian Christians need to link up to Syria, as a place. with the ancient texts, 
which could cast the Jews as enemies of the Arameans. 
The land of Canan which God gave to Abraham and his descendants (Genesis 
12: 7) is the area of today's Palestine, Israel, Lebanon and parts of Syria. I 1i. % 
descendant, Joseph, a grandson of Issac, travelled from there to Egypt. Nloscs' Exodus 
from Egypt and the conquest of Palestine happened in approximately 1200 B. C. 
(Grollenberg, 1988: 105). The return of Jewish tribes from Egypt to Palestine and their 
expansion created territorial disputes between Jews and Arameans. The Jewish tribes 
occupied the land between the Mount Ephraim and Galilee (Aharoni, 1979: 87). 
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Archaeological and historical studies of the Arameans suggest an expansion of Aramcan 
tribes into Palestine. Before the end of the second millennium B. C., Arameans became 
the dominant force in the area and they began establishing kingdoms throughout Syria. 5 
A book about the ancient history of Syria written by a Muslim historian, al-Ashuqar, 
which now circulates among Syrian Orthodox Christians, and whose vicw they support, 
mentions the origin of the ancient Arameans. According to this historian, at the 
beginning of the ninth century B. C., the tribe, i. e. the Akhlarnli, %ýus called the Akhlamil 
Arameans, al-Akhlamil al-A-ramlyffn- 6 He argues that al-Akhtarnii was a tribal 
confederation, and Arameans were one of the tribes in al-Akhlam(i tribal confederation. 
The name Aramean gradually became popular in reference to the tribal confcderation. It 
means that the Arameans surpassed other tribes in the confederation and represented the 
whole tribal group (al-Ashuqar, 1981: 196-7). Many scholars have identified the 
Akhlamii as Arameans or have proposed that the Arameans were at least a part of the 
Akhlainii tribe. The important thing for both Syrian Orthodox Christians and other 
populations in Syria, such as al-Ashuqar, is that the Arameans originally came from the 
land of Syria, and constituted a tribal confederation of Bedouins who were scattered in 
the area of the Euphrates, and gradually expanded their territory. 
Syrian Orthodox Christians describe how ancient Arameans were stubborn 
fighters against the Jews. In the time of David, the most powerful state in southern or 
central Syria was an Aramean kingdom, Aram Zobah. Its king, Hadadezer, fought 
against David (2 Samuel 8: 3-8; Chronicles 18: 3-8). This king organiscd the anti-Jewish 
alliance of small Aramean states. The Arameans had developed a unified coalition 
against the Jews 3,000 years ago (al-Ashuqar, 1981: 198). This indicates a significant 
constant that Syrian-Arameans have been supporting the unity of Syria with an anti- 
Jewish campaign. Syrian Orthodox Christians describe the ancient Ammcans as 
defending Syria against Jewish invasions. They even consider that the Old Testament, 
which was recorded by Jews, exaggerated the victory of King David and Solomon m'cr 
the Arameans (2 Samuel 8: 5). Yet, Syrian Christian intellectuals acknowledge that the 
battles between Arameans and Israelites may have allowed Jews to gain influence o%, cr 
Aramean territory in the western part of Syria. However, Syrian Orthodox Christians 
believe that Syria never submitted to the Jews, because the strategic places, such as the 
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commercial centre, Tadmor (Palmyra), and a centre for military operation, I-lama, %yere 
never controlled by the Jews, and had remained in the hands of Aramcans. They assert 
that the eastern. parts of Syria, the Euphrates region, which is regarded by Syrian 
Orthodox Christians as their homeland, never belonged to the Israelites. As the sacred 
texts cast the Jews as enemies of their ancestors, Syrian Orthodox Christians reconstruct 
the history of Syria portraying it as one of fighting against the Jews. By doing so, they 
support present policy of Syria which presents Asad as a stubborn leader confronting 
Israel. 
In the reign of Solomon, Israelite political power reached its peak, but declined 
later in his reign. Conversely, by the middle of the ninth century B. C., the Aranican 
kingdoms became powerful. 8 Syrian Orthodox Christians believe the influence of die 
ancient Arameans reached as far as the land of Canan, the Lebanese mountains of the 
Phoenician border which separated the Mediterranean coastal region in the south-%kvst, 
and present Jordan and Beqa' valleys. Israel was then no longer a threat to the 
Arameans. As a result, Arameans had influence on the Fertile Crescent, from 
Mesopotamia to Canan, which overlaps with the territory of Bilad as-Shant in the 
present political terminology of Syria. Aramaic became the everyday language in the 
Fertile Crescent. 
The strategy of Syrian Orthodox Christians stresses the prominent cultural and 
political influence of the Arameans over Syria. Although the identification of Syrian 
Christians with Arameans is an idea which was introduced at the time of an upsurge of 
nationalism in Syria in the 1930s, the argument has become more refined in the current 
situation. This idea is entertained by ordinary people, even though they arc not able to 
present their history in either a systematic or a chronological %%my. Even intellectuals do 
not present the whole history. They tend to discuss only part of their history in order to 
claim how they are able to trace their origin and traditions back to those of ancient 
Arameans. 
In order to prove that their community has endured in Syria, they ought to be 
concerned with the threads between ancient Ararneans and present Syrian Christians, 
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They are concerned with identifying from where the name of the 'Syrian', til-Suriy, lin, is 
derived. Metropolitan Gregorios Saliba Shamoon suggests that the 'Syrian', al-Suri), Tin, 
is not confined to a group of people whose origin are Aramean and who speak Aramaic, 
but it also means that they are descendants of ancient 'Christians' (Shamoon, 198 1: 
149). The former Syrian Orthodox Patriarch Mor Ignatius Yacoub III suggested a nc%v 
interpretation, which has become the official view of the Syrian Orthodox Church today. 
According to the former Patriarch, the name of the 'Syrian' was derived from Cyrus, the 
King of Persia (559-529 B. C. ) who conquered Babylon (539 B. C. ) and liberated the 
Jews by permitting them to return to Palestine. Later, the Jews who convcried to 
Christianity believed that Christ, 'the liberator of captive mankind', resembled Cyrus. 
their liberator from their Exile. This connection between the two events relates the 
Christians' name to Syria as it is derived from Cyrus. Mor Ignatius Yacoub [if also 
indicates the connection of 'Syrian' with the Christians from a different perspective. In 
the cosmopolitan Syrian capital of Antioch, where Paul and Barnabas started their 
preaching in about 40 A. D., people in Syria became the followers of the Messiah, 
Christos in Greek, which was the official language in those days (Acts 11: 26). These 
followers in Syria came to bear the name Christians and therefore, the term 'Syrians' 
became to be synonymous with Christians in Syria (Yacoub 111,1980a: 6,29; Kcriah, 
1976; 5). 
From wherever the word "Syrian' is derived, the Church authorities maintain that 
threads between the ancient Arameans and present 'Syrian' Christians can be 
substantiated. However, they try not to relate their argument to that of Christians' 
political identity. For example, Metropolitan Isbaq Sak-k-a clarifies this by saying that 
'Syrian' has neither political nor nationalist meanings, but the word specifics Christians 
(Sakka, 1985; 24). In order to examine their usage of the term 'Syrian' Christian, one 
example is presented below, which was produced in an article about 'the identity of 
Jesus Christ' written by a Syrian Orthodox priest. One of his attcmpts was to pro%-c 
Jesus' identity from the viewpoint of ethnicity and origin. When lie discusses the nature 
of Jesus as a human being, he quotes the words of the Patriarch Zakka. 'Jesus is a 
Syrian'. This is confirmed by Luke 2: 1-2 which stated that Joseph took Mary and Jesus 
to Judea for registration at the time of Quirinius, who was the Governor of Syria- Jesus 
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was born of a Jewish family in Syria, and spoke Syriac-Aramaic. He was claimed to be 
a descendant of David and Moses. The latter had proclaimed to God that his Father was 
a 'Syrian' (Deuteronomy 26: 5). As Jesus' origin can be traced back to Moses, he is a 
Syrian. However, David and Moses are also ancestors of Jews. In his divine nature, 
Jesus says, "before Abraham was, I AM' (John 8: 58). The priest denies Jesus' Jewish 
origin and calls to his audience: "Jesus existed before Abraham. So how could he be a 
Jew? " Jesus is seen as a descendant of ancient Arameans and, therefore, ethnically, is 
one of the ancestors of the Syrian Christians (Tarj, n. d.: 2-3). 
Figure 11. The Aramean Land 
I 




The priest carefully avoids connecting Jesus' ethnic identity with a political one 
(qawmlya) and maintains that a religious identity, such as Christian, Muslim and Jew, 
should be separated from a political identity (ibid.: 6). However, by introducing the 
secular identity of Jesus, whom Syrian Orthodox Christians believe to be their ancestor, 
he maintains that a Syrian Christian can be identified as a person who is a descendant of 
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Abraham, which means that the person has an ethnically Syrian-Aramean origin. This 
example suggests that in their discussion the religious identity of 'Syrian' Christians 
cannot be separated from their secular/ethnic identities. 
To recapitulate, Syrian Orthodox Christians consider 'Syrian' Christian identity 
from three different dimensions. First, the 'Syrians' are ancient Arameans and their 
descendants originated in the Fertile Crescent, i. e. the land of Arameans (e. g. Figure 11, 
a map entitled "The Aramean land; the homeland of the Syria[n]s" has compiled by 
Assad Sauma-Assad in 1991). This is a definition of their ethnicity. In this usage, the 
connection between the 'Syrians' and the territory of the ancient Arameans is 
unavoidable. Moreover, they often substitute Syria for the territory of ancient Arameans. 
Second, 'Syrians' are Christians whose origin is in Greater Syria. This means 
that Arabs who used to be Christians and, later, converted to Islam are former 'Syrian' 
Christians. In this sense, 'Syrian' Christians and some local Arabs have a common 
origin. The strategy of the Syrian Orthodox Christians is to maintain that the original 
inhabitants of Syria were 'Syrians', who are ancestors of both indigenous Syrian Arabs 
and Syrian Orthodox Christians. Therefore, Syrian Orthodox Christians share their 
origin with other people whose ancestors were the original inhabitants of Syria. By 
claiming this, the Christians can prevent segregation by contemporary Arabs on ethnic 
grounds. They maintain that people who share a 'Syrian' origin are descendants of 
original inhabitants of Syria and those who do not share the 'Syrian' origin are people 
whose ancestors later immigrated to Syria. This strategy is useful in presenting them as 
a group who play a crucial role in integrating the inhabitants in Syria. Third, 'Syrian' 
denotes religious identity and the word is used in order to denote Christians, Muslims 
and Jews. Their identification of who are 'Syrian' Christians is complicated due to the 
various claims based on the grounds of their origin, ethnicity and religious identity. They 
are able to encompass descendants of ancient Arameans and ancient Christians as 
original inhabitants of Syria. By doing so, they construct a broader sense of Syrian 
national identity. 
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Syrian Orthodox Christians suggest the origin of people in Syria can be identical 
with those of Syrian Orthodox Christians. As they have maintained the cultural 
traditions of pre-Islamic Syria until to this day, they assume a crucial role of promoting a 
national identity based on the unity of ancient community of Syria. Their discussion is 
strongly effected by the government's propaganda concerning shared language and 
culture, whose relationship to religion plays an important part as a unifying force. Syrian 
Orthodox Christians present traditions which had been shared by people in Syria in 
contrast to the regime fostered identities: Syriac-Aramaic v. s. Arabic; Syrian-Aramean 
history v. s. Arab history; Christianity v. s. Islam. In the Syrian Orthodox Christians' 
attempt at presenting an alternative Syrian national identity, they integrate various 
groups in Syrian under the name of 'Syrians'. However, there is a problem. Do Syrian 
Orthodox Christians regard other Oriental and Orthodox Christians in Syria as 
descendants of original inhabitants of Syria? They claim that all these Christians are 
descendants of ancient Christians in Syria. However, all these Christians do not share 
Aramaic origin. People who are originally either Armenian or Greek Orthodox 
Christians do not think that they share the same ethnic origin with Syrian Orthodox 
Christians. In order to construct a shared identity with other Christians in Syria, a 
Byzantine Christian identity may be required consideration as the Middle Eastern 
Council of Churches promotes the unity of these Christians (Chapter 6). Syrianism 
presented by Syrian Orthodox Christians has the potential to cultivate Syrian 
identity/identities among different groups in Syria. 
Conclusion 
In the government fostered identity of Syrian Arabs, Arab Islamic traditions and 
history play significant parts in imaging a classical community of Bilad as-sham, which 
used to be a territorial entity. These cultural markers hinder Syrian Orthodox Christians 
from constructing their identity within this framework. They require alternative 
discourses for anchoring their own group's history to that of Syria's, so as to place 
themselves in Pan-Syrian culture. Syrian Christians advocate their own version of Syrian 
national identity. They make two claims: 1. ) that their liturgical language, i. e. Syriac- 
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Aramaic, is the direct descendant of the original unifýýing scripts of Syria and was the 
'lingua franca' of Syria in the pre-Islamic period, and 2. ) that Syrian-Arameans were in 
this region, i. e. Bilad as-Sham, before the Arabs, and that the sacred texts prove their 
political influence in the region as well as their descent and genetic origin. They claim 
that descendants of the original inhabitants in the region share the history and cultural 
traditions of Syrian-Arameans. 
They maintain that the ancient Jews were themselves Arameans. If so, this makes 
them 'kin' to the Israelites and so could exclude them on political grounds ftorn the 
mainstrewn of contemporary Arab nationalism. Therefore, Syrian Orthodox Christians 
have decided to cast themselves as 'enemies' of Jews, as defined by their ancient texts, 
and link up with Syria as their place of origin. This could, of course, cast Syria as being 
the 'enemy' of Jews since the ancient times. In this sense, Syrian Orthodox Christians 
side with Asad's regime in its alienation of the Jews. Syrian Orthodox Christians support 
the regime's anti-Israeli campaign by constructing a different discourse for unifying 
Syrians against Israel. It is possible to say that the national identity advocated by Syrian 
Orthodox Christians is based on secular Syrianism, even though they use the sacred texts 
for reference. 
In order to maintain their version of Syrianism, Syrian Orthodox Christians have 
to prove that the culture of pre-Islamic Syria, i. e. that of ancient Syrian-Arameans, until 
to this day, constitutes part of contemporary Syrian culture. In order to prove it, many 
Syrian Orthodox Christians are interested in tracing the origin of words which are used 
in both written and spoken Arabic. They insist that Syriac words, idioms and names of 
places which are now retained in Arab culture are the proof that the local 'Syrians' had a 
great influence on the Arabs and contributed to the development of Syria. One example 
is Dimashuq (Damascus), in Arabic which is derived from Dem Shoq, in Syriac, 'drink 
blood'. The late Patriarch Mor Ignatius Yacoub III said that Syriac words and 
expressions are found in both literary and colloquial Arabic. He said that even famous 
Arab writers use Syriac words in their writing. Some Arabic idioms presented by Arab 
writers, who have a good command of Arabic, are grammatically incorrect, but are 
influenced by Syriac. This proves that these idioms have been used before the time when 
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Arabic was introduced into Syria (Yacoub 111,1980b: 55-6). 
Although the political authorities, as well as moderate and intellectual Muslims, 
maintain that Syrian-Arab culture has developed its distinctive characteristics in the 
process of the local culture of Syria meeting up with the Arab-Islamic culture from the 
Gulf, Syrian Orthodox Christians do not accept such a view. The amalgamation of these 
two cultures means that Syrian-Aramean culture had an influence in the past, and its 
present existence and influence on present Syrian culture are ignored. These Christians 
maintain that the importance of present Syriac-Aramaic culture in Syrian society must 
be recognised, if a broader sense of Syrian national identity is accepted and, 
consequently, the political rights of Syrian Orthodox Christians are to be acknowledged. 
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Chapter 7. Notes 
' At the early stage of their ethnic movements, Syrian Orthodox Christians regarded Syriac as a symbol of 
the historical continuity of their group and, therefore, an important marker for unifying them as an ethnic 
group. However, they had not at that time identified Syriac with Aramaic (Shahin, 1997[1911]: 1-4). In 
the current political context, it has become very important for Syrian Orthodox Christians to trace the 
threads between Symic and ancient Aramaic, in order to trace their origin back to pre-Christian period. 
2 One cuneiform script was used to write more than one language, and a language was written in more 
than one script (Mitchell, 1988: 13). 
3 Texts for the Old Testaments came into existence only in the fifth century B. C., the period of before and 
after the Jewish Exile (Grollenberg, 1988: 83). 
4 For example, Hebrew documents from Qumran were dated between the first centuries B. C. and A. D. 
contain two types, i. e. a formal hand stemming from the Aramaic in the Persian Empire of the forth 
century B. C., and a series influenced by the Aramaic vulgar scripts of the third century B. C. (Cross, 1961'. 
135). 
' The first reference to 'people of Aram', which appears in a Near Eastern text, is in one of the 
topographical lists on a statue base that form the funerary temple of Amenpolis III at Thebes (Pitard, 
1987: 82). 
6 The name of the tribe, al-Akhlamij, appears in Assyrian documents. According to an Assyrian text, this 
tribal confederation occupied the territory near the Euphrates, i. e. northern part of Syria, in the fourteenth 
century B. C. and fought against Assyrains between 1325 and 1311 B. C. The al-Akhlamn had expanded 
their territory and reached the northern Tigris in the twelfth century B. C. which abutted on Assyria 
(Adamthwaite, 1996: 93,94,96). 
' The state of the Damascus Arameans was called 'Aram' by its inhabitants (Pitard, 1987: 90). Other 
Aramean kingdoms in Syria, such as Hamah, which maintained a considerable strength in the west, Bet- 
Adini in Harran, Bet-Agusi near Aleppo and Bet-Bahiani in Tell Haraf became powerful (Sader, 1987: 
287-289). The king of Damascus, Bir-Hadad L was involved in a boundary war between Israel and Judah 
(I Kings 15: 16-22; Chronicles 16: 1-6) and captured the trade routes to the Mediterranean coastal cities in 
the early ninth century B. C. King Hazal of Damascus (844/42-800 B. C. ) captured most of Israel's 
territory in the east of Jordan at the beginning of the reign of Jehu (841-811 B. C. ) (2 Kings 10: 32-33) and 
had continued his oppression into the reign of the Israelite King Joahaz (814-798 B. C. ) (2 Kings 13: 3,22) 
(Pitard, 1987: 107 109,120). 
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Conclusion 
"Since 1948 almost 200,000 people from my church have been dispersed through the two Americas, Europe and Scandinavia. 
Regardless of their merits and qualifications, they have nearly all started their lives in their new countries as refugees. How can a 
small community scattered in this way maintain its own character, spirituality, tradition, heritage and language, and also hope to 
extend its long history? It is a tragedy not only for my church but also for other churches that have lost members of their 
congregations in the same way. " (Mor Gregorios Yohanna Ibrahim, Archbishop of Aleppo, 2001: 8) 
Christian millets (communities) or fawiff'ifa, in the Ottoman period were 
theoretically protected by the Empire provided they agreed to submit politically. The 
implementation of Ottoman Islamic practices was subject to the vagaries of officialdom 
at a local level. Syrian Orthodox Christians, who emigrated from Tur 'Abdin and 
, kzakh, recall that they had maintained relatively independent status during their time in 
Turkey. For example, at times there were alliances between Syrian Orthodox Christians 
and Kurds and at others hostilities arose. Christian raided Kurds and Kurds raided 
Christians. 'Me separation of Christians from Muslims was institutionalised, in the form 
that Christians had contractual relationships with powerful Muslim leaders, who were 
also agents of the government. Christians in the Ottoman Empire were forced to display 
signs of their subordinate position and had various social restrictions placed on them. 
When oppression accelerated some Christians converted to Islam (Cragg, 1992: 20-1). 
However, the Ottoman political system did not exclude Christians from the Empire. 
An important change occurred after the 1915 Christian massacre, in that 
Christians were deprived of the right to co-exist with their Muslim neighbours. The 
reason behind tWs change in status could be traced to the enmity built up since the 18th 
century when the Ottoman Empire began to decline and, ultimately, the Christians living 
there had achieved protdgd status under the protection of the European powers. As 
European protection was intensified, it gave the Christians hopes of modifying their 
subordinated status. However, as I have discussed in Chapter 6, this foreign protection 
invited Christian suppression in Aleppo by the Islamic government and, consequently, 
the decline of the Christian community due to defection and emigration. In eastern 
provinces, as European pressures and pretensions intensified in the 19 th century, local 
Muslims viewed with suspicion the Syrian Orthodox Christians, who were enjoying 
foreign protection. 
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Apart from physical pressures, in the process of modernisation the introduction 
of the idea of nationalism changed the foundations of traditional Ottoman society. 
Modem education, whose model was imported from Europe in the 19 th century and 
which was different from the traditional Islamic one, contributed to generating a young 
elite who became capable of introducing new forms of political expression during the 
reformative years of the Empire (Erlich, 2000: 48-9). New education was geared 
towards shaping the ideal of nationalism and generated young people who were able to 
participate in activities for challenging the political establishment. The introduction of 
the idea that a nation is composed of people who share culture generated a view that 
Christians who are unable to share Islamic culture are not the subjects of the Empire. 
Thus, Christians in the Empire, including Syrian Orthodox Christians, were excluded 
from the formation of the new state. Conflicts between Syrian Orthodox Christians and 
their Muslim neighbours, i. e. Turks and Kurds, were exacerbated. It is the upheaval 
brought about by the spirit of nationalism that destroyed the traditional tolerance 
between the different religious groups on Turkish land. This culminated in the 1915 
Christian massacre. 
Since the collapse of the traditional Islamic political system and the rise of 
nationalism, cultural pluralism became difficult to sustain. Therefore, even after the 
enforced emigration to Syria, Syrian Orthodox Christians have been anxious about 
emergence of a strong force for Arab nationalism, whose assumption is that Syrian Arab 
nationality is defined in terms of shared Arab Islamic culture in a give territory, i. e. 
'Greater Syria'. Syrian Orthodox Christians needed to be accepted as a group, whose 
rights were acknowledged, in virtue of the cultural attributes which they claimed to 
share with other Syrian citizens. 
When referring to Renan's discussion on 'social memory', Gellner (1987) 
stresses that the concept of shared 'culture' covers obscure internal differences of a 
nation and reveres its ethnic homogeneity. Current nationalism in the Middle East shows 
distinctive characteristics of shared 'culture', which cannot be seen in the model of 
Western Europe. As Islam constitutes an important aspect of the culture of the Middle 
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East, the history of the Islamic movement and that of modem Arab nationalism can 
hardly be separated from each other. Eickelman (1976) and Gilsenan (1990: 192-214) 
discussed the problem that economic and political changes deprived the local 
'middlemen' (who had been prominent in pre-national mode of the communities), from 
their roles as a mediators between men and God, of both spiritual power and authority. 
Consequently, a heavy stress on transcendent scripturalism becomes one of the 
characteristics of current nationalist and Islamic movements. For example, Asad, like 
Nasser in Egypt, who subordinated Islamic institutions and practices in his attempts to 
prove that he was running a secular bureaucratic state, nevertheless used Islam and 
Quranic verses as a resource for official legitimisation of his leadership and promotion 
of Syrian Arab nationalism (cf. Zubaida, 1989: 154). Intellectual inheritance of Arabic 
and Islamic knowledge is important for becoming a political leader in the Middle East 
and for political authenticity to be acknowledged. The authenticity of family cliques, or 
hereditary dynasts, such as those of Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Jordan, is safeguarded, 
genealogically, in terms of their relationship to the Prophet Muhammad and by 
genealogical succession of social and Islamic knowledge by means of lineal face-to-face 
transmission (Shryock, 1997). Noble genealogy, Prophetic authenticity and 
transcendent scripturalism are important cultural elements shared by people in a nation 
and promote their integrity and the idea of ethnic homogeneity of the nation, which 
conceals internal differences existing in the nation. They are adopted not only by 
politicians, but also by local tribes - for example, Shryock's study of Jordanian Bedouins 
(1995) - for constructing their identity in the context of a national identity. 
Syrian Orthodox Christians use these concepts to prove that they share culture 
with other populations in Syria. Similar to political leaders and ordinary Muslim 
population, Syrian Orthodox Christians emphasise their political authenticity in the 
context of modem nationalism. The Christians refer to holy texts and books of their 
ancient Fathers (for example, the Chronicle written by a 120, century cleric, Michael the 
Syrian). Syrian Orthodox Christians maintain that their language has been shared with 
other inhabitants of Syria and their genealogical link to Aram and Sham, who is the 
ancestor of all the Semitic tribes, indicates their shared origin with local Arabs. They try 
to maintain threads between their oral tradition and ancient texts and conceal/forget their 
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recent past in Turkey which may become an obstacle when claiming their Semitic tribal 
origin in Syria. 
In order to claim Syria as their homeland, Syrian Orthodox Christians refer to the 
fact that there had been no political or cultural boundaries between their former 
homeland in Turkey and the area in Syria where they settled after the 1915 massacre. In 
fact, in the 19'h century, population movement from the eastern provinces of Turkey to 
the Syrian Jazirah had started. Syrian Orthodox Christians, who constructed villages on 
the present Syrian side, were not separated from their home community on the present 
Turkish side. Syrian Orthodox Christians in Turkey also emigrated to Aleppo and 
established regular contact Nvith those in Aleppo in order to seek opportunities for their 
textile business. Although the border between Syria and Turkey was settled in 1924, 
both material and human resources had easily crossed over the border until the 1950s. 
Syrian Orthodox Christians in the Jazirah still believe that the political boundary is 
unable to separate Syrian Orthodox Christian villagers on the Turkish side from those in 
Syria. For example, infori-nation and opportunities for emigrating to Europe in the 1980s 
were brought to the Christians in Syria by those in Turkey. Syrian Orthodox Christians 
even believe that due to political tension between Syrian and Turkey and skirmishes 
between them, the actual border has changed its position, slightly, several times. So for 
Syrian Orthodox Christians, the cultural boundary and the political one have not been 
finally settled. The present political boundary prevents them, they believe, from being 
both culturally and politically congruent. They maintain that their forebears were 
residents of 'Greater Syria', which has had a cultural homogeneity with Syriac and 
Aramaic culture, and so now they believe that they have the right to reside in Syria, 
which is part of 'Greater Syria'. 
In 2000, the Syrian Orthodox Church authorities stated officially that the English 
translation of Suriyjn, i. e. "Syrian", which indicates the Church and its community, 
must be replaced by "Syriac". The reason is that the term "Syrian" means not only 
"Syrian" Christians, but also people who live in geographical Syria, whereas the term 
"Syriac" is applicable only to the Church and its people who use Syriac as their liturgical 
language. This statement contradicts with their previous one that Syriac is the language 
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of "Syrian" Christians, but does not indicate the people or their Church. The official 
view suggests that there are changes in the means for emphasising their Syriac tradition 
and the endurance of their community. They did not want to be identified as a religious 
group and so risk religious persecution, but wish to be seen as one of the ethnic group in 
Syria. 
The three communities, which have been discussed here, bear some formal 
resemblance. They talk about the historical continuity of their community across time, 
even though individuals claim little memory of their medium-term past, i. e. their past in 
Turkey. At the same time, they claim links that go back some thousands of years by 
tracing the origin of their liturgical language, Syriac. However, Syriac had literally and 
orally a very restricted circulation in the past and there were changes, also, in their 
every-day languages due to their changes in domicile and attitude to neighbours. Table 3 
summarises the changes of common languages in the three communities. The 
transformation of spoken languages is one of the examples of how they have concealed 
their past in Turkey, in which they shared languages and traditions with their Muslim 
neighbours. Their spoken languages such as Kurdish, Toroyo (a Syriac dialect) and 
Armenian, were not written languages for the Christians. The M51. kiya Christians 
onginally spoke Kurdish. Now they speak Arabic although the older generation appear 
to understand Kurdish. The QabtWiya Christians used to speak both Toroyo and 
Kurdish. Now some older women, who did not receive formal education and had few 
opportunities to have contact with people other than the Christians, speak only Toroyo 
and others speak both Toroyo and Arabic. Kurdish is forgotten by them. Toroyo is a 
dialect of Syriac, but it is not regarded as authentic Syriac owing to its adoption of 
Turkish, Kurdish and Arabic words. The Urfallis in Aleppo originally spoke Turkish and 
Armenian. Now they speak Arabic and most understand Armenian although the young 
appear not to use it. 
Furthermore, the gradual shift from restricted literacy in Turkish, which was the 
Turkey's official language and understood to a limited extent by the older generation, to 
a growing literacy in Arabic among the young have moved the different generations 
apart in formal educational skills. The few individuals who had some restricted literacy 
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in Turkish did not compile any records in that language, because the young were unable 
to read Turkish. For example, some Urfalli elders have meetings to read the Turkish 
version of the Bible written in Armenian alphabets. However, they compose an isolated 
group, as this language skill was not transmitted to the younger generations. Due to the 
changes in both spoken and literary languages, these languages are unable to become a 
means for proving their communities' historical continuity. Therefore, they require 
Syriac, which is the liturgical language of Syrian Christians and whose origin they 
attempt to trace back to ancient Syria, as the ideological foundation onto which they can 
peg their claim to be "Syriac" Christians and as the descendants of 'original' inhabitants 
of Syria. They learn the Syriac language and Syriac hymns assiduously, as they believe 
them to have been traditional for generations, yet their knowledge of what is an 
ecclesiastical, literary and classical language appears relatively rudimentary. 
Table 3. Changes of Common Languages in Syrian Orthodox Christian 
Communities 
Community/ Urfalli Qabt5n! ya M51kiya 
Characteristics (Aleppo) (Jazi 
I 
(Jazirah) 
Origin Urfa Tur'Abdin Azakh 
(in Turkey) 
III 
Common Armenian/ Toroyo (Syriac I Kurdish 
Language Turkish dialect)/ Kurdish 
(before emigration) 
II 
Common Arabic/ Toroyo (Syriac Arabic 
Language Armenian dialectV Arabic 
(present) 
II 
Many Syrian Orthodox Christian peasants left their villages and emigrated to 
towns. Many Christians now become urban inhabitants and try to establish a new 
identity as urban professionals, which appears to be achieved not only by professional 
skills obtained through education, but also by abandoning their traditions. The social 
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differences created in the community due to attitudes towards people in professional and 
non-professional occupations divide the community. I have discussed how Urfallis in 
Aleppo and Qaht5n! ya Christians make light of their traditional marriage customs and 
attempt to adopt wedding ceremonies similar to those of urban professionals in order to 
merge themselves with the urban population. Moreover, they started to allow marriages 
between close relatives, even first cousin marriages, which used to be regarded as taboo. 
Marriage of close relatives reduces the size of their social networks and makes them 
vulnerable to outside pressures. 
Political alignments with opposition forces, which tried to slip from 
governmental control, have done serious damage to Syrian Orthodox Christian 
communities. Their historical experiences are kept alive through memories and are 
sustained through this current uncertainty. Contemporary Christians believe that the 
government's arrests of Syrian Christian intellectuals in 1980 was in retaliation on the 
dissidents who supported an ethno-separatist ideology. Their aim was to establish an 
autonomous territory for Syrian Christians by tracing origins back to the ancient 
Assyrian Empire. This contemporary understanding seems to be different from the anti- 
govenunent movements of the 1980s. Then, professionals protested against the 
economic controls by the government (Perthes, 1994: 54). However, contemporary 
Christians reinterpret this incident in relation to the present situation where many of their 
professionals and intellectuals currently support an ethno-separatist ideology. This 
alarms other Syrian Orthodox Christians who fear that continuous investigations of the 
ethno-separatist movements by the regime's Secret Services might spill over and 
identify all Christians as rebels, meriting swift and brutal repression under the guise of 
religious persecution. Memories of massive state repression thus tend to increase their 
present anxiety. This anxiety has precipitated large scale emigration, referred to in 
Archbishop Ibrahim's statement at the Woodbroke-Mingana Symposium on Arab 
Christians and Islam in Birmingham: "Since 1948 almost 200,000 people from my 
church have been dispersed through the two Americas, Europe and Scandinavia" 
(Ibrahim, 2001: 8). 
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Therefore, the Christians have turned increasingly to a manufactured past so as to 
create a 'safe' ethnic identity. The change in the terminology instigated by the Church 
authorities, which addresses their group as "Syriac", is one such attempt. Syriac/Syrian 
Christians appear to have done four things. First, they have erased memories which 
reveal their refugee origins and their close relationship with their Muslim neighbours. 
Second, they have elaborated a whole recent (oral) past which emphasises unity and 
continuity in faith, which is contested by other evidence (literary and oral). Third, they 
have developed a whole new formal history for themselves based upon the supposed 
transmission of heritage, tradition, and language, as those of the original inhabitants of 
Syria. Fourth, they have developed their own version of Syrian national identity which 
embraces the various ethnic/religious groups in Syria. 
Each Syrian Orthodox Christian community tries to present evidence to prove the 
apparent continuity of their community in the place where they now live in Syria, in 
spite of their refugee origins. The Christians in Qabt5n! ya are attempting to prove the 
continuity of the Orthodox faith in the locality. Memories of their rapport with local 
miracle producing saints who demanded that Christians restore the old village churches, 
make it possible for them to claim that their local saints support their right to maintain 
their land and community in the area. This movement, as well as educational efforts to 
spread Syriac language and Syriac hymns, is symbolic of the community's continuity 
and demonstrates to Christians and outsiders that their community has endured in this 
land which has been their territory at least for hundreds of years. 
The Malkiya Christians maintain that they are the descendants of the survivors of 
the 1915 Turkish siege. This identity, however, defines them as refugees from Turkey. 
So the Christians in al-Milkiya need to claim that their ancestors used to live in this area 
in order to insist that they are the descendants of 'original' inhabitants in this region. 
They recount that the Virgin enabled them to find a ruined fourth century church in al- 
M51kIya and her miracle of oil springing out of the church ground was acknowledged by 
the state. Memories of these incidences gave credence to the Christians' land claims. 
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Urfallis, however, try to establish their rights to residence in a different way. 
While they regard themselves as Aleppienes (inhabitants of Aleppo), and wish to 
conceal their origin as refugees from Turkey, they identify themselves as the 
descendants of people in the ancient Christian kingdom in Edessa (present Urfa), where 
Aramaic was spoken. This affirms to them that the ancestors of present Urfallis had 
resided in geographically Greater Syria. However, this does not support the present-day 
Urfallis' right to be Aleppienes. They did find archaeological evidence that Aleppo was 
the land of ancient Syrian Christians. By constructing their past in such a way, they try 
to aff irm the persistent existence of their community in the area and their right to remain 
in Aleppo. 
This thesis has been an investigation of ethnogenesis of a very specific kind: To 
show how a group has concealed its own short-term history through a type of amnesia 
whilst 'recollecting' long term pasts. It is a classic case of 'the invention of tradition' 
(Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983). Inevitably certain formal cultural differences between 
the Syrian Christians and their Muslim neighbours tend to be emphasised, whilst in 
reality the cultural practices appear to be similar and even becoming more similar (e. g. 
close kin marriages). The problem the Syrian Christians experience is that whilst in 
practice their everyday local culture is not that dissimilar to their Muslim neighbours, 
their religion sets them apart They inevitably turn to 'history' and tradition in the mists 
of time to minimise the differences that religion imposes. 'Tradition', 'heritage' and 
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